Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

200. Editorial Note

In a telephone conversation with Assistant to the President Kissinger at 7:25 p.m. on March 17, 1971, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin reported that “tomorrow I would like to give you in a sealed envelope a new suggestion on a Berlin question.” “You can give it from my Government to the President for the Four Power [talks],” he explained. “You will be in a position to give me a certain kind of reaction before the [quadripartite]meeting on the 25th.” Kissinger suggested that Dobrynin send the envelope to the White House the next day; he would then need time to consider the proposal before he could give an informal response. The two men agreed that they would continue their discussion during dinner at the Soviet Embassy on March 22nd. Kissinger then addressed the conduct of negotiations on Berlin by confidential channel:

“K: The only other question I have, you will not object if I show this to our man in Berlin—Rush?

“D: Very privately?

“K: On a very private basis.

“D: I am afraid even our Ambassador knows nothing of this, no one knows about it, and if he should—

“K: Let me worry about whom I show it to.

“D: I understand how you do it.

“K: You can be certain it will remain in the presidential channel.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone Records, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

After talking to Dobrynin, Kissinger called the President to report that he had “put off the meeting with Dobrynin till Monday, partly at his request because he is coming in with a big request for Berlin and I need time to study it.” (Ibid.)

On March 18, Dobrynin sent Kissinger two documents on Berlin: a handwritten note and the Soviet draft of a four power agreement. Notations on both indicate that they were “received from D 1:00 PM 18 March 71.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 2]) For text of the Soviet draft, see Document 201. The text of the handwritten note reads:

“After our telephone talk yesterday I received instructions to remind you of your information that the President instructed Ambassador Rush to talk with the leaders of political parties of the Federal Republic of Germany with the view to curtail various demonstrative actions in West Berlin so as not to complicate the Four Powers negotiations. Recent events, however, testify rather to the contrary—to the increase of the number of such demonstrations and to their encouragement on the part of the Western Powers.

“You will also recall that you mentioned the intention to instruct Ambassador Rush to conduct confidential exchange of opinion with Ambassador Abrasimov on working out of an ‘appropriate formulation’ concerning ‘serious limitation’ of the Federal Republic’s political activity in West Berlin. Although the Soviet side has agreed to this proposal of the United States, Ambassador Rush has not yet contacted Ambassador Abrasimov on this subject.

“Moscow wouldn’t like to make conclusions from these and some other facts that the channel Ambassador-Dr. Kissinger does not function effectively when matters concern practical steps. But at the same time these facts do attract attention.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 2])

Kissinger then sent the following special channel message to Rush: “Thank you for your message [Document 197]. Dobrynin has just handed me an extremely long document which Abrasimov wants to table at the next Four Power meeting. I will transmit it shortly. I must have your comments Monday [March 22] our time and sooner if possible. I have put off my meeting with Dobrynin until Monday evening. This is to alert you to stand by for a very long message containing a new Soviet proposal and draft agreement.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

In a telephone conversation at 6:12 p.m., Kissinger gave Dobrynin a preliminary response to the Soviet draft agreement.

“D: You received the paper?

“K: Yes, and [I] am analyzing them now. There are some positive elements and some that may present troubles.

“D: We tried what you said to put it as compromise.

“K: I recognized that there were many positive elements.

“D: Even things we didn’t discuss, for instance about presentation. Can I say to them that I will get your reaction, just to give them a time, by Monday?

“K: I will give you some reaction on Monday. Whether it will be the formal one…

“D: No need to be the formal one, just your reaction.

“K: You can tell them you will get my reaction by Monday, but maybe not to every point.

“D: I understand. Then after I think they have a meeting on the 25th.

“K: Right. Are you committed to putting it forward on the 25th?

“D: I think so.”

Dobrynin asked that Kissinger and Rush “please observe strictly the instruction not to speak with our people” and proposed that Rush and Abrasimov “begin some private exchange,” presumably after the Soviets tabled their draft agreement. Dobrynin further maintained that the Soviet draft represented an attempt to be “constructive.”

“K: In reading it quickly I can see points where you were. There are also some points that will not be acceptable.

“D: But this is not worse.

“K: No, it is not worse.

“D: And there are points where this is definitely better.

“K: That is true. This represents a movement.

“D: Okay, Monday evening at 8:00 at my house.”

(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone Records, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

During a meeting with the President at 6:30 p.m. in the Oval Office Kissinger reported that the Soviet draft “on first reading it’s acceptable.”

Kissinger: “But in the two areas that I’ve discussed with him, the federal presence and, it’s a major, there’s some major concessions. He just called ten minutes ago to say he hoped he’d have a response by, a preliminary response from me by Monday; that they’re very anxious to move ahead.”

Nixon: “Hmm.”

Kissinger: “And I said, ‘Well, you know, as you know, there are parts of it that are totally unacceptable.’ He recognized that.”

Nixon: “On Berlin.”

Kissinger: “Yeah, on Berlin.”

Nixon: “Yeah.”

Kissinger: “But he said, ‘But you do know that none of the parts that are unacceptable to you are worse and a lot of the parts are better,’ which is true. I think we should use Berlin just to keep him talking.”

Nixon: “Yeah.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, March 18, 1971, 10:05–11:30 a.m., Oval Office, OVAL 469–13) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

Kissinger then sent another special channel message to Rush:

“My ubiquitous contact Dobrynin called a few minutes ago to say that Moscow was counting on a reply by Monday evening. He stressed that I was the only person in the West to have a copy. When I told him you were being kept informed he urged me to keep you from making any reference to the Soviet Ambassador who allegedly has not seen the draft. Finally, he said that he recognized some provisions remained unacceptable but no formulation was worse than the previous one and some were better.

“The President has asked me to make a preliminary reply to Dobrynin by Monday evening along the lines of my previous cable. It should contain some general reactions together with a few specifics.

“Dobrynin tells me that this is their last shot before the Party Congress, so you will be rid of me for a while.

“Warm regards.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2])

On March 18, Kissinger also received a special channel message from German State Secretary Bahr. The text of the message, as translated from the original German by the editor, reads:

“1) Yesterday Kohl agreed to accept our old proposal to deal with general traffic questions and to defer consideration of transit and Berlin traffic. The GDR recognizes and fully understands that the Federal Government cannot talk about transit and Berlin without the ‘green light’ of the three powers. I hope that this will help the Berlin negotiations.

“2) On the issue of Soviet presence in West Berlin, we agree with everything that you arrange, provided it remains below the level of a general consulate.

“It would be great if that becomes the point through which the access issue can finally be handled.

“Best wishes.” (Ibid., Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [2 of 3])