20. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Secretary’s Bilateral with Brandt
- Transitional Arrangements for Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
-
FRG
- Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister
- Rolf Pauls, FRG Ambassador
- Hans Ruete, Assistant Secretary, FRG Foreign Office
-
U.S.
- The Secretary
- Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary (EUR)
- Alexander C. Johnpoll, Acting Country Director (EUR/GER)
Brandt thought that at the Quadripartite Dinner tonight the Foreign Ministers should take up the proposal that the Soviets be probed on whether they would be interested in helping to stabilize Berlin access, and the situation of communications between the two parts of Germany.2 Brandt said that what he had in mind was that the Three Western Powers should advise the FRG, and the Soviets advise the [Page 59] GDR, that they would like to see the two of them try to work out a more rational arrangement than exists now. The Three Western countries could separately, and without giving the impression of being involved in a coordinated move, suggest in a low key to the Soviets that the Soviets encourage the GDR along these lines.
Brandt said that the purpose would be to see whether the Soviets are more likely than the GDR to be interested in stabilizing the situation around Berlin. Brandt was not too optimistic that it would work, but he thought it worth trying. He added that if something like this could get started, it would help get around the Soviet argument that since the GDR is a sovereign state, the Soviets do not wish to involve themselves in these questions.
Brandt emphasized the importance of preserving the Four Power status of Berlin, and the rights of the occupying powers, in any conversations with the East that might ensue from his proposal.
The Secretary asked what the purpose of such talks with the GDR would be—to what are the talks intended to lead? Is there interference with German access to Berlin now which has to be rectified?
Brandt said that there was no significant interference at present. However, such interference could happen at any time, and steps should be taken now to see whether this kind of interference could be removed. The talks would also be designed to give Berliners a chance to visit relatives on the other side. In addition, while mail and communications between the two parts of Germany work at present after a fashion, there is no organized system for payments, so that mail and communications could be endangered at any time.
The Secretary told Brandt that he sees Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin quite frequently, and would not hesitate at all to raise this matter with him if it is decided that it is a good idea.
Brandt said that his concept was that this should not be a special subject of conversation between ourselves and the Soviets, but that we mention it to the Soviets in the course of conversations with them on a variety of other subjects.
The Secretary reminded Brandt that the Russians had complained to us that President Nixon’s speeches in Berlin had been too strong and had helped prevent a compromise on the Bundesversammlung. The Secretary had replied to the Soviet Ambassador that the President, [Page 60] being in Berlin, certainly had to speak to the Berliners; and the President had not gone beyond well established US positions and views which we continue to hold.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in S on April 15. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. Brandt was in Washington for the biannual meeting of NATO Ministers. The memorandum is part III of V. The other parts are: I, Brandt’s Visit to Canada (ibid., POL 7 GER W); II, Non-Proliferation Treaty (ibid., DEF 18–6); IV, The Budapest Appeal (ibid., DEF 1 EUR); and V, Four Power Talks on the Middle East (ibid., POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR). For a German record of the meeting, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 459–461.↩
- At the traditional quadripartite dinner of Foreign Ministers that evening, Brandt proposed a “transitional arrangement” on Berlin, as detailed in a talking paper circulated to the Bonn Group on April 2. The text of the talking paper is in telegram 4429 from Bonn, April 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38–6) Brandt led off the discussion of Berlin by outlining the conclusions he had drawn from the recent Bundesversammlung crisis: 1) the Soviet Union was impressed by Allied unity; 2) the Soviet Union was more interested in “the broad range of international relations” than merely Berlin itself; and 3) East Germany evidently did not share the Soviet “willingness to compromise.” Brandt, therefore, proposed that the Allies should “see what the Soviets were willing to do on Berlin and other aspects of relations between the two parts of Germany.” In the ensuing debate, Stewart questioned whether the Soviets and their East German allies were prepared for “meaningful talks.” French Foreign Minister Michel Debré maintained that nothing should be done to endanger quadripartite rights in Berlin, arguing: “The time has not yet come when we can expect any reasonable compromise on Berlin.” The Foreign Ministers, however, approved Rogers’ suggestion to submit the proposal to the Bonn Group for “urgent study.” (Telegram 55485 to Bonn, April 11; ibid., POL 38–6) For text of the final communiqué, in which the Ministers supported “concrete measures aimed at improving the situation in Berlin,” see Department of State Bulletin, April 28, 1969, pp. 354–356. For Brandt’s brief account of his initiative, see People and Politics, p. 388, and My Life in Politics, p. 214.↩
- Reference may be to the meeting between Rogers and Dobrynin on March 8. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38. Rogers, who returned from Europe on March 2, also called Dobrynin at 3:40 p.m. on March 6. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.↩