Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

18. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Negotiating Interest on Berlin

Background

In the voluminous exchanges over the past decade Moscow’s proposals for Berlin have featured three central objectives: (1) to change the legal-political status of the Western sectors, (2) to maintain a sharp distinction between West and East Berlin, and (3) to advance the sovereignty of East Germany either by transferring access controls or by substituting Ulbricht’s regime for the USSR as the principal negotiating partner. Accordingly, Western counterproposals, designed to insure the status quo or improve on it have evoked little Soviet interest. More ambitious plans, such as unifying Berlin have been completely rejected and made virtually impossible for the Soviet side by the erection of the wall. Other approaches, such as agreement on “principles” or interim arrangements were kept alive for a time. Generally, however, these were tied to some agreement in principle to change the status of the city after some given period.

As for negotiations limited to the question of access the Soviets in the past have been willing to explore alternatives, but mainly to determine how far the Western powers would go in the direction of granting new authority to East Germany. Thus, whatever new control organs might be created, they would then be responsible to East Germany for the practical details and day to day enforcement of access.

Signs of Soviet Interest

Within this general context, the Soviets have shown some interest in the following features of plans discussed by the West:

a. An all-German commission of some sort with at least some authority for Berlin Affairs, perhaps including settlement of access problems; the commission might be associated with a Four Power group; alternatively a Four Power group might be constituted with German technical advisors.

b. A UN presence of some kind located in West Berlin, with no real authority, or to perform limited tasks, such as investigating complaints of “subversive” activity.

c. Continuing Four Power consultations, at the “deputy” foreign ministers level, with the aim of reaching a new general agreement for Berlin. This would be largely a device for putting off real negotiations.

d. Creation of a new entity to supervise civilian access (the International Access Authority—the four powers in another guise) or an Authority of Neutral powers with or without the UN for the same purpose.

Berlin and the German Question

In view of the limited leverage which they can exert in negotiations limited to Berlin, the Western powers may enjoy a stronger bargaining position if they link Berlin to broader issues. The Soviets have not adamantly opposed such linkages, though they have generally tried to tie Berlin to a German peace treaty, either with the two Germanys or a separate treaty with East Germany à la Khrushchev. The farthest the Soviets have gone in the Western direction of an overall peace plan is the creation of an all-German commission to deal with unification and Berlin issues. Over the past few years this has been pressed pro forma.

Berlin-Bonn Relations

A more lively issue has been the relationship of Berlin to the FRG. The Soviet stand is well known: under none of its various proposals or concepts has the USSR been willing to admit a formal or legal link between Bonn and Berlin. But in numerous private exchanges over the years, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to facilitate the improvement of economic and cultural ties between Bonn and Berlin (this was reiterated in Dobrynin’s remarks to Secretary Rogers on 8 March).² In practice also, while they have frequently protested German activities or waged various harassments in connection with them, the Soviets have lived with a substantial FRG presence in Berlin. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets would go very far with a deal on this issue without some change in Berlin’s status or Bonn’s renunciation of any political rights in Berlin.

Soviet and East German behavior in the recent “crisis,” however, does suggest they are willing to bargain on this general issue. The offer of Easter passes provides some opening for further discussions should Bonn desire to proceed. Some permanent arrangements on Berlin passes could probably be negotiated, but the price would be high. Bonn would have to forego most of its activities in Berlin. Agreement not to hold another Bundesversammlung (the next one isn’t due till 1974) would obviously be insufficient. In any case, now that the issue has been raised, it could provide a means of discovering whether the Soviets or East Germans are interested in enlarging the area of negotiations to include West German access to the city as well as within it.

Berlin and European Security

The Soviets have shown some interest in attaching Berlin to wider issues other than German unification. In general, the Soviets have indicated that “normalization” of the Berlin situation could be one of several measures included in a European security package. The most recent formal position on this is the Declaration of European Communists at Karlovy Vary in 1967,³ which mentions a European treaty renouncing the use of force, guaranteeing peaceful solution of disputes, as well as normalization of relations with the GDR and between the GDR and Berlin. This general line was echoed during the recent ructions, and could indicate that the Soviets are raising Berlin as a means for opening broader issues for negotiation.

Thus, one approach that might prompt some Soviet interest would be to revert to the idea of an agreement, or exploration of “principles” under the rubric of non-aggression, as a follow-on to ratification of the NPT. Though this was overtaken in the 1962 exchanges and not fully examined by the Soviets (Tab A),⁴ it may be what they might have in mind in reviving the Berlin issue. Under this approach no new agreements would be made on Berlin, which would be set aside for “study,” while negotiations proceeded on mutual renunciations of force, including disputes over European borders.

This approach, of course, does nothing to improve Berlin’s access or viability, but it might prevent further eruptions and might forestall what is now reported as long term East German effort to restrict the flow of goods and force East-West German negotiations under favorable circumstances for Ulbricht.

Soviet and US Interests

If the Soviets are actually now interested in taking up the Berlin issue once again, probably they still have the same general objectives as in earlier phases: to exchange some stabilization of access procedures or of the city’s viability for a modification of West Berlin’s juridical or political status and a strengthening of East Germany’s claim to recognition and sovereignty over the land and air corridors. The issue has probably not arisen merely because of the Bundesversammlung, but also because Moscow feels compelled to make a more active defense of its interests in Central and East Europe since the Czech invasion. Thus, the Soviets will want to shore up Ulbricht’s regime and discredit Bonn’s Eastern policy.

At the same time, the Soviets may have a current interest in stabilizing the Berlin situation, or at least beginning negotiations, in order to fend off pressures from Ulbricht for new disruptive actions. While the USSR may agree in principle with Ulbricht’s various harassment schemes, Moscow is also interested in controlling the timing and degree so as not to interfere with larger moves on East-West issues.

In almost any discussions on Berlin, the Western Powers and Bonn suffer from certain negotiating weaknesses. To protect against new encroachments or harassments the US must insist on a rigid respect for existing agreements as the basis for discussion. The Soviets and East Germans, on the other hand, can affect the urgency and atmosphere surrounding talks by applying pressures against West Berlin and the access routes. Moreover, the Soviets can play off Western military access against German civilian access. Finally, since the USSR and East Germany have no positive interest in improving the Western position, any conceivable agreement would almost certainly have to include some concessions tending toward the recognition of East Germany or confirming the special political status of West Berlin.

In short, there has never existed a common basis for negotiations on Berlin, and those few occasions when there was some actual bargaining were limited to peripheral issues, i.e., troop levels, subversive activity, non-stationing of certain weapons, etc. Thus, if Soviet-American contacts are to be resumed on Berlin it would be well to draw out the Soviets first, rather than offering old US negotiating proposals, or fashioning new ones. The safest US position, at least at the outset, is that the current situation, inadequate and imperfect as it may be, is still satisfactory, provided the USSR lives up to its obligations. If the Soviets have changes in mind they will inevitably spell them out, and should be invited to do so. Indeed, it is possible that the USSR intends to move on several fronts simultaneously; they may continue Tsarapkin’s discussions with Brandt on the NPT and a mutual renunciation of force, continue GDR exchanges in Berlin with the Senate, while exploring the US attitude.

American Interests

Without examining all of the details of the various negotiating formulas, American interests may be defined as: (1) the preservation of West Berlin’s viability, and consequently (2) a substantial economic role and corresponding freedom of access for the FRG; (3) the maintenance of US-UK-French presence in the city and their access thereto. Discussions with the Soviets should proceed on the basis of their acceptance of these interests, at least tacitly. Further regulation of Bonn’s political activity in the city could be discussed, provided there is some compensation for Western interests. Within this definition of Western interests, there can also be room for negotiation over the modalities of civilian access. However, just as the ultimate sanctions for the protection of US interests in Berlin are external to the situation there, so the prospects for improving the situation through negotiations with the USSR probably will depend on the inclusion of elements not immediately related to Berlin as such.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Secretariat, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969 [9 of 19]. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the paper. Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to Kissinger on March 11 as an attachment to a memorandum drafted by Hyland. Haig noted on the memorandum: “HAK has seen says fine job.” Kissinger presumably requested the paper after his meeting with Dobrynin on March 3 (see Document 17). As Hyland explains in his memoirs: “One of the early surprises for the Nixon administration had been Soviet interest in talking about Berlin. Dobrynin had said as much to Kissinger in early 1969. This was one of my first assignments on the NSC staff: to assemble some background on the history of the long, tedious negotiations over Berlin that had taken place at various times since 1945.” According to Hyland: “The idea of new talks about Berlin appealed to Kissinger. Berlin was a concrete issue on which progress could be clearly measured. In other words, it did not involve a vague, abstract improvement in atmosphere. And given the long history of Berlin, almost any progress would be a significant signal that superpower relations were improving.” (Hyland, Mortal Rivals, pp. 29–30)
2. A memorandum of the conversation between Rogers and Dobrynin on Berlin is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 38.
3. A conference of European Communist Parties was held in Karlovy Vary April 24–27, 1967. For text of the declaration approved at the conference, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. XVI (1967/1968), p. 22501.
4. Tab A, attached but not printed, is a March 6 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, including an attached set of documents detailing American proposals on Berlin given to the Soviets between 1959 and 1963.