Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

174. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Four Power Meeting on Berlin, February 8; Rush–Abrasimov Dinner, February 7, 1971

The main purpose of the Ambassadorial meeting was to learn the Soviet reaction to our draft treaty which had been handed over at the advisors meeting of February 5.

Judging from Abrasimov’s glittering generalities he probably had no instructions of substance from Moscow. He took refuge in predictable critical remarks—“one sided, poor in content, ignores Soviet positions, etc.”—but he was careful not to reject the draft. According to Ambassador Rush the meeting was one of the “more harmonious” ones, and Abrasimov was affable. As expected, he countered with a proposal to take up the Western draft section by section, and indicated the Soviets would present their own language and proposals.

This strongly implies that as far as general structure is concerned the Soviets are not going to throw the draft away. As the French Ambassador said at the outset of the meeting, the structure of the draft— a four power agreement, an intervening German negotiation, and a final Four Power Act—was the “main contribution” of our draft. Abrasimov responded that the Western draft was a “point of departure” and the schematic three stage agreement could be the basis for ultimate agreement.

Abrasimov gave no real indication of how the Soviets intended to treat the substance. He merely reiterated what we already know is the Soviet position.

The question of Federal German presence obviously remains at the center of Soviet concern. Abrasimov specifically called attention to the failure of our draft to address the issues of prohibition of Bundestag Committee and commission meetings (this of course was in the original draft but subsequently taken out by the FRG).

It is still fairly clear that the Soviets suspect we are trying to undermine and thwart Ostpolitik. For example, Abrasimov noted that the draft treaty was a maximum position put forward for “deliberate tactical purposes.” In his private dinner with Ambassador Rush, Abrasimov was more direct: he asked whether we supported the CDU or Brandt, and whether we really supported Ostpolitik.

Linkage

In their private conversations Abrasimov made another effort to draw us into a bilateral exchange or deal. This time, he proposed a bizarre meeting of Rush, Abrasimov, and Brandt in Hannover, at the home of a Professor Hillenbrecht!! Later he said this was merely an off the cuff suggestion. (Presumably, Abrasimov is duty bound to launch these probes, as he does with all three Western powers.)

Of more importance, Abrasimov and Rush engaged in a byplay on Berlin linkage to other international issues. While Abrasimov rejected any tie in to ratification of the Eastern treaties, he did assert that a Berlin solution would affect the prospects for solution of other outstanding world problems, and he assumed that the Ambassador knew which he had in mind.

Harassments

Rush reports that Abrasimov’s defense of recent harassments of traffic was not accompanied by new warnings. This might be interesting in light of the forthcoming SPD Vorstand meeting on February 15, which the East Germans have already warned Bahr will not go “unanswered.”

Rush tried out on Abrasimov a modus vivendi on harassments and Federal activities. He said that on the one hand, all activities could cease pending agreement, but that this would be unacceptable to Bonn; on the other hand, all activities could proceed, but the Soviets would not agree. Rush’s idea, therefore, was that those activities that had not caused difficulties in the past could continue pending an agreement. Apparently, Abrasimov did not respond.

It will be an interesting signal if, in fact, the harassments are less severe next time, or Abrasimov is authorized to reply.

(Comment: In your conversation with Rush last week at which I was present, you agreed with his idea of talking to the three FRG party leaderships to see if some reduction in their Berlin activities can take place. I assume that Rush knew whereof he spoke in now making his suggestion to Abrasimov.² At the same time, there is no evidence in cable traffic that he informed the Allies (and Germans) in advance of or after making his proposition to Abrasimov. Rush’s own report³ on his comments to Abrasimov does not indicate how he defined “FRG activities as had taken place without difficulty in the past.” The “past” began yesterday and by that standard a whole host of FRG activities would have to stop. The Soviets of course maintain that all FRG political activities have caused “difficulties” for them even if they and the East Germans have not always reacted. In sum, this strikes me as rather slippery semantic ground and potentially quite dangerous if the subject is pursued without intra-allied consultation.

Meanwhile, as you are aware (see my memorandum of February 6, Log 25737),⁴ US officials in Berlin have vigorously denied the accuracy of Bahr’s assertion, following his recent US trip, that we would like the Germans to think about reducing their presence in the context of a four-power agreement. This, however, is unlikely to stop Bahr from making the assertion and from being believed. I would judge that when the Rush initiative eventually gets out and is put alongside Bahr’s assertion, we will be clearly identified as assuming a posture of initiative with respect to the reduction of the German presence in Berlin.)

The Next Round

The Western side proposed the next meeting for February 18, and in agreement with the Soviets, who urged intensification, there will be an advisors session on February 12, and, provisionally, on February 16. This represents an increase in the pace of the talks, and should relieve some of the pressures in Bonn and on us. (It also makes more important some clarification of our fall back positions, if any.)

The whole tenor of the meeting was that we have reached a new stage—a stage of drafting concrete sections of the agreement. The Soviets urged that the advisors come prepared to go through each major section, and when confronted with a major problem, move to the next section, etc.

Conclusions

Good humor, affability, and proposed “secret” meetings aside, it is not possible to tell from this meeting whether we have moved an inch.

The Soviets, of course, recognize that we have given them what Abrasimov described as a maximum position, 80–90 percent in our favor. Considering some of the trepidations we had about advancing such a position in midcourse of the talks, the Soviet reaction has not been very ominous.

Setting the probable intensification of these talks along side of the shift in the Bahr–Kohl talks to inner-German “principles,” one could conclude that the Soviets will keep the option of agreements open for a time. Abrasimov will return to Moscow for the Party Congress, and perhaps by then or shortly after, we will be clearer on the general course of Soviet policy.

We may get one signal next week in any case, when the Five Year Plan supposedly will be completed and the regional Soviet Party Congress begins.

Soviets Deny Souring on Ostpolitik and Brandt (Maybe).

The Soviet Embassy in Bonn meanwhile has denied the authenticity of the interview with a senior Soviet official (actually Vorontsov) which appeared in the Hearst press last week. (See my memorandum of February 5, Log 25734.)⁵ The denial was, however, only partial in denying that an interview “of this kind” had been given by a Soviet official. In point of fact, the Hearst reporter who wrote the original story was later called back to the Soviet Embassy and told that he had overwritten his story. The position in Moscow, according to this second interview, was indeed one of disenchantment with Brandt and the Ostpolitik but had not yet reached the point of “turning the back on it.” The Soviets also again mentioned differences of view in Moscow. Interestingly enough, Die Welt today carries a Stockholm-datelined story attributed to a Soviet diplomat there by name and following closely the points of the Hearst piece. These are the only two items of this kind so far, but there does seem to be a line being put out from Moscow.

At Tab A is the full reporting cable of the Meeting.⁶

At Tab B is the report of Rush’s private dinner with Abrasimov.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Bahr/Rush—Backup. Secret. Sent for information. According to another copy, Hyland drafted the memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 11, Chronological File, 1969–75, 2 Jan.–16 Feb. 1971)
2. Kissinger wrote the following comment in the margin: “Damn it Sonnenfeldt, he had no instructions from me!”
3. Tab B; see footnote 7 below.
4. In his February 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that “Bahr has told CDU leaders that ‘the US Government had encouraged the FRG to weigh the removal of some features of the Federal presence within the context of Four Power talks.’ You will note from the telegram that the CDU leaders, who had just returned from the US, correctly stated the US position as it has hitherto existed, i.e. that within the basic limits of what the allies had approved, it was up to the FRG to take the initiative in changing the Federal presence.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [3 of 3]) In a February 6 note to Kissinger, Haig commented: “Sonnenfeldt has gleaned on this like a leech on a hippo’s belly. He is, of course, convinced that you are the source of the problem and has called to remind us both that whoever encouraged Bahr to weigh removal of some of the features of the Federal presence in Berlin has moved directly contrary to the existing NSDM. Sonnenfeldt also emphasized that he was the source of the CDU’s information in Washington on February 1–3. I think it would be helpful for you to set Hal straight.” (Ibid., Box 60, Bahr/Rush—Backup)
5. Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, February 5. (Ibid., Box 691, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. III) See also Document 181.
6. Attached but not printed; telegram 262 from Berlin, February 8. (Also in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
7. Attached but not printed; telegram 263 from Berlin, February 8. (Also ibid.)