Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

109. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

• NSSM–83, Longer Term Perspective on European Security²

By the time you reach this, the last of a triple header on Monday, August 31, you will have covered all the aspects of troop levels and MBFR, including some of the European politics involved. For the NSSM–83 exercise, therefore, you should use whatever time remains to focus on Berlin and Germany, which is the heart of this paper in any case. The paper is a rather optimistic and sanguine treatment of Ostpolitik, which you will not agree with. Yet it is fairly good in parts and it is the first time the NSC machinery will have been engaged on this subject, and your bureaucratic aim should be to assert a continuing control over the issues.³

There are, however, major substantive problems only touched on in this paper, which, if you have the time and energy on Monday, you should go through.

The first problem is to estimate the prospects for Ostpolitik. The study asserts that Brandt’s aims are compatible with our own, and strongly favors supporting him and doing so more actively. However, there is a basic contradiction between the German view of Ostpolitik, and what the Soviets want out of it. There is at least the possibility of a major crisis when German expectations of a loosening of Soviet domination and restoration of cultural and economic unity are not realized. The question for US policy is whether there is anything we can or should do to forestall such a crisis by making the settlement Brandt is negotiating more durable. And the further question, not really addressed, is what estimate we make of his chances of success and his ability to withstand the internal political pressures from the CDU. (Your talking points⁴ bring out these problems and suggest further analysis, including an assessment of Soviet intentions, which in this study appear to be rather benign.)

The second major problem is that in Berlin we have become saddled with the prime responsibility for the success or failure of Ostpolitik—a negotiating situation not foreseen when we initiated the talks as a low-key probe of Soviet interest in practical improvements at a quiet time. Now a “satisfactory” Berlin solution becomes the key to the web of treaties Brandt intends to complete in short order, including a modus vivendi with East Germany, which will make it a legitimate state, perhaps in the UN, and thus make our position in Berlin anachronistic if not perilous.

The importance of Berlin in this scheme does give us some bargaining power with the Soviets, who presumably want Ostpolitik completed. Thus, one choice is to continue probing for a bargain on the basis of restrictions on Bonn’s political role in Berlin for better guarantees of access. If, however, the enhancement of East Germany is inevitable and we have some bargaining leverage now, why should we not try for a new status for West Berlin only, conceding East Berlin and obtaining a better contract from the Soviets (and GDR).

This is at least worth considering and your talking points explore whether this is an option worth examining.

Finally, we have to pull together our German and Berlin policy in some coherent manner. For example, we can support Brandt but remain aloof (one of the study’s options), hedging against his fall, but in this course we may contribute to his difficulties and political demise.

Or we can give him more active support (which needs to be defined in more detail) but recognizing that we strengthen his domestic position, and elevate the GDR, thus weakening our Berlin position unless we are willing to seek a new, improved basis for remaining in Berlin.

These seem to be the rough choices, in addition to a nonstarter of opposing Brandt and killing the Berlin talks.

What you want out of this meeting is a fleshed-out study of the options as described and suitably modified, with an analysis of Brandt’s domestic position, Soviet motives, and prospects for the Berlin talks, including a possible agreement on a new status.

It is up to you whether you want to hold out the prospect of an NSC meeting, or prefer to ask for a memorandum for the President. But in any case, if you want to have a crack at the analysis and the discussion in any future study, it must be kept in the NSC machinery, not simply remanded to State. For this purpose you may want to suggest a working group with your staff involved, if not in control.

We have done a rather lengthy analytical summary⁵ in order to rearrange the study so that the various sections on Berlin and Germany are put together in one cohesive mass. Your talking points also deal with the general situation in Europe with reference to Berlin and Germany, though the analytical summary covers the entire paper.

The other subjects (a European Conference, MBFR) are not worth discussing in the limited time available. If you do have time you might look at the section on East-West economic relations, which points up the growing economic links between Western Europe and the East, and notes that in this important area we are pathetic observers.

1. Source: National Security Council, SRG Meetings Files, Box 96, Senior Review Group, 8–31–70, European Security. Secret. Sent for information.
2. For background on consideration of Germany under NSSM 83, see Document 49.
3. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: “Was State told that before Rush sees Abrasimov we want to get a crack at the decision?” On September 2 Rush met Abrasimov for lunch at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. For a record of the discussion, see Document 114.
4. Not printed. (National Security Council, SRG Meetings Files, Box 96, Senior Review Group, 8–31–70, European Security)
5. Not printed. (Ibid.)