107. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- German Eastern Policy and Berlin Talks
PARTICIPANTS
- Egon Bahr, State Secretary, FRG Chancellery
- Rolf Pauls, German Ambassador
- Antonius Eitel, Assistant to State Secretary Bahr
- Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for EUR
- William Hyland, National Security Council
- Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr., Acting Director, EUR/GER
Mr. Hillenbrand asked Bahr if his understanding from their earlier conversation2 was correct that the Germans regarded the following three points as necessary in any Berlin agreement: (1) acknowledgment of economic, cultural and legal Bonn-West Berlin ties, (2) an access accord, (3) FRG passports for Berliners (with the last point less important than the others). Mr. Bahr confirmed this understanding.
[Page 295]Mr. Hillenbrand inquired if it would be sufficient for the FRG on the first point that the Russians agree to the formula what is not specifically forbidden is permitted. Mr. Bahr responded that the Germans had used a formula in their negotiations with the Soviets of “respect, not recognize.” There was also the question of method. Talks with three-week intervals between them are not negotiations. Complex problems are being discussed. He has gained the impression that the Soviet Ambassador has a distinct advantage derived from his much greater familiarity with the subject through seven years of experience. A second problem is that the Western consultation process is much more complicated and time-consuming than that of the Soviet Union, even though the latter is obliged to consult the GDR. A lower level working group could discuss specific problems in detail. It is better to concentrate on concrete results for Berlin. Berlin must live and have prospects. The working group should meet one to three times weekly.
Continuing, Mr. Bahr noted that the Russians have also advanced larger and smaller solutions to the Berlin problem. The larger solution seems to offer a new status for Berlin, something which arouses German fears. Mr. Hillenbrand commented that one has to assume this, but it is not clear from the Soviet presentation. Mr. Bahr said that the larger Soviet proposal offered one advantage: a new status for Berlin would presumably give certain Russian guarantees that would safeguard Berlin from the GDR. On the other hand, there were many disadvantages including the loss of the Four Power status in Berlin and recognition of the Wall.
Continuing, Mr. Bahr said that the Germans were suggesting one additional point based upon their own bilateral negotiations. There could be a renunciation of force agreement on West Berlin similar to that of the FRG and the USSR. In the agreement with the Soviet Union the FRG had not said that current borders are pretty, that their origin was just or that they were thereby recognized. It simply said that borders exist and are inviolable. We could seek some Soviet “respect” for the borders of West Berlin that would be binding on the GDR. Our borders would be respected by both sides. This could be part of even a “smaller solution” on Berlin.
Reverting to Mr. Hillenbrand’s question as to whether the Germans could accept a formula where what is not forbidden is permitted, Bahr said that a catalog of points to be forbidden could be made but in this event we must tell the Russians at the beginning what is to be permitted. For example, it would be possible to dispense with the Berlin clause in the future on the understanding that it would be automatically valid unless a treaty should pertain to such subjects as defense, NATO, the Bundeswehr, etc. This could be discussed with the Soviet Union. It would be face saving for the Soviet Union and the GDR.
[Page 296]Mr. Hillenbrand inquired if Bahr had given up his earlier concept of mutual respect for the status quo in West and East Berlin. Bahr responded that he had done so. If it proved necessary in the negotiations, one could come back to this concept but he now preferred to concentrate on practical arrangements. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that this was in line with our thinking. To do otherwise would run the risk of weakening our rights in Berlin.
Bahr commented that Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov always turns the screw tighter. The first step had been the Federal presence. It is a well known Soviet method to turn the screw until one’s adversary cries out. He thought one should cry out in time, making one’s position clear and holding on to it stubbornly. There is only one package: proceed from the status quo and seek improvements, as in SALT. The goal is that Berlin should be made a point not sensitive to disruptions. The package could be the Federal presence in Berlin in exchange for improved access. With regard to the Federal presence in Berlin, he has informed the Russians that the Federal Chancellor is always such, even in Berlin. The Federal President has always signed laws in Berlin—it would be a great concession to stop doing so. He has told the Russians that Berlin is not governed from the Federal Republic, and the Federal Republic will not be governed from Berlin. One can discuss the question of sessions of the Bundestag in Berlin. Despite harassments, the Germans could continue to hold these there; if they gave them up, it would be a concession. However, when dealing with such institutions as administrative courts with 20,000 workers, it becomes an economic question. Such institutions could not be given up.
Referring to a conversation he had had with Falin of the Soviet Foreign Office, Bahr said that Falin had sought to argue that the West have no original rights in Berlin because only the Soviet Union had conquered Berlin. Bahr said that he responded to this argument that the U.S. would have original rights in Thuringia as far as Torgau. Falin had then said that the French have no original rights. He had claimed that all of Berlin is the capital of the Soviet Zone and that West Berlin had been extracted and made into a special zone. Bahr had reminded Falin that if the Russians were to seek to implement their legal view, it would mean war. Falin had commented that the Russians do not want war but the situation is complicated. Bahr commented that Falin is “the one,” i.e., the one who is preparing Abrasimov’s instructions for the Berlin talks.
Mr. Hillenbrand noted that Bahr during their luncheon conversation had said Kosygin would make a suggestion for the Berlin talks but that it would not be altogether satisfactory to the West. He asked what Bahr thought the suggestion might contain.
Bahr responded that the proposal would affect the role of the FRG in Berlin. He commented that we must then be stubborn. During the [Page 297] German-Soviet talks, Gromyko had tried hard to prevent a link between the second and third articles in the draft treaty.
Bahr had admitted to Falin that the link reduced the value of the treaty to the Soviet Union, but he had argued that without it the treaty could not be ratified. His argument had been purely political but this is the kind of argument the Russians understand. Subsequently, Gromyko, while strolling with Scheel at his dacha on the Sunday before the initialing of the treaty, had proposed the link as his own suggestion. Scheel had been clever enough not to react too eagerly and the bargain had been struck.
Mr. Hillenbrand said it was harder for us to say that something affecting the FRG role is politically impossible. Our first problem is to find a tactic to elicit Soviet views without commiting ourselves. Mr. Bahr commented that one must make one’s own position clear to the Soviets, giving political grounds for it.
Mr. Hillenbrand asked Bahr’s impression what would be a realistic schedule for the next round of the Four Power talks. He inquired if there should be a round of these talks before the senior level meeting scheduled for September 18–19 in Bonn. Mr. Bahr said no. Mr. Hillenbrand asked if Bahr thought the Russians would lay their proposals on the table at the next session. Mr. Bahr shrugged his shoulders. Mr. Hillenbrand said that it depended in part on whether the FRG exerted pressure. Mr. Bahr commented that the Russians would not forget what the Germans had told them. Mr. Hillenbrand suggested that the FRG should nonetheless repeat its view. Mr. Bahr commented that in Moscow everyone will be on vacation in August. (In an aside to Ambassador Pauls, Bahr commented that the Russians were “third generation” revolutionaries.)
Mr. Hillenbrand commented that there had been some talk in the Bonn Group of an earlier resumption of the quadripartite talks. Mr. Bahr responded that it must be shown to the Russians that we intend to work intensively, but for that we first need to have the Soviet proposals.
Noting that there were elections scheduled in the FRG in November and Berlin next March, Mr. Hillenbrand inquired what would happen if we reached December without progress. Bahr commented that we would then get together and consult.
Reverting to the question of passports, Bahr suggested hypothetically to Falin that Berlin as a special political unit could sign an agreement with the FRG to represent it similar to the relationship between Liechtenstein and Switzerland. This representation would be valid in Moscow as well as in Paris. Falin had responded that Berliners could go to the U.S. or U.K. Embassy just as well as to that of the FRG. Bahr had said that “we are Germans and have our pride.” They could not [Page 298] allow people to go about unprotected. He had asked Falin if Berliners should bear U.S. passports. Falin had said no. Bahr had suggested that the passports could be issued from the Ministry of the Interior or from some Federal office in Berlin, but they must be a German passport. This would not affect the rights of the Allies in Berlin, since they indisputedly have the power to block such issuance. For example, the Western powers had blocked the application to Berlin of the Federal law on waterways on the grounds that there are no Federal streams in Berlin. Mr. Bahr summed up that it was difficult but the situation was not wholly without prospects. Mr. Hillenbrand agreed that we could at least try.
In response to Mr. Hillenbrand’s question about Soviet motives behind the recent treaty, Mr. Bahr responded that problems of economic growth are very much worrying the Russians. The gap between the East and the West is growing rather than contracting. The Russians know that they can get the economic help they need only from Western Europe, the United States and Japan. He mentioned a project being looked into by Mercedes Benz which is valued at one billion rubles. Mercedes can supply the know-how but it cannot build the factory. The French will do that. The Japanese are constructing a harbor in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, but the Japanese role is limited to that part of the USSR. The reason that the (FRG-Soviet) natural gas negotiations took so long was because it was first necessary to find a political basis from which an economic agreement could flow. Therefore, he saw the Soviet motives behind the recent treaty to be a combination of the following elements: (1) “Bolshevik thinking” about the need to create a political basis for economic cooperation, (2) a need for quiet in Europe, (3) an irrational fear of China and (4) a desire by Brezhnev now that he had consolidated his own position to demonstrate a foreign policy line clearly bearing his own personal imprint at the beginning of the “Brezhnev era.”
Mr. Hillenbrand wondered if an additional Soviet motive was to confuse the West. Mr. Bahr said he doubted the Russians wished to do so. They wanted no disorder in the West. They wanted quiet. However, they also wanted the ideological struggle to continue, an element also required for their relationship toward China. They require clear ideological differences. For example, when Brandt told them that these differences would continue in spite of the signing of the treaty, the Russians agreed with great enthusiasm. As they become outwardly looser in foreign policy, the Soviets insist that ideological differences be stressed for internal purposes. When someone tries to reduce the role of ideology and become outwardly looser at the same time, as did Dubcek in Czechoslovakia, the Russians react.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by Skoug. The meeting was held in Hillenbrand’s office. Eitel also drafted a record of the meeting; see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 1492–1496. Following his meeting with Hillenbrand, Bahr met Secretary of State Rogers. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–USSR; see also Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1969– 1970, Nr. 187, pp. 745–746.↩
- Hillenbrand, Bahr, and others had attended a luncheon meeting at the White House that afternoon; see Document 108.↩