Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

105. Letter From German Chancellor Brandt to President Nixon¹

Bonn, August 14, 1970.

“Dear Mr. President:

I returned yesterday from Moscow from the signing of the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. On this occasion, I had comprehensive discussions with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, A. N. Kosygin, and with the Secretary General of the CPSU, L. Brezhnev. I do not want to miss this opportunity, dear Mr. President, to report to you my first impressions immediately after my return:

I was repeatedly assured by my Soviet counterparts that they did not intend to encumber or complicate the relations of the two parties to the treaty with other countries. One proceeded rather on the assumption that from the treaty a positive effect on the general political situation in Europe and in the world will emanate. One did not intend to play one party off against another. In the past the Soviet Union had achieved positive results also in the field of cooperation with other European countries. The Soviet leadership was united in the desire to avoid unrest which could come about as a result of the conclusion of this treaty. I have gained the impression that the Soviet leadership, in its desire to consolidate its own sphere of influence, is aware that this is tied to a consolidation of Western Europe. Both with Kosygin, as well as in my fourhour conversation with Brezhnev, I strongly emphasized the seriousness of the Berlin problem and the necessity of coming to a satisfactory solution in the Four Power talks. The Soviet side was also informed officially repeatedly that the treaty concluded with them would not enter into force unless a satisfactory settlement on Berlin was reached. Though my Soviet counterparts did not want to make any precise comments on this question, I nevertheless gained the strong impression that the Soviet Government recognizes the connection between ratification of the treaty and a satisfactory settlement on Berlin and will be ready, therefore, to make suggestions for the practical settlement of that problem. Brezhnev’s comments implied that he was not giving up any basic positions, but he did not want to exclude the possibility of arriving at a solution with regard to Berlin, which is acceptable to all sides. Much, however, will depend on our ability to avoid creating the impression that pressure is being applied on the Soviet Union in this matter. In the months ahead the coordination of the Berlin talks among the Western Powers, which so far has been good, will acquire special significance.

The interest of the Soviet Union in alleviating its difficult problem of economic growth through increased economic cooperation with the Western countries became evident in all conversations. Our conversations may have played more than a negligible role in bringing the Soviets to their current willingness to recognize the European Economic Community as a Western reality, and to try to adjust to it. The suggestions made to us in the economic area do not go beyond what other European countries have done in the Soviet Union.

In summary, it is my general impression that the Soviet Union desires a general calming of the international scene in order to be able to proceed on this basis with the realization of its long-term economic plans. The talks we conducted with the Soviet leaders were pursued in a businesslike manner and with great frankness on both sides.

I hope, Mr. President, that we will soon have an opportunity to arrive at the best concerted and coordinated posture possible on the questions regarding the relationships with the Soviet Union. I am convinced that, independent of the different forms of society, new opportunities are developing for East and West to live peacefully side by side and that this development would justify a meeting of Western heads of state or heads of government or, if you would prefer, of the Foreign Ministers. For this reason I would like to come back again today to the suggestion which I made to you on August 8, 1970.² In the same vein I have written today to President Pompidou and Prime Minister Heath.³

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Willy Brandt ”

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 753, Presidential Correspondence File, Germany, Chancellor Willy Brandt, May–Dec 1970. Confidential. The German Embassy delivered the letter to the White House on August 14. The source text is the Department’s Language Services’ translation, which Eliot forwarded to Kissinger on the same day. The original text in German, which the German Embassy delivered on August 27, is ibid. For the nearly identical version from Brandt to Heath, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 1473–1475. See also Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1969–1970, Nr. 184, pp. 737–738.
2. See Document 104.
3. Kissinger and Rogers discussed the summit proposal in a telephone conversation on August 16. Rogers: “I know you’re going to be talking to Bahr, you and Hillenbrand. I had a discussion with the President about the proposed meeting of the Four. I don’t think he has come to any definite conclusions as to whether or not it should be done, but he mentioned the possibility of going to Europe to have it. I think we ought to think that through carefully. I think there’s some advantage in his having them come to him.” Kissinger: “He has only talked vaguely about it to me.” Rogers: “Me too.” Kissinger: “And I wasn’t going to talk to Bahr about it at all. What happened was Bahr called me. I told you immediately when he called. He said he might want to come over. I said we always like to see you but if you come make it through channels. The next thing I know he’s coming and I called Marty immediately as soon as I knew. I have no intention of getting into the Summit Meeting with him. I would talk with him in general terms and say we’ll be in touch with him when the President has replied to the letter.” Rogers: “That would be a good way to handle it. I am uncertain about whether to do it at all. But if we’re going to do it at all it might be a good idea to do it before the elections.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Conversations) In an August 17 memorandum to Eliot, Haig wrote: “In connection with any talks with German State Secretary Bahr or any other Western officials, the President wishes that for the time being we give no indication as to our response to Chancellor Brandt’s proposal for an autumn Western summit. If the matter should arise, we should simply say that we have the proposal, as well as the alternative possibility of a foreign ministers meeting, raised in Brandt’s most recent letter of August 14, under active study.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 282, Agency Files, Dept of State, Vol. VIII)