Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

102. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Backchannel Message from Bahr

Bahr’s message to you, (attached)² prior to his departure for Moscow with Scheel makes the following points:

• —He hopes for results in about two weeks of negotiation.
• —They will make clear to the Soviets there will be no ratification until a satisfactory Berlin settlement is reached.
• —In case a clause reaffirming four power competence for Germany is not included in preamble of treaty (as we have asked for) the German side will notify the Soviets that the treaty cannot disturb the treaty relationship between Bonn and the Western three powers.
• —The Soviet side may not exchange letters on the integrity between the renunciation of force agreement and the goal of German unity (i.e. the Germans will make a unilateral declaration). The Germans will make it clear in the negotiations that the treaty with Moscow will not affect the Federal Republic Western European policies.
• —The voices of the CDU opposition are still vociferous, but they risk isolation in view of the criticism they have received from Christian Democrats in Benelux and Italy for their continuing opposition to Ostpolitik. Barzel, however, has offered a truce while the negotiations are in progress.
• —This (truce) has not hindered, until the last few days, the dissemination of rumors, as happened earlier, which, by referring to alleged conversations or telephone calls with you, claim to have knowledge of the White House’s deep skepticism over the government’s Ostpolitik.

(Note: This is probably reference to Strauss’ call; you are well covered on this by my conversation with Pauls, and notification of State of call from Strauss to you.)³

• —Bahr goes on to say that trusting in his relationship with you he does not attach significance to these allegations. It should remain as before, “whomever has a problem or a question should raise it.”
• —The Chancellor recalls his conversation with you and the President in April concerning a reaffirmation between Bonn and the Three Western Powers (this fall), which would be advantageous in dealing with Moscow.
• —One notes some positive signs in East Berlin of the impact of Bonn’s negotiation in Moscow. The East Germans are backing away from the demand for full international recognition. Ulbricht remains as always: to insure that his line conforms to the turns in Moscow.
• —Bahr asks how busy you will be, since he believes it would be valuable to give you a first hand account of the course and results of the Moscow talks.
• —In passing the message [less than 1 line not declassified], Bahr said he did not expect a reply, unless you had questions. If so, he would have to receive them by Sunday morning.

I think you need not reply, since you would have to involve Jake Beam and so forth. There is nothing you can say without going into substance. When Bahr returns, however, you may want to send him a note on the backchannel asking for his appraisal, especially if you want to put off a visit from him. I think you are well protected on the “rumors” he cites.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
2. Dated July 24; not printed. See also Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 1231–1232.
3. In a telephone conversation with Kissinger on July 15, Strauss reported on the upcoming Scheel visit: “You are expecting a visitor next weekend from Germany. Be careful. The planning is to gain a positive communiqué or statement on your side as far as Berlin is concerned.” Strauss explained that Scheel, in his travels to Paris, London, Washington, and Moscow, was motivated by “German internal policy,” since “he hopes to rescue his party over the 5% limit.” “The second point,” Strauss continued, “is that the Soviets want a marketable credit from our side and in private discussions they expressed quite openly what they have in mind. They want to continue the arms race. They want to continue the strong military armament including the Mediterranean. They need a better situation in the field of consumer goods in the Soviet Union. In order to get out of it continued armament and improve the internal situation, they want a close cooperation with a dynamic industrial power. The intention of our fools is that they are ready to do it. That would mean that we would support the Soviets against you.” Kissinger expressed appreciation for the report and promised to inform “those concerned” within the administration. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 364, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Sonnenfeldt informed Pauls of the call on the same day. (Memorandum for the record by Sonnenfeldt, July 15; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V) Haig also forwarded an accurate summary of the conversation to Eliot on July 15. (Ibid., Box 282, Agency Files, Dept of State, Vol. VIII)
4. On August 4 Kissinger wrote on this memorandum: “Hal—Maybe I should see Bahr when he comes back from Moscow. What do you think?HK.” Kissinger decided not to send a reply to this backchannel message but subsequently agreed to meet Bahr after signature of the Moscow Treaty. Sonnenfeldt thought Bahr should see officials at the Department of State “whatever more private and sensitive matters you and he may want to discuss.” (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, August 10; ibid., Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII) Haig, however, forwarded a message from Fritz Kraemer, who warned that the “reptile Bahr” would “do all in his power to get some endorsement and will probably claim it even if he doesn’t get it.” Kraemer also suggested: “if Bahr is exposed to any State Department people we should probably keep Hal glued to his flank as long as he is here to prevent the inadvertent or advertent issuance of exploitable adjectives from State personnel.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, August 14; ibid., Box 1002, Haig Chronological File, Haig, Alexander M. (General), Staff Memos—7/24/70 to 12/31/70)