Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

10. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 14, 1969, 1205Z.

640. Subject: Delivery of Tripartite Reply on Bundesversammlung. Ref: Moscow 0634.²

1. On being informed Deputy Minister Vinogradov still “absent” from Ministry, I requested appointment with Kornienko (Chief US Section) and delivered to him this morning tripartite reply on Bundesversammlung. Wilson was received by Acting Chief Second European Section V.M. Vasev a half hour later and Seydoux is scheduled to be received by Deputy Minister Firyubin at 1700 hours this afternoon. Any comment to press in Bonn or other capitals should therefore be deferred pending receipt of telegram from French Embassy confirming delivery. At regular weekly backgrounder with US press representatives this afternoon we will refrain from comment on this subject.

2. I left with Kornienko English text of tripartitely agreed reply (State 021914)³ and made additional oral remarks contained para 2D of same telegram. I also gave Kornienko, as locally agreed, a copy of the tripartite statement of February 10 on the new measures of harassment announced by East Germany February 8.

3. Kornienko said that he would convey text of statement and my oral observations to higher authority but wished to make certain preliminary comments. While he noted professed position of US Government that the situation in Berlin should not be aggravated, US support of provocative FRG action was leading precisely to just such an exacerbation of the situation. Nor could he accept “excuse” that previous meetings of Bundesversammlung had been held in Berlin; carrying out an illegal action three times did not make that action legal. West Berlin does not and will not belong to FRG, and US Government has itself agreed that West Berlin is not a part of FRG. How can unprecedented action of holding elections on someone else’s territory be justified? Quadripartite agreements on access pertain exclusively to occupation forces and not to citizens of FRG. Finally, Kornienko said he wished stress that Soviet Government had not wanted to engage in public polemic and exacerbate tensions over Berlin. It had been refusal of FRG, with support of three powers, to abandon its provocatory action which had led to new tensions.

4. I replied that I saw little utility in restating US Government position on Berlin and Bundesversammlung since those positions were well known to him and had been fully set forth in my earlier remarks. I said I nevertheless wished to stress importance US Government attributes to avoiding needless tension over Berlin at time when new US administration has just taken office and when other pressing bilateral and international problems deserve our mutual attention.

5. Kornienko asserted that Soviet Government certainly not interested in creating tensions either in Berlin or elsewhere, “especially now,” but that Soviet Government can hardly ignore fact that “certain circles” are interested in causing tensions. US Government must take cognizance of this fact. At this point he retrieved some documents from a nearby desk and handed me official note from Soviet Government to US Government (text in septel)⁴ to which was appended a copy of Soviet Government statement which Tsarapkin handed Kiesinger February 13 (Bonn 2054).⁵ Covering note makes point that USSR “fully supports” measures being taken by East Germans to prevent “misuse and violation” of established order and regulations pertaining to access to West Berlin.

6. I told Kornienko I would transmit note to US Government but wished inform him in advance that fact of Soviet support for East German measures would be seriously regretted in Washington and could not help but lead to further tensions in Berlin, a situation which all powers should seek to avoid.

7. Comment. It is of course evident that 24-hour delay in according US appointments to deliver tripartite reply was deliberately engineered by Soviets to permit Tsarapkin to deliver Soviet Government statement to Kiesinger. Kornienko was fairly amiable during meeting, and neither his demeanor nor language of covering note would necessarily indicate that serious new moves against FRG (much less against Allied access) are contemplated. I expect see Wilson and Seydoux this evening and will report further if any points of interest arose in their meetings.⁶

Swank

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 28 GER B. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, USNATO, London, Paris, CINCUSAREUR, CINCEUR, and USELMLO. Kissinger forwarded the text of the telegram in a February 15 memorandum to the President. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 2, President’s Daily Briefs, February 15–18, 1969)
2. In telegram 634 from Moscow, February 13, Chargé d’Affaires Swank reported that the Soviet Foreign Ministry declined the initial tripartite request for a meeting, claiming that “neither Vinogradov nor any other official could receive us today.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 28 GER B)
3. Dated February 11. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 646 from Moscow, February 14. (Ibid.)
5. Dated February 14. (Ibid., POL 14 GER W) Also printed in Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1029–1030.
6. In telegram 659 from Moscow, February 15, Swank reported: “It is risky to read too much into Soviet atmospherics, but all of us are agreed for what it is worth that demeanor and behavior of our Soviet interlocutors in these sessions were not such as to suggest an intention to exacerbate this issue into a major crisis over Berlin.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 28 GER B)