60. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, June 16, 1971.
SUBJECT
-
NSC Meeting on Mutual Force
Reductions in Europe (MBFR)
A NSC meeting on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions in Europe is scheduled for 3:30 pm, June 17, 1971.
The issues for discussion are:
- —What substantive position should the United States take on
the basic framework of an MBFR?
We need to resolve such questions as
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the area for reductions,
the size of reductions, whether to reduce “stationed”
forces only (mainly U.S. and
Soviet) or both “indigenous” and “stationed” forces, and the
related verification questions.
- —How should the United States proceed in coming months to
explore and eventually negotiate with the Soviet Union on MBFR? A related question for
consultations with our allies to develop an alliance consensus
on the substance and procedure of negotiations?
The Verification Panel has reviewed the substantive work performed over
the past year and agrees that we are now ready to establish the basic
framework of a U.S. position on MBFR.2
The Substantive U.S.
Position
The principal issues to be resolved involve:
- —The geographic area to serve as a base for reductions. While
we should not rule out wider areas, the principal area for
MBFR is Central Europe. Our
work indicates that either the NATO Guidelines or Rapacki areas3 should be used initially for
consultations.
- —The size of reductions. All symmetrical reductions of ground
forces slightly enhance NATO’s
position before mobilization, and thus reduce the Pact’s
capability to launch a successful attack if they do not have
time to mobilize. However, MBFR
degrades NATO’s relative
position following a short period of mobilization. Thus, the
risk of a Pact attack after a fast, full mobilization may be
somewhat larger after MBFR.
- —The nationality of forces to be
reduced. In the past, we have supported the inclusion
of both stationed and indigenous forces in a reduction program.
However, the reduction of stationed forces would probably be to
NATO’s military advantage
as well as presenting fewer problems of negotiation and
verification than reduction of indigenous forces. On the other
hand, our allies, particularly the FRG, might be unwilling to accept this position
since they want to reduce their forces for domestic
reasons.
- —The verification provisions to be included.
We cannot verify reductions of less than 10 percent in
stationed forces or reductions taken in units of less than
regimental size even in East Germany. The issue is
whether we want to consider reductions which cannot be verified
by national means and, if so, what provisions for on-site
inspection we wish to make.
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In general, the agencies seem to be converging on a
U.S. approach toward MBFR involving fairly substantial (say
20 percent) reduction in the stationed and indigenous ground forces
of the NATO Guidelines Area with
heavier weight given, if possible, to stationed forces.
Nevertheless, there are significant differences among the agencies that
should be discussed at the NSC
meeting.
Operational Issues
We are now approaching our own internal evaluation of MBFR with a sound two-phased approach:
- —First, consideration of the basic framework
of possible MBFR
agreements. This corresponds to the “building block”
stage we went through for SALT.
- —Second, development of a range of specific
options within this basic framework. Based on past
guidance, detailed MBFR options
have now been formulated and are being assessed. They will be
revised on the basis of your decisions on our basic position for
MBFR.
In principle, our approach toward consultations with our NATO allies and eventual negotiations with
the Warsaw Pact should be designed to follow the same general approach
as our internal preparations. This would involve:
- —In
NATO
, an immediate effort this summer to focus on
substantive discussions with our allies to determine the basic
elements to be considered as part of MBFR. With a large infusion of U.S. substantive help, this process
could hopefully lead to an allied consensus on an MBFR framework by late summer. At
the moment, we are light years ahead of our allies.
- —With the Soviets, we should
continuously explore their understanding about what MBFR involves. Neither we nor our
allies should, however, get very deep into substantive
exploration with the Pact until a NATO position has emerged. The problem is how to
hold back on substantive discussions without appearing to be
less than serious about MBFR.
The Conduct of the Meeting
The purpose of the meeting is to discuss:
- —The issues involved in formulating a basic substantive
framework for the U.S. position
on MBFR.
- —The substantive and procedural issues that will arise in
consultation with our allies and negotiations with the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Helms has prepared a brief on
the Soviet proposals and the present comparative force postures of the
Warsaw Pact and NATO.
I am prepared then to present the principal issues and alternatives
involved in the substantive U.S. position
on MBFR.
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Your Red Book Contains
- —Talking points;4
- —A summary of the issues and alternatives.
Attachment5
The President’s Summary
Since Brezhnev’s speech last
month, the prospects for negotiations on mutual force reductions
(MBFR) in Central Europe have
become more serious.
The Diplomatic Background
The Soviets were finally responding to repeated NATO offers to discuss MBFR. The NATO Rome Declaration of May 1970 (joined by all
Alliance members except France) invited “all interested parties” to
join in exploratory talks on MBFR
of stationed and indigenous forces and their weapon systems in the
European Central Region. This position was repeated in December,
1970. The Lisbon (June, 1971) communiqué replied to the Soviets by
stating NATO’s intention “to move
as soon as may be practical to negotiations.” An early meeting of
NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers
to consult on substantive and procedural approaches to MBFR was agreed.
Last week, the Soviets were critical of NATO’s stalling while expressing a readiness to discuss
reductions of both “foreign” and “national” armed forces in Europe
to possibly include a limitation on naval deployments.
The Issues
In preparing to explore and clarify the Soviet position, and prepare
for eventual negotiation, the United States and its NATO Allies now must begin active
consultations to develop a common negotiating framework. The issues
which must be decided at this time are:
- —The substantive position which the United States should
take in the forthcoming consultations with NATO.
- —The operational procedure we and our Allies should follow
in exploratory talks and eventual negotiation with the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.
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A. The Geographic Area of Reductions
MBFR is most clearly related to
NATO and Warsaw Pact armed
forces in Central Europe. This has been acknowledged by both NATO and the Soviet Union. However,
reducing forces in this area might be unappealing to other Allies,
such as Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Greece, Portugal and possibly
Italy:
- —Nevertheless, the Central Region is the main area of confrontation between the ground
forces and tactical air forces of both sides and, if MBFR is to be a serious arms
control measure, it must focus there. This area contains
large numbers of both stationed and indigenous forces—over
one million men on each side, depending on the precise
region specified.
- —In the NATO flank
regions, MBFR would involve
mainly indigenous forces (including Soviet), and could
greatly complicate the problems of negotiating and verifying
an agreement. This is particularly true for U.S. naval forces in the
Mediterranean and their nuclear delivery systems.
Within Central Europe, the choice of an area
depends in part on the type and nationality of forces to be reduced
or limited, and in part on the comprehensiveness of an agreement,
including its verification provisions.
- 1.
-
The first question is the choice of a
specific area for reduction within Central Europe.
The main alternatives are:
- (a)
- For MBFR
involving either stationed forces or stationed and
indigenous forces in Central Europe only, the “Rapacki Plan Area” is the most
advantageous to NATO of the areas which exclude Soviet
territory. The Rapacki Plan Area covers the
two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It
includes all Soviet forces in Europe stationed
beyond Soviet borders except for Soviet troops in
Hungary. It also includes all NATO stationed forces
except 1–2,000 men in Belgium and the
Netherlands.
- (b)
-
There may be pressures within NATO or from the Soviets
for inclusion of some additional NATO territory. The “NATO Guidelines Area,” favored in
some NATO
studies, adds the territory of Belgium, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux). There is a
rough balance of ground forces manpower in this
area (Warsaw Pact 818,000 men; NATO 744,000 men).
For reductions of stationed
forces only, the Guidelines Area produces
military effects similar to the Rapacki Area.
However, for reductions of both
stationed and indigenous forces, the
Guidelines Area is less advantageous to NATO.
(Including portions of France or the United
Kingdom would be highly disadvantageous to NATO without
restrictions on Soviet territory.)
- (c)
-
Limiting reductions to East and
West Germany only would be disadvantageous to
NATO in view of
the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and in
Poland though the stationed forces in the
Germanies are roughly in balance in this area and
our initial offer to reduce stationed forces only
might focus on this area.
- (d)
-
Whereas the two Germanies offer the narrowest
base for reductions, the most comprehensive base
would be the
NATO Guidelines
area plus the European portions of the Soviet
Union itself. If reduced Soviet forces are
simply redeployed to the Western sectors of the
Soviet Union, they could return far more quickly,
and in greater numbers, than U.S. forces redeployed to
the United States. Thus, MBFR in which redeployed
Soviet forces are not disbanded or transferred
beyond easy reinforcing distance (e.g., East of
the Urals) could be relatively disadvantageous to
NATO in terms of
the military balance following a short period of
mobilization. On military grounds, therefore,
it would be desirable for an MBFR agreement to cover
forces inside the Soviet Union itself.
However, the Soviets may be
unwilling to agree to limitations or reductions of
Soviet ground forces in part or all of the Soviet
Union without compensating restrictions on the
territory of France, the United Kingdom and
probably the United States. In addition,
existing national collection means are inadequate
for verification of ground force limitations or
reductions in the Soviet Union. To achieve any
on-site inspection—let alone a system adequate to
detect a rapid Soviet build-up opposite Central
Europe in the early stages of mobilization—could
pose severe negotiating difficulties. For these reasons, limitation and
reduction of Soviet ground forces in the Soviet
Union should only be considered for inclusion in
comprehensive MBFR options, particularly those
entailing very substantial reductions in NATO’s forces. It
might be possible, however, to include USSR territory if U.S. forces withdrawn from
Europe were demobilized, along with the Soviet
forces.
- 2.
-
The next choice is the size of force
reductions to be considered.
For a given geographical area, a range in the size of
reduction could be postulated, such as
- —A freeze of forces at
present levels. While a reasonable first step in an
agreement, a freeze would not satisfy unilateral
pressures by Congress for reduction.
- —A mutual reduction at a minimum
level. Our verification studies indicate that
this should be at least 10%.
- —A mutual reduction of a greater size. Our studies
of mobilization and reinforcement indicate that 30%
may be a dangerous cut unless the Pact mobilization
and reinforcement disadvantage can be overcome
through restrictions on Soviet ground forces with
the USSR or
substantial improvements in the mobilization base of
our Allies. [We have found that the Pact’s advantage
in mobilization and
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reinforcement during the first
month of mobilization is increased in proportion to
the size of the reduction in stationed forces
(U.S., Canadian,
Belgian or Dutch) unless reduced
Pact forces are disbanded and their equipment
destroyed.]6
- —A common ceiling at a given
level, or other asymmetrical reductions in
which the Pact reduces more than NATO. Our studies
indicate this approach is advantageous only when
NATO’s reductions
are minimal (less than 10%) and when the ceiling is
based on active tank forces (which would require a
major restructuring of Soviet forces in Central
Europe).
In sum,
- —No MBFR improves the military situation for
NATO
if the Pact is able to mobilize reduced forces and
reinforce the Center Region. On the
other hand, it is very important to note that most
MBFR agreements
considered do improve NATO’s relative capabilities prior to
reinforcement by either side. This could be an
important advantage in a crisis leading to a sudden
attack by the Pact in which they had not
reinforced.
- —After a 10% MBFR
restricted to the NATO
Guidelines Area, NATO
is 4–6% worse off at M+21 days compared to the present,
in terms of the ratio of opposing forces.
- —After 30% MBFR
restricted to the NATO
Guidelines Area at M+21 NATO is 10–17% worse off.
These figures show adverse trends, but do not tell us whether
NATO will still retain
an initial conventional defense capability after MBFR of 10% or 30%. While we
believe that NATO’s
conventional option would not be lost with small mutual
reductions, we are still working on a precise answer to this
question.
Clearly, at this stage we should consider
large reductions on the order of 30% in connection with
comprehensive agreements which restrict the Soviet
reinforcement capability or compensate NATO in some tangible way
(e.g., unequal tank reductions). Smaller reductions
might be considered with few, if any, restrictions on Soviet
reinforcement.
- 3.
-
The choice of the nationality and type of
forces for reduction.
Military forces in Europe are either “indigenous” to the
country where they are garrisoned, or they are “stationed”
beyond their national borders. In Central Europe, on the
NATO side, the
principal stationed force include Belgian, British,
Canadian, Dutch, French, and U.S. forces in West Germany. On the Warsaw Pact
side, Soviet forces are stationed in East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.
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MBFR could include either
stationed forces only, or both
stationed and indigenous forces. [To reduce indigenous
forces only would be illogical and politically unacceptable
to the United States.]
- —Important qualitative differences aside, it makes
little difference in the resulting force ratios whether
reductions are taken in stationed forces only or in both
stationed and indigenous forces.
- —However, stationed force
redeployments are verifiable by national means,
while verification of indigenous force reductions
may require enhanced on-site inspections in Central
Europe. (A minimum degree of on-site inspection
in East Germany is allowed by the Potsdam agreement.)
Elimination of indigenous force equipment poses a
particularly thorny verification problem.
Thus, the most advantageous form of an
MBFR agreement
would appear to be one limited to or heavily weighted
toward redeployment of stationed forces in Central
Europe though political considerations may dictate that
indigenous forces also be included. In addition, it
would be to
NATO’s advantage
to:
- —Seek reduction of both conventional and nuclear
Pact capabilities in exchange for NATO dual-capable weapon
systems.
- —Reduce only equipment in active units, since
NATO, unlike the
Pact, has substantial war reserves of combat
equipment, such as tanks, in Central Europe.
However, both these approaches involve very complex problems
that need further study.
- 4.
-
Verification and warning.
The immediate issue is whether to consider agreements that
cannot be verified by unilateral U.S. means, and if so, the degree of onsite
inspection we would insist upon, if any. It is generally
agreed that some on-site inspection will be required to
verify that reductions are being carried out. The question
is the degree of verification we will require in the post
reduction phase.
- —We cannot verify the reduction of ground force units
of less than regimental size (3–5,000 men) anywhere in
Central Europe.
- —Outside East Germany we would have difficulty
verifying the reduction of even division size forces
with any reliability unless NATO military attachés and military liaison
personnel were increased in numbers and restrictions on
their movements were cancelled.
- —However, improved technical collection systems may
increase the frequency and detail of our coverage of
Central Europe, enhancing our verification capability,
although we would probably not be able
to detect changes in individual unit strengths and
equipment levels unless these were larger than
10%.
Given these limitations on the
verifiability of either unit or manning reductions at
the 10% level, we have to consider whether or not we are
willing
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to consider reductions of this size.
This problem is particularly significant because our Allies,
at this point, all favor a NATO position that would call for reductions of
this unverifiable size. If MBFR is to be a serious arms control effort, it
must involve reductions that are large enough to be
verifiable even in the initial stage.
Options for Negotiation
Within the foregoing framework, we could
consider a range of options of increasing
comprehensiveness for discussion with our allies and
exploratory talks with the Soviet Union.
- (a)
-
A limited option involving an
immediate 15% reduction of stationed ground and air
forces in Central Europe, with national means of
verification. This could reduce U.S. force levels by 25,000–30,000
men.
- (b)
-
A more comprehensive option
involving both a further 10% reduction of stationed
forces and a 10–20% reduction of indigenous forces. This
agreement should include on-site inspection in Central
Europe, other constraining measures such as restrictions
on the size of maneuvers, and limitations on theater nuclear forces.
- (c)
- Finally, we could propose a
comprehensive option involving deeper cuts in
stationed and indigenous forces or stationed forces
only, provided redeployed Soviet and U.S.
forces were disbanded, their
equipment was destroyed and on-site inspection was
adequate. (Accepting such constraints on U.S. forces in the United
States would not necessarily be disadvantageous.
Meanwhile, proposing the option could help constrain
further congressional pairing of the defense
establishment.)7