Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIX, European Security

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, July 19, 1974, 2103Z.

157032. Subject: CSCE: Basket 3 issues. Geneva for Ambassador Sherer, US CSCE Del.

1. NAC discussions and other reports of Nine views indicate that we confront an uphill effort to reach Allied agreement on minimum satisfactory CSCE results.² Nonetheless, we wish to pursue this exercise, for we believe that only through intra-Allied debate on the issues at play can we begin to bring the Allies to consider the choices they will need to make, especially with regard to Basket 3 and CBM’s. Thus, you should take a strong lead in the work of the NATO caucus in Geneva, pressing for the development of the text of a study which clearly identifies the issues in Basket 3, and that fleshes out in reasonable detail principal Allied objectives in these areas.

2. For the purposes of this exercise, we are prepared generally to accept the Nine paper³ as it relates to Baskets 1 and 2, though we may have editorial changes to suggest. The portion of Basket 1 on CBM’s can be left to be worked out in NATO. (For USNATO: we assume SPC will develop contribution on CBM’s, and you should base your approach on previous guidance, including Madrid 4339.)⁴

3. With regard to Basket 3, your objective should be to stimulate a discussion of each of the texts, including anticipated Eastern attitudes toward each. Based on the discussion, the operative elements of each text should be set out succinctly so that in the ensuing NAC review PermReps will be in a position also to discuss them. Where there are differences in Allied views, bracketed texts should be included, together with an indication of respective national positions, as a further aid to NAC review. Finally, you should strive to elicit a rough order of priority among the texts, looking toward a narrowing of the number to, say, six to eight. While we may not be able to get agreement at this stage to paring the number down, prioritization now would help with this later in NAC discussion.

4. As a contribution to this exercise, we will provide you with suggested drafts on selected issues, drawing on the helpful suggestions in Geneva 4464.⁵ The first of these texts, on working conditions for journalists, is provided below. Others will follow by septels on broadcast information, travel, access to literary works.⁶ As you will note, we have moderated some of the texts to render them more realistic in terms of negotiability with the Soviets.

5. Consistent with the approach outlined above, our drafts, too, will cover what we regard as the key operative passages.

6. We do not intend to provide a text on the family reunification issue because of its sensitivity for the FRG. We also note that an Allied paper on this issue has been largely agreed in the NATO caucus and has been discussed with the Soviets. On the marriage issue, we can support the Norwegian paper as a succinct statement of Allied desiderata. Nor do we plan at this time to provide you with texts on secondary, and probably non-controversial, issues of cultural exchanges and cultural contacts.

7. There follows the text covering working conditions for journalists:

Begin text. That visas and residence permits for journalists and their technical staffs be granted as expeditiously as possible. That steps be taken to grant journalists greater freedom of travel within participating states in pursuit of their professional activities and that the necessary travel permits be granted within a reasonable period of time.

That journalists not be subject to expulsion for normal professional activities.

That steps will be taken to facilitate journalists’ contacts, in pursuit of their professional activities, with officials of the participating states, as well as with private individuals.

That journalists be allowed to carry with them equipment and materials necessary for the exercise of their profession.

That journalists be allowed to transmit, fully and without delay, the materials which are the results of their professional activity. End text.

Ingersoll

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Streator and cleared by Hartman, Lowenstein, Humphrey (EUR/SOV), Small (L), Robert Anderson (S/PRS), Wozniak (USIA), and Fry (S/S). Approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to USNATO, Moscow, and NATO capitals.
2. In telegram 4464 from Geneva, July 13, Sherer sent operative language on key Basket III issues and strongly urged the Department to reconsider its intention to try to reach agreed texts on these points at NATO. He believed that there would be considerable resistance to such an initiative, but that such resistance would be substantially less if the drafting of texts was left to the NATO caucus in Geneva. Sherer stated: “Our allies fear that if we set out our minimum essential requirements in specific drafts, we will be forced to negotiate for less. For this reason, they would prefer objectives to be listed in outline form, as in the EC–9 paper on this subject (Geneva 4443), with flexibility left to negotiators in Geneva to adapt texts as necessary. If we advance in NATO drafts which are clearly aimed toward compromise, allied fears will be reinforced, and their resistance to this project may well be strengthened. It is only after confronting rigid Soviet resistance that our allies will be willing to accept compromise texts.” (Ibid.) Telegram 4443 from Geneva, July 12, is ibid.
3. See footnote 2, Document 236.
4. See footnote 3, Document 236.
5. See footnote 2 above.
6. See footnotes 6–8, Document 236.