215. Editorial Note

In a meeting with Department of State officers and National Security Council staff members on June 21, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed ongoing negotiations with the Soviets in the context of the upcoming summit meeting between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. A memorandum of the conversation of the meeting reads in part:

  • Sonnenfeldt: In CSCE, we will just have to wait until Moscow, where we can be sure that Brezhnev will unload on the President.
  • “Secretary: They say the present text [of the draft U.S.-Soviet communiqué] is less than last year. And you know that CSCE is going to end in a summit.
  • Sonnenfeldt: But we are saying more this year. We are really giving them more than in the past.
  • “Secretary: Then let’s stick for awhile. I wonder what makes them think that in the communiqué they can make us change our well-thought-out positions.”
  • Later, discussion turned to MBFR:
  • Sonnenfeldt: What about MBFR?
  • “Secretary: Dobrynin said they would continue to stick with their present position.
  • Sonnenfeldt: And we should stick to ours. Did you give him any indication we would compromise?
  • “Secretary: No. The President wants it, but any deal in Moscow would get us into a terrible mess with the Allies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet-Summit, 1974)