- A.
-
Security Issues—Principles Guiding
Relations Among States
The Warsaw Pact states will regard an agreed CSCE document on principles as
a major contribution to European security because it will
convey, in their view, a measure of recognition of the
territorial and political status quo in Eastern Europe, and
thus of the permanent division of Germany. To some extent,
Moscow and its Allies will see this text as the functional
equivalent of a World War II peace treaty. Most Western
participants believe, in contrast, that the major value of
such a document would derive from the added inhibitions it
might place upon coercive Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe.
The FRG holds that a CSCE declaration on this
subject should not be seen as confirming the division of
Germany.
US Position. The
text of a CSCE declaration
should make clear that the principles are to be applied
unreservedly by all participants in their relations with all
others and thus be incompatible, on its face, with the
Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty within the “Socialist
commonwealth.” However, the document will enhance only
marginally, if at all, the security of Western participants,
which will continue to rest on the Atlantic Alliance. It is
important, therefore, that Western public opinion avoid the
erroneous conclusion that agreement at CSCE on principles of
relations will permit the Allies to reduce their defense
efforts.
We envisage a declaration of intent, not a legally binding
text. The document thus could not be a surrogate World War
II peace treaty, and the special rights and responsibilities
in Germany of the quadripartite powers would remain
unaffected.
- B.
-
Security Issues—Military Aspects
At issue here is whether the conference should have broad
latitude to address general military security issues,
including MBFR (as some
Allies, most neutrals, and Romania will urge), or whether
there should be no substantive MBFR/CSCE
linkage, with CSCE
negotiations limited to confidence-building measures
(exchanges of observers at maneuvers; advance notification
of maneuvers; and consideration of advance notification of
major troop movements).
[Page 500]
US Position.
MBFR can be most
effectively negotiated by those states whose forces or
territory are directly involved, and CSCE agreement on MBFR principles would only
complicate the already difficult MBFR negotiations.
- C.
-
Cooperation Issues in the Economic,
Scientific/Technological and Environmental Fields
Few contentious issues engaging our interest are likely to
arise at the Ministerial under this rubric. The Warsaw Pact
states, however, will lay propaganda emphasis on
“pan-European” projects, thus implying a marginal North
American role in East-West cooperation in Europe.
US
Position. We intend to participate actively in
East-West cooperation in these fields.
- D.
-
Issues of Human Contacts, Dissemination of
Information, and Cultural and Educational Exchanges
Most Western participants believe that some lowering of the
barriers in this field is essential to enhanced European
security and cooperation. Western European governments,
moreover, feel under public opinion and parliamentary
pressures to use Soviet interest in détente to achieve
progress in this area. The Warsaw Pact states, however, will
resist any implied commitment to significant changes and
will assert the primacy of the state in all aspects of these
matters.
US Position. The
conference should find practical ways to reduce some of the
obstacles to contacts between people and to the freer flow
of information and ideas. Better understanding among peoples
will allay suspicions and make a positive contribution to
European security. However, we do not seek to undermine
existing political and social systems and recognize that
progress in this area can only be gradual.
- E.
-
Issue of Follow-up to the Conference
The Warsaw Pact states and some neutrals will stress the need
to set up a “consultative committee” to continue
multilateral discussions on European security and
cooperation and to prepare for further highlevel
conferences.
US Position. We have
joined our Allies in taking a reserved view of
follow-on-machinery, which we believe in any case should not
have a political or security role.
- F.
-
Organizational and Procedural Issues
- 1.
-
Open or Closed Ministerial Working
Sessions
While the inaugural and closing sessions will be open
to the media, working sessions will be closed unless
Ministers decide otherwise by consensus. While we
would prefer closed sessions in the interest of
efficiency, a large majority of your colleagues have
indicated a preference for open sessions so that
their own statements will be fully reported to
domestic audiences.
[Page 501]
US Position.
We should join the majority in favor of open working
sessions.
- 2.
-
Opening Date of CSCE Stage II
Warsaw Pact states will likely propose opening stage
II in July, as soon as possible after the
Ministerial, and working through the summer to
permit the third and final stage to convene in the
fall. All Western European participants, in
contrast, will prefer to begin stage II in
September.
US Position.
We are flexible on the opening date and are prepared
to support the majority viewpoint.
- 3.
-
Level of Participation at Stage III of CSCE
Although not a matter for decision at the meeting,
Warsaw Pact foreign ministers will undoubtedly urge
that stage III be convened at the highest level.
Most Western participants would prefer to leave the
issue open.
US Position.
The level of participation at stage III should be
decided during stage II.
- 4.
-
The Role of Nonparticipant
States
The Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff may insist—as did the
Maltese representative during the MPT—that representatives
of the Arab states bordering the Mediterranean be
allowed to appear before the conference and to state
their views—despite the likely opposition of all
other participants.
US Position.
We do not wish representatives of nonparticipant
states to appear personally before the meeting, but
would let others take the lead in opposing any such
proposal. We could agree, however, to permitting
interested states to circulate their views in
writing.
- G.
-
Final Communiqué
Most Allies would prefer a short text which does not
address CSCE
substantive issues. The Soviets, however, may prefer
a more pretentious document that tends to prejudge,
indirectly at least, some of the substantive issues
to be dealt with in succeeding stages. (The drafting
mechanisms will likely resemble the communiqué
drafting process at NATO Ministerials.)
US Position.
Ashort non-substantive communiqué, to which would be
attached the MPT
report, is suitable to mark the closing of the
initial stage of a three-stage conference.
