254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Affairs (Goldman) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Energy (Siemer)1
SUBJECT
- DOE Intelligence Requirements
Review of DOE’s requirements for intelligence on foreign energy developments, and the Intelligence Community’s current ability to satisfy these requirements, suggests three kinds of information we do not now get which would be useful objectives of Department of Defense interest. First, we need better information on tanker loadings and movements. Second, detailed intelligence on foreign energy technology programs generally is lacking. Third, more comprehensive nuclear pro[Page 796]liferation intelligence is essential. Additional thoughts on these three needs are outlined below.
The Department of Energy requires additional, more detailed information on the movement of crude oil in world markets. As governments and national oil companies have assumed more responsibility for marketing and shipping, the quality and quantity of overt information available to the US Government has declined. Many oil-producing countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and the Soviet Union, now consider production and export statistics to be “state secrets”, thus forcing DOE market analysts to rely on dated and often incorrect “official numbers” to develop short-term forecasts of supply and price. Moreover, in recent months the amount of crude oil passing through the major international oil companies also has declined, causing additional uncertainty. The DOD, and especially the US Navy, might be in a position to provide independent and timely information on oil tanker loadings, destinations, offloadings, shipping problems, and in-transit transactions.
It is important that the U.S. not be surprised by foreign technological developments in energy or energy-related fields. Community reporting on the political and economic aspects of oil supply and pricing generally is adequate. [8 lines not declassified] DOD assistance in filling this disturbing gap in our energy intelligence capabilities would enable the DOE International Energy Technology Assessment Program to provide more complete and balanced studies in support of DOE policy development and program planning.
The wider use of nuclear technologies to meet national/international energy demands, and the associated spread of various strategic nuclear materials in both spent fuel and separated form will enable an increasing number of countries to make nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The diffusion of this potential for nuclear weapons will impact significantly on the criteria, procedures, and assessments involved in nuclear-related export cases, the implementation and verification of US bilateral technical agreements for nuclear cooperation, and the development of US non-proliferation initiatives. The past limited role of intelligence in providing a periodic watch of impending nuclear weapon capabilities in certain countries is no longer adequate, but this role must be expanded to provide a major input to national security policy development, implementation and verification. DOD’s information on the security concerns motivating nations to develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and these countries’ technological progress toward such capability, would be of particular use to DOE in meeting our various non-proliferation responsibilities.
The DOE intelligence staff continues to work closely with the Intelligence Community in defining and prioritizing collection, analysis [Page 797] and production of energy related intelligence. However, energy intelligence must compete for limited National Foreign Intelligence Program resources with traditional military and political topics and, consequently, does not have sufficiently high priorities to ensure adequate attention. In addition to urging our friends in Defense to re-orient their resources toward the three topics discussed above, I suggest that we solicit their support for DOE representation by Secretary Duncan on the Policy Review Committee (Intelligence). Such representation, previously denied to Secretary Schlesinger by Admiral Turner, would provide a national-level forum for energy intelligence issues, thereby enabling DOE to influence the National Security Council guidance to the Intelligence Community.