Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in West Germany¹

Washington, August 7, 1979, 1532Z.

205196. Subject: Energy: Tokyo Summit Discussions. Reftel: (A) Bonn 13525; (B) State 188623.² For Ambassador from Secretary Schlesinger.

1. (Entire text Confidential)

2. Please clarify for Count Lambsdorff the position taken by both the US Government and me in regard to the targets established at the Tokyo Summit. You should make clear that I certainly did not and would not acquiesce, let alone “advocate to the Europeans”, that North Sea oil be treated as a private playpen for the individual members of the European Community. To the contrary, the US Government’s position was steadfastly that national targets had to be adopted which would fairly restrain imports into each industrial nation. With US and possibly Canadian production falling and the Japanese having no production, the main point was that North Sea oil should not create a privileged sanctuary that would permit European consumption to grow as oil consumption elsewhere was constrained.

3. These points were made in conversations with representatives of the EC (Jenkins and Williams) as well as with representatives of the member governments.

4. I said imports from the North Sea should be counted in individual 1985 oil import targets for the Federal Republic of Germany and other EC member countries who participated in the Summit. Some confusion may have resulted in reconciling individual oil import targets with the overall EC target. Naturally, UK oil production is included in any overall EC target but oil imports from the UK into Germany or France must be included in their import account and therefore counted against their oil import target.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D790358–0253. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by D. Hickey (DOE/IA); cleared by Bergold, Schlesinger, Poats, and Rosen and in EUR/CE; and approved by Cooper. Repeated to Brussels for USEEC and to Paris for USOECD.
2. Telegram 188623 to Bonn, July 20, informed the Embassy: “We are concerned that the FRG may not take the commitment to oil import targets made at Tokyo with sufficient seriousness. It is the clear understanding of the President and his advisors that it was decided at Tokyo that exports from the UK would be considered as imports for purposes of meeting the national 1985 targets set by the FRG, France, and possibly Italy. Further, the agreement by the four EC Summit countries to recommend to their non-Summit EC partners that each country specify its contribution to annual EC import levels is to reflect the Tokyo results.” (Ibid., D790331–1164) In telegram 13525 from Bonn, August 1, the Embassy reported: “Lambsdorff states that FRG understanding of Tokyo goals is that UK oil to be treated as Community oil, a view which he states was advocated to Europeans at Tokyo by Secretary Schlesinger.” (Ibid., D790348–0440)