169. Letter From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to Director of Central Intelligence Turner1
I recently wrote you2 to express my concern over the impact of proposed reductions in FY 1980 funding for certain National Security Agency collection activities which support, among others, Department of Energy requirements. Review of the National Intelligence Topics attached to your 28 August letter3 has prompted me to express additional concerns regarding the collection, analysis and production of intelligence on foreign energy intentions, research and technology development and the priorities assigned to Community efforts in these areas.
It is important that the U.S. not be surprised by future foreign political or technological developments in energy or energy-related fields. Community reporting on the political and economic aspects of oil supply and pricing is generally adequate. However, it appears that insufficient information is being collected to allow comprehensive analysis and evaluation—in DOE or elsewhere—of potential developments in foreign energy technologies and energy resources, especially in the Soviet Union. The National Intelligence Topics reflect this situation in mentioning energy only with respect to nuclear proliferation and oil production policies and capacities. Although these are important topics, there are many other important areas of interest, for example: resource development, especially in the Soviet Union, and foreign energy technology, such as secondary oil recovery, coal conversion, and breeder reactors. My staff will work closely with the DCID 1/24 Committee this Fall in order to more clearly define requirements and align priorities for collection of this essential information.
Despite the increasing importance of energy from a political, economic, and security standpoint, it appears that Community efforts in this area continue to be fragmented and lack overall coordination. Specifically, the Community lacks a suitable focal point for interaction with policy-level users of energy intelligence, for coordination and monitoring of efforts throughout the Community, and for timely dissemination of information and analyses. For instance, energy intelligence production responsibilities are spread among the Economic Intelligence [Page 543] Committee, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee rather than in a single committee or working group concerned with providing a broad perspective of all factors relating to energy. Even within CIA, energy intelligence production efforts are shared by several offices, including OSI, OER, and ORPA, with no one office having overall coordination responsibility.
I believe that existing Community assets are capable of satisfying the requirements of this Department and other users for timely warning of significant foreign energy developments and for subsequent assessment of the implications of such developments. However, I feel this will require that higher priorities be given to the collection of energy intelligence and a more central focusing and coordinating of Community analysis and production efforts. I understand that the Resource Management Staff currently is conducting a study of Community energy intelligence activities which will serve as a basis for review and subsequent revision of Community priorities, efforts, and organizations. I look forward to discussing these matters with you following conclusion of the RMS study.
Sincerely,
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Box 4, Chron: Oct.–Dec. 1978. Secret. Drafted by J.B.K. LaBarre on September 12.↩
- Not found.↩
- Neither the letter nor its attachment was found.↩
- DCID 1/2, February 17, 1977, is entitled “U.S. Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities.”↩
- Printed from a copy with Schlesinger’s typed signature and an indication that he signed the original.↩