179. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic and Business Affairs (Armstrong) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs (Casey)1
Washington, April 20,
1973.
Your Participation in the Next Meeting of the OECD High Level Group of the Oil
Committee—Paris, June 12, 1973
You are already aware of our interest in you heading the United States
delegation to the next meeting of the OECD High Level Group of the Oil Committee. As you also
know we are seeking to reschedule this meeting so that it takes place on
June 12 following the OECD Ministerial
session which you will attend June 6 to 8. The President’s energy policy
message2 will have been out one and a half months by
that time. Also there will have been sufficient time to formulate USG positions and proposals for
cooperation, including seeking support for them in a few key bilateral
conversations. Your presence at both the Ministerial (where energy is a
likely topic) and the High Level Oil Group (HLG) meetings will clearly demonstrate that our government
[Page 456]
is serious in its efforts
to keep competition for petroleum from becoming a dangerous, divisive
international issue.
The OECD Oil Committee and especially
its restricted-membership High Level Group have long been the main
forums for consultations and action on oil matters by the major consumer
nations—i.e., US, EEC countries, Japan and Canada. The June OECD
HLG meeting will be the most suitable
time following the President’s Message for specific multilateral
consultations on the energy situation. The OECD members expect and hope that specific proposals and
ideas for cooperation on oil and other energy matters will be floated by
the U.S. at this meeting. If we fail on
this occasion to give concrete evidence that we are willing to take the
lead in proposing and advancing cooperative efforts, this could well
lead other major consumers to interpret the President’s message and the
new oil import arrangements as a purely national response by the US to its worsening energy supply problem.
This interpretation can be expected to lead them to intensify their own
individual (or EEC group) efforts to
meet their needs through unilateral and bilateral efforts. There is no
need to describe the adverse price, investment and political
repercussions likely from such unrestrained competition.
Either I and/or George Bennsky
would remain on in Paris following the High Level meeting to chair the
U.S. delegation at the subsequent two
days of sessions of the Oil Committee proper.
Attached is a summary of the positions of other governments on
cooperation as they have so far expressed them and suggested proposals
that might be put before the OECD
membership for discussion and consideration. This material will be the
basis from which we seek inputs and clearance from the large number of
USG agencies and offices with
interest in the international aspects of the energy problem. Leadership
(including memoranda from you and/or the Secretary) will be required to
further this process. State must continue to represent the US at these meetings and we must respect the
restricted nature of the HLG by limiting
the size of the delegation.
Recommendation
That you review the attached suggestions as possible U.S. proposals for presentation at the
OECD
HLG and Oil Committee (Tab A).3 If
they meet your approval we will begin preparing the position papers and
statement for your use as head of the U.S. delegation to the High Level Group of the Oil
Committee.4
[Page 457]
Tab B5
VIEWS OF OTHER COUNTRIES
Some generalized conclusions may be drawn from the various country
and group priorities summarized below. All major consumer nations in
the West favor some form of increased cooperation among themselves.
The nature and limits of this generalized desire for cooperation
vary when specific alternatives are considered.
The highest degree of consensus exists for two concepts: cooperation
on development of new sources of energy and increased protective
security measures. Most major consumers favor expanding the range of
energy supplies through the development of alternative sources.
Japan prefers bilateral arrangements on research and development
with the US rather than a
multilateral framework. France wants to focus primarily on long-run
aspects of this type of cooperation and can be expected to press for
a united EEC front in dealing with
the U.S. Increased security measures,
such as emergency oil sharing arrangements and enhanced storage
capacity, have wide support. Discussions are now underway to
consider expanding, along the lines of the existing OECD European oil apportionment plan
for time of emergency, an apportionment plan to include the US and other non-European members.
A policy of avoiding actions that would unduly provoke OPEC is a clear and common position of
all major consumers. The continuum of specific positions ranges from
extreme sensitivity on the part of the Japanese to reasonable
concern by the US. The generally
accepted position of avoiding confrontation with oil producing
countries and the sensitivity of this subject are based on the
potential threats of radical producing governments to use oil as a
political or economic weapon. More responsible OPEC governments have recognized that
producers and consumers alike must work toward some kind of
accommodation. Saudi Arabia has though Yamani, its Petroleum Minister, suggested a special
oil relationship with the United States.6 In advancing
this proposal, Yamani made
clear he sought, in part, to ensure that country’s future security
as it becomes more and more a dominant and controversial force in
the supply of world oil requirements. More recently Yamani, reflecting differences in
thinking among Saudi decision makers, has been emphasizing the
investment rather than special oil marketing arrangements of his
proposal.
There is a growing body of opinion in Europe and Japan that consumer
governments must have or will by events be forced to have a
[Page 458]
voice in future
negotiations with the producing countries, either directly or
through the oil companies, by advising on options and on the extent
of commitments the companies should, or should not, make. This
general desire for a greater government role varies in degree by
country. Some countries favor greater government support for
companies in future negotiations with OPEC. The bureaucracy of the EEC has come up with ideas that would put the companies
under considerable common market government direction. No major
country, except Japan has suggested immediate direct
government-to-government contacts. Japan has suggested informally
that it may be desirable for the consuming countries, through the
OECD or other mechanisms, to
enter into direct negotiations with OPEC nations to ensure the future availability of oil
in the quantities required and at assured prices.
Recent conversations in Washington with visiting energy officials at
the EEC and British Government7 has
revealed a desire to see some not too formal arrangement fashioned
in which consumer government energy policies, especially as they
relate to competition for crude imports, could be synchronized.
Growing concern is also evident in Europe and Japan about the ability
and willingness of the United States to continue to supply nuclear
fuel to other nations at reasonable costs. Other major consumers
welcome the expressed willingness of the US to share enrichment technology, subject to adequate
safe-guards. However, progress in cooperation and the development of
nuclear power has been slow indeed and a major effort will be
required if atomic energy is to become a meaningful source of energy
within the next ten years.
- 1)
- European Community. The Commission of
the European Community’s attempts to develop a common energy
policy has been consistently delayed and a common policy does
not presently exist. Considerable weight must be given to the
national policies of the major member states, which play the
decisive role on energy matters. The Commission favors, in
principle, cooperation among petroleum consuming and producing
states. The Commission is also favorably inclined towards
specific consumer cooperative measures dealing with security and
stock building, more rational use of energy resources and the
development of alternative sources of energy. The Commission has
not adopted a position on a consumer-country organization of a
“cartel” type, but hopes to avoid bilateral relations between
consumer and producer governments. A concern exists that the
formation of a consumer country bloc could lead to solidifying a
common front by the producers.
- We have learned that a draft document prepared by the
Commission currently is being circulated among member
governments. It proposes much closer future cooperation on and
tighter joint control of energy among European nations and may
be designed to counter what the Commission fears will be US and Japanese efforts to
unilaterally seek assured oil supplies.
- 2)
- Japan. Japan is the most sensitive
OECD member to reductions
in oil supplies and would oppose any joint consumer bloc
designed to confront OPEC. The
Japanese continue to stress that their complete dependence on
imports makes them unique and does not permit them to offend
anyone. They oppose bilateral deals between producer and
consumer governments that involve preferential treatment (such
as the recent Saudi proposal to the US), but consider deals by companies for the
purchase of crude or participation in a concession to be acceptable.
Many Japanese Government and private sources favor “in
principle” some joint producer-consumer organization, but
reaction is not uniform. Closer consultation with the US and EC are sought, but on a bilateral basis. Japan
probably would welcome a cooperative arrangement with the US, involving the OECD countries, for apportioning
oil in an emergency, but only if a basis for burden sharing it
considers equitable can be agreed upon. The Japanese would
probably be very much interested in participating with the
US in joint research and
development projects for new forms of energy if this would lead
to a privileged position for them.
- 3)
- United Kingdom. The UK is the most cooperative-minded of
the major Community countries and might take the initiative on
cooperative venture if the US
does not. Thinking on the subject has reached the ministerial
level. The UK supports efforts to
expand energy supplies and to develop alternative energy forms.
In the UK view oil has become too
important to be left entirely to the companies and producer
governments. At the same time, it wishes to avoid the appearance
of confrontation with OPEC or
introduce government-to-government arrangements supplanting the
companies as negotiators or marketers. The UK would like to improve relations
with OPEC producers, but sees
some type of producer-consumer institutional relationship as far
in the future.8
- 4)
- France. The French are interested in
consumer cooperation, but place a much higher priority on
cooperation in the long-run development of alternative sources
of energy than on short-run defensive cooperation. They feel the
scope for action in the short-run is very
[Page 460]
limited and the risks of provoking
OPEC quite high. In
addition, a precondition for French cooperation is the
development of a common European energy policy along French
lines. France does not want Community members to negotiate
individually with the US and
Japan. These policies seriously reduce the chance that France
would be willing to join in cooperative ventures with other
consumer bloc countries that could be considered as provacative
to OPEC.
- 5)
- Germany. German officials have
repeatedly stated their general support for expanded consumer
cooperation, but they oppose the formation of a consumer’s bloc
which they fear would lead to a strengthening of and
confrontation with OPEC.
Germany would be very cautious on cooperative proposals aimed at
holding down prices, supporting major international oil
companies or pressuring key countries to increase production.
German officials do favor intensified consumer country
consultations, cooperation on new energy sources and increased
security measures such as emergency sharing arrangements and
enhanced storage capacity.
- 6)
- Other European Countries. Other
European countries have been less specific and less vocal in
spelling out the extent or type of cooperation they would be
willing to support. As a group they generally favor consumer
cooperation, but seek restraint and avoidance of any
confrontation with oil producing countries. Some industry
sources believe that Italy is advocating cooperation while at
the same time seeking a privileged position in Libya, Iraq and
other producing countries.
- 7)
- Canada. The Canadians appear to favor
cooperation with other consumer countries, but they would wish
to proceed cautiously and on a multilateral basis. They are
sensitive to insuring that Canadian interests be served and that
adequate voice be given to smaller countries in any sort of
cooperative arrangement.
- 8)
- Developing Nations. The oil importing
LDCs have until recently
regarded the “energy crisis” as a developed country problem.
There are, however, some advanced developing nations, such as
India, that are beginning to feel the economic pinch of
increasing oil prices. In India’s case, the response has had to
be curtailment of consumption and hence development. Brazil is
another of the alerted LDC’s and
is actively seeking world petroleum sources as both buyer and
producer. While most LDCs have
not yet felt the energy problem in a significant way, there is
an awakening concern about the present burden of payments for
oil imports and the costs they will have to pay in the future.
This concern can be expected to mount as both their oil needs
and oil prices move upward. These pressures provide a
significant and exploitable force to complement developed
country opposition to increased oil prices forced by OPEC on all oil buyers. The LDCs have, on occasion, through the
U.N. and elsewhere sought
special treatment of their needs by the oil producing
countries.
- 9)
- Communist Nations. The USSR, Eastern European countries
and the Peoples Republic of China generally are not considered
part of the consumer country group. The Soviet Union is a net
exporter of over one million barrels of oil per day, to both
Communist and non-Communist nations. The PRC is not presently a
significant importer or exporter of oil. As a group, the three
areas play a modest role in the consumer equation. However, the
possibility of incorporating some or all of them into planning a
solution to the energy problem should not be discarded.
- 10)
- OPEC.
All OPEC spokesmen have
publicly opposed the formation of a consumer bloc as contrary to
OPEC interests. Privately,
many appear bemused at the failure of the consuming countries to
join together to defend their interests. More responsible OPEC governments have recognized
that producers and consumers alike must work towards some kind
of accommodation. The former Secretary General of OPEC has indicated privately to
U.S. officials that consumer
country cooperation would only be “normal.” Failure of the
U.S. and other major
consuming countries to make clear their intentions towards
OPEC and individual
producing countries is a major source of preoccupation among the
oil producing countries. The OPEC countries will be carefully watching U.S. and Western initiatives and can
be expected to react promptly to signs of a “bloc approach.”
They also are concerned by the alleged failure of the U.S. to take a more helpful and
forthcoming “attitude” towards producer country problems and
aspirations. There are certainly legitimate security, financial
and development concerns on the part of Saudi Arabia and Iran
that deserve serious attention by the U.S. and its allies.