Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976

103. Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs¹

Washington, undated.

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 243 “MAAG REQUIREMENTS STUDY”²

I. Introduction

National Security Study Memorandum 243, entitled “MAAG Requirements Study,” directed the preparation of a study to determine the continuing US requirement for Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) after FY 1977 with a view to requesting Congressional authorization, required by law, for continuation of specific MAAGs after FY 1977.³

The term MAAG is used generically hereunder to describe a variety of DOD organizations in foreign countries whose common function is that of direct liaison and representation between the US Department of Defense and the foreign defense establishments in activities usually related directly to security assistance. The official titles of these organizations are several: Military Mission, Military Training Mission, Defense Liaison Group, Office of Defense Representative, Liaison Office, Military Group, and Military Assistance Team.

There are currently 33 MAAG organizations in operation.⁴ Security assistance functions are accomplished in 25 other countries by Defense Attache Offices, eight of which are augmented with security assistance personnel. Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) have been established, as permitted by the law, in the eleven countries where MAAGs were disestablished on 30 September 1976. (Annex A, Estimated FY 1977 MAAG Authorizations and Funding Requirements.)⁵

II. Study Objectives

1. To determine requirements for MAAG-type organizations.

2. To develop options and alternatives for MAAG presence abroad after FY 1977 with the advantages and drawbacks in each case.

3. To determine, for MAAG-type organizations that are to be continued, the estimated number of personnel needed and the costs.

4. To develop proposed legislation to support the MAAG-type organizations recommended in the Study.

III. Security Assistance and US Objectives

Security assistance has been a tool of US policy for nearly 30 years and has played an important role in furthering several important US foreign policy objectives. It has helped strengthen the defense of countries whose security has been important to the US. Over time, security assistance has become a major means of supporting bilateral security arrangements and strengthening our worldwide position vis-à-vis the USSR and PRC. Besides contributing to collective security, security assistance has also played an important, and at times an essential role in serving such diverse foreign policy objectives as contributing to regional balances and stability, facilitating the use of US bases and rights abroad, providing a symbol of US support and fostering closer relationships between the USG and recipient governments.

The national purpose remains that of preserving the US as a free and independent nation. Derivative military objectives are first, to deter conflict; failing that, to terminate conflict on terms advantageous to the US; to maintain sufficient military capabilities to prevent coercion; to assist the self-defense efforts of selected nations; and to maintain freedom of transit of the air and seas. It follows that the defense strategy requires a visible and credible military strength, and stresses collective security and combined actions.

The Soviet Union remains the dominant threat to the achievement of US objectives. Though Soviet military strength is the most visible facet of this threat, the Soviet Union has a growing and increasingly sophisticated capability to project power and influence worldwide; not only in pure military dimensions but in a subtle nature across the wide spectrum of political, economic, and social influences.

The US is faced with the enormous challenge of countering Soviet influences; this is particularly critical in strategically important regions of the world. Security assistance, as a facet of collective security, has proved to be an effective and efficient mechanism to achieve this objective.

IV. Security Assistance in a Changing World Environment

a. General

The situation today is radically different from that of the 1950s and 1960s. In this earlier period, most requests for US security assistance were for grant aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Over the years, however, grant aid has declined as more recipients have made the transition to foreign military sales, either credit or cash.

The expansion of our transfers since the early 1970s to higher dollar levels, and the change of geographical concentration to more controversial regions and countries, have fueled disagreement and debate about the US program in general. There is a concern, which is reflected by some in Congress, over the US role as a major arms supplier. This concern has been translated into legislative proposals for arms control measures.

b. Transfer of Criticism to MAAGs

Security assistance has become a highly visible and controversial aspect of our foreign policy. It has also become a major source of friction between the Legislative and Executive branches. As a result, Congress has placed several restraints on future MAAG-type organizations in an effort to influence and control the Executive Branch’s options.

MAAGs, as an historic adjunct of the security assistance program, are viewed by some as an anachronism. As the Security Assistance Program has become characterized by reduced grant assistance and increased Foreign Military Sales (FMS), MAAGs have been perceived as the overseas unregulated extension of security assistance and, as such, have come under close scrutiny for primarily two reasons:

—As members of the Uniformed Services, MAAG personnel are often viewed as tending to entice many foreign military establishments to seek excessive amounts of US defense articles.

—As more security assistance takes the form of FMS, there is a question of the propriety of active duty US military personnel continuing in the role of advising a country on the allocation of its resources.

V. Purpose of MAAGs

a. Functionally

The basic responsibilities of MAAGs with respect to security assistance are listed in DOD Directive 5132.3 (Annex B). While the major functions of MAAGs vary from country to country, MAAG involvement can be divided into the following categories:

—Identification of security assistance requirements, development and implementation of the resulting grant aid programs and sales arrangements.

—Advising host country personnel to assure effective utilization of military materiel and training and assist in the ultimate disposal of materiel provided as grant aid.

—Providing assistance in force development planning, including planning and programming equipment acquisitions, logistics, supply, and training.

—Serve as liaison between the US and foreign military establishments with respect to the latter’s acquisition of US defense articles and services, in order to assist the foreign government in making the best possible decisions in this respect.

—Advise and assist the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission by serving on the country team as the Department of Defense representative and an integral part of the foreign policy apparatus of the US Government.

b. Regionally

Most individual security assistance programs are at some point of transition from MAP to FMS/commercial sales. Moreover, the MAAGs associated with these programs are moving from an advisory role to one of military liaison in order to assist in sales and transfers, DOD representation and equipment follow-on support. For the most part, the emphasis is appropriate to the situation confronting the MAAG and the requirements of the host country. For example, in the more highly developed regions and those capable of earning a favorable balance of foreign exchange, the emphasis is on sales and DOD liaison (Western Europe, North East Asia, and the Middle East), while the advisory function is still relatively important in those areas that have not yet attained self-sufficiency in defense capabilities (Africa, South Asia, and the nations of Latin America).

It should be noted that the continuous existence of military missions in Latin America dates from 1923 in some cases and, almost all, predates security assistance. The legal basis for the Latin American military missions originated under PL–247, 69th Congress, in 1926. Each Latin American mission operates under agreements executed by the host governments with the United States, and is tailored to specific requirements. In many cases, the host country reimburses the United States for various costs of maintaining the mission. Throughout the years, these military missions have become accepted by the Latin Americans as visible evidence of US concern and resolve to deter aggression within the Western Hemisphere. The presence of US military advisors provides a continuing assurance of US resolve to honor its commitments under the Rio Treaty and Charter of the Organization of the American States.

c. Militarily

Where appropriate, MAAG elements contribute to military force interdependence and equipment standardization, and reduce US force requirements under the total force concept. They assist in development of compatible doctrine and, as justified, in acquisition of US materiel, equipment, and training, thereby improving the capability of the US and its Allies to conduct combined operations. MAAG organizations also help project US influence and power overseas, serving as evidence of US military interest and capability in countries with little or no other US military presence. From an arms control perspective, the MAAG can serve as an element of restraint, curbing appetites for equipment which, if acquired, would destabilize local military balances. The US military advisor seeks to focus host country attention on the budgetary and other national resources impacts of arms procurement decisions. Finally, the long-term personal relationships and American values fostered by CONUS training programs and liaison activities pay dividends as US-trained or influenced officers assume more important positions in host governments.

VI. MAAG Requirements Beyond FY 1977

For the past 30 years, US policy has included the provision of military advice, training, and equipment to Allies and other friendly nations to assist them in achieving internal stability and in resisting external threats, and to obtain beneficial bilateral and multilateral ties.

Over the next three to five years, basic US objectives relevant to security assistance, which is part of our effort to build a closer network of relationships with friendly nations, are unlikely to change dramatically. We will continue to need strong collective security, stable regional military balances, access to important overseas basing facilities, and to strengthen key recipient nations to bear the primary responsibility for defending themselves against attack or subversion. There will continue to be a large, perhaps growing number of nations concerned about their national security—internal, external or both—and many of these nations are or will be in a better position to buy what they need from whomever will supply it. Accordingly, security assistance will continue to have a role in furthering US objectives, and the overseas management of the security assistance program will continue to play a critical role in this regard. Indeed there will be a need, in most cases, for some form of MAAG organization, however small. However, depending on the host country’s capabilities and the size of the program, requirements for a security assistance management office will differ. In Latin America, as noted above, MILGPs have an historic representational role with security assistance functions being a secondary consideration.

The legislative history associated with the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 indicates that Congress does not intend to disestablish all MAAGs, Military Groups (MILGPs), or similar organizations performing advisory functions. Instead, the approach adopted by Congress recognizes that United States foreign policy and national security interests militate against termination of all advisory and representative relationships; desires to be apprised more specifically than in the past of Executive Branch assessments of which bilateral relationships should be sustained and the reasons why; and, expects in this process that the Executive Branch will adjust MAAG organization and functions to fit existing circumstances.

VII. Alternatives Beyond FY 77

There are several methods by which security assistance can be provided beyond FY 77:⁶

a. Alternative 1

—Description: Continue the operation of currently organized MAAGs, missions, military groups (MilGps) and similar organizations from FY 1978 through FY 1980.

—Concept of Operation: Security assistance organizations in operation during FY 1977 would continue to perform the full range of advisory, assistance and representational functions specified in existing Terms of Reference and DoD Dir 5132.3 (Annex B). Internal structure of the MAAGs would remain essentially unchanged while minor adjustments from FY 1977 manning levels would be made for FY 1978 and subsequent years.

—Projected Organizational, Manning and Funding Requirements (Annex C–1)

Countries with MAAGs, Missions, Mil Gps	33
Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation	11
Countries with Augmentations of Security Assistance Personnel to Defense Attache Offices	8
Other Countries Where DAO’s perform security assistance functions.	17
Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY 78) (U.S. Mil—1263; U.S. Civilian—173; and Local Civilian—439)	1875
MAP Funding (FY 78 Funding T-20)	54.4

—Requirements for Implementation

Congressional authorization to continue operation of 33 MAAGs during the period FY 78–80.

Amendment to Sec 515, FAA of 1961, as amended, to permit Defense Attachés to continue security assistance mission beyond FY 1977.

—Advantages

—Less adverse impact on host country perception of U.S. interest as there would be minimal change and continued substantive U.S. military presence.

—Continues the security assistance program management function with minimal disruption.

—U.S. personnel in-country can develop detailed knowledge of problems peculiar to that country.

—Disadvantages

—Requires two legislative actions—one, to authorize MAAGs and, two, to allow DAOs to perform security assistance functions.

—Indicates an unwillingness to adjust MAAG organization and functions in accordance with changing circumstances.

—Retains high profile MAAGs.

—Requires high number of U.S. personnel.

b. Alternative 2

—Description—Eliminate all Military Assistance Advisory Groups and establish Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where major security assistance delivery programs are on-going. Representation to Latin America countries is a special situation and will require the continued operation of Military Groups which will perform the traditional role of representation and essential security assistance functions on an as required basis. Offices of Defense Cooperation will be assigned to American Embassies in countries having limited security assistance functions.

—Concept of Operation: In developed countries where the major security assistance function is focused on acquisition of equipment and services, the MAAG will be replaced with a DEFO that is specifically structured to meet individual country needs. In these countries, the new activity would not have advisory or training functions and would be staffed with only the requisite numbers of contract, fiscal and logistics personnel. The primary function of the activity would be to serve as a conduit for information on FMS actions to include technical matters, payment and follow-up actions. In developing countries, the DEFO will in addition, manage and monitor delivery programs and assist in the integration of equipment as required. All other advisory or training functions would be met by periodic survey/planning teams, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) when requested by the country concerned and the Department of State. These teams when available would be introduced for specific purposes and for a specified duration. The teams would be supported by funds made available through the MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. Military Groups for Latin American countries are categorized separately due to their special relationships with host countries.

In countries where there is a type of Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) either in effect or under consideration by the Congress, the security assistance management organization has specific functions associated with the agreement of US forces in the host country. Approval should, therefore, be sought in legislation to have the DEFOs in these countries approved for the duration of the agreement.

—Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements (Annex C–2)

—Developed countries with Defense Field Offices	2
—Developing countries with Defense Field Offices	14
—Countries with DCAs	4
—Countries with Military Groups	13
—Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation	23
—Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY 78) (US Military—788 US Civilian—126 and Local Civilian—290)	1204
—MAP Funding (FY 78 T–20)	50.6	M

—Requirements for Implementation

Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of Defense Field Offices and to continue the operation of Latin American Military Groups during the period of FY 78–80.

—Advantages

—Provides a lower profile for security assistance personnel.

—Changes the name of MAAGs to a title more in line with functions performed.

—Demonstrates a willingness to change MAAG organization and functions with no open ended commitments.

—Provides both in-country and TDY flexibility by establishing a minimal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and TAFTs as required.

—Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel required to perform security assistance functions and enhances reimbursement possibilities.

—Provides for continuing Latin American military mission agreements.

—Retains organization, functions and procedures for assignment and control of DoD personnel in security assistance positions in foreign nations.

—Disadvantages

—Could have a short-term impact on host country perceptions of US interests.

—Requires completely new legislation authorizing DEFOs/Mil Gps.

—Fewer US military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries’ problems and military personnel.

d. Alternative 3

—Description: Eliminate all Offices of Defense Cooperation and Military Assistance Advisory Groups and establish Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where significant security assistance programs are ongoing and where traditional and essential advisory and training roles are important.⁷ Defense Attaché Offices will perform the security assistance functions in countries where these functions are on a smaller scale.

—Concept of Operations: In highly developed countries where the major security assistance function is focused on acquisition of equipment and services, the MAAG will be replaced with a DEFO that is specifically structured to meet individual country needs. In these countries, the new activity would not have advisory or training functions but would be staffed with the requisite numbers of contract, fiscal and logistics personnel. The primary function of the activity would be to serve as a conduit for information on FMS actions to include technical matters, payment and follow-up actions. In developing countries, the DEFO will in addition manage and monitor delivery programs and assist in the on-going advisory and training functions. Other advisory or training requirements would be met by periodic survey/planning teams, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) when requested by the country concerned and the Department of State. These teams when available would be introduced for specific purposes and for a specified duration. The teams would be supported by funds made available through the MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. DEFOs for Latin American countries are categorized separately due to their special relationships with host countries.

In countries where there is a type of Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) either in effect or under consideration by the Congress, the security assistance management organization has specific functions associated with the agreement on US forces in the host country. Approval should, therefore, be sought in legislation to have the DEFOs in these countries approved for the duration of the agreement.

—Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements (Annex C–3)

—Developed countries with DEFOs	2
—Developing countries with DEFOs	14
—Latin American countries with DEFOs	14
—Countries with DAOs having Security Assistance responsibilities	35
—Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY 78) (US Military—779; US Civilian 120; and Local Civilian—283)	1,182
—MAP Funding (FY 78 T–20)	$50.1M

—Requirements for Implementation

Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of DEFO and to void the prohibition against DAO involvement during the period FY 78–80.

—Advantages

—Provides a lower profile for security assistance personnel, in accordance with ambassadorial preferences, but maintains visible symbol to host nation of US military presence.

—Changes MAAGs to a title more in line with functions performed, while restraining further proliferation of new types of organizations.

—Demonstrates willingness to change MAAG organization and functions.

—Avoids disruption/misunderstanding in 25 countries where security assistance is currently administered by DAOs.

—Provides both in-country and TDY flexibility by establishing a minimal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and TAFTs.

—Maintains security assistance presence in countries not otherwise covered, through use of DAOs.

—Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel involved in performing security assistance functions.

—Establishes one standard organizational concept and simplifies operational channels.

—Maintains military chain of command for planning and implementation.

—Disadvantages

—Could have an adverse impact on host country perceptions of US interests.

—Requires completely new legislation authorizing DEFO and DAOs to administer security assistance.

—Fewer US military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries’ problems and military personnel.

—Will require increased use of TDY elements ( MTT, TAT, TAFT, etc.) to assist DEFOs.

e. Alternative 4.

—Description: Eliminate all Military Assistance Advisory Groups and establish Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where security assistance delivery programs require the presence of more than three military personnel. In countries where the security assistance function can be performed by three military personnel or less, a separate Office of Defense Cooperation will be established. In other countries where there is only a limited security assistance program or political sensitivities are paramount, we will ask Congress for authorization to allow the DAO to handle security assistance responsibilities. Foreign Service Officers will handle security assistance in countries with the very smallest programs.

—Concept of Operation: In each country the nature of the program and the level of staffing will be determined by the security assistance requirements of the particular country. To the extent possible, we will encourage the use of host-country or MAP-financed Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) to supplement the skills of personnel assigned on a long-term basis. MTTs, TAFTs and TATs would be introduced for specific and limited purposes and for a specific duration.

—Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements: (Annex C–4)

Defense Field Offices	23
Offices of Defense Cooperation	24
DAOs with Security Assistance Functions	17
Posts with Foreign Service Officers Performing Security Assistance Functions	6
Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY78) (US Military—772, US Civilian—144, and Local Civilian—336)	1252
MAP Funding (FY78 T–20)	$51.3 million

—Requirement for Implementation: Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of Defense Field Offices and to permit designated DAOs to perform security assistance functions.

—Advantages

—Presents a simplified organizational structure worldwide.

—Provides a low profile for security assistance personnel.

—Changes the name of MAAGs to a title more in line with functions performed.

—Demonstrates a willingness to change MAAG organization and functions with no open-ended commitments.

—Provides both in-country and TDY flexibility by establishing a minimal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and TAFTs as required.

—Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel required to perform security assistance functions and enhances reimbursement possibilities.

—Provides for continuing representation in Latin America in keeping with military mission agreements.

—Retains organization, functions and procedures for assignment and control of DOD personnel in security assistance positions in foreign nations.

—Disadvantages

—Could have a short-term impact on host-country perceptions of U.S. interests.

—Requires completely new legislation authorizing DEFOs/DAOs.

—Fewer U.S. military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries’ problems and military personnel.

e. Alternative 5:

—Description: Inactivate all MAAGs by end FY 77 and establish Offices of Defense Cooperations (ODC) in countries where MAAGs are disestablished and in other selected countries now served by Defense Attaches.

—Concept of Operations: ODC will perform security assistance and representational functions in accord with constraints specified in Section 515, FAA. All MAAGs, Missions, Military Groups and similar organizations will be disestablished and DAOs will relinquish security assistance missions by end FY 77. Unique advisory, instructional and assistance requirements will be met through the use of survey teams, Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Field Teams on a fully reimbursable basis under MAP or FMS.

—Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements: (Annex C–5)

Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation	59
Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY ’78) (US Military—168; US Civilian—53 Local Civilian—82)	303
MAP Funding (FY 78 T–20)	11.7M

—Requirements for Implementation

None, can be accomplished within provisions of Sec 515, FAA.

—Advantages

—Can be accommodated within existing legislation.

—Requires the lowest number of uniformed service personnel.

—An office exists so that personnel can be brought in on a TDY basis to deal with specific systems or problems.

—Permanently assigned US personnel in country can develop a knowledge of problems peculiar to that country.

—Disadvantages

—The small number of personnel would be unable to accomplish the mission in a number of countries.

—Such a drastic reduction on a worldwide basis could send the wrong signal to friends, allies, and enemies.

—Reduced flexibility in countries with large security assistance programs.

—Would violate bilateral military mission agreements in Latin America.

VIII. Choice of Alternatives

Based on the consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of each option and viewed from the perspective of a continuing need for MAAG-type organization of varying sizes with different primary functions which will be closely scrutinized by the Congress, Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 are worthy of consideration. These alternatives in addition to being innovative approaches to a changing international environment, provide sufficient military personnel to accommodate the security assistance program and are flexible enough to assure that functional requirements will be met on a timely basis. The disadvantages associated with the alternatives can be minimized or eliminated through well-conceived implementing instructions and close liaison with security assistance recipients to ensure that their concerns are addressed.

The legislative history of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 demonstrated Congressional intent relative to MAAGs as indicated earlier; however, the President’s constitutional prerogatives in the area of foreign policy should not be sacrificed in an effort to be more forthcoming to the Congress than required by the law. The alternatives cited should satisfy the Congress as they demonstrate a willingness to forego continuation of MAAGs while they do not unnecessarily restrict the President’s options to meet current, realistic security and foreign policy requirements. Alternative 1 fails to recognize the realities associated with the legislative history of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976. On the other hand, alternative 5, which would be within current legislative restraints, does not provide sufficient personnel to effectively manage the security assistance program in many countries.

Being completely new concepts which closely follow the earlier termination of 11 MAAGs with a resultant changeover to ODCs, the details associated with implementation will require extensive coordination between the concerned Executive Department agencies in the Washington area and overseas US Government activities and missions. It is further recognized that the reductions in MAAG personnel proposed by the cited alternatives are likely to require DOD back-up to assure and coordinate functions currently being performed by MAAGs.

Historic usage of the terms mission, liaison office, etc. to refer to MAAGs may make the term DEFO or ODC unacceptable to host governments. Where this is the case, or where existing agreements establish a name or manpower minimums, every effort will be made to accommodate the Chief of Mission’s recommendations. In addition, new terms of reference (TOR) will have to be developed for each DEFO. Finally, host countries will have to be advised in detail on the background and rationale for the new approach to security assistance manning.

IX. Conclusions

1. Security Assistance will continue to have a role in furthering U.S. objectives.

2. Overseas security assistance management/liaison elements are a necessary adjunct of security assistance.

3. Overseas security assistance management/liaison elements requirements may increase.

4. The image and operation of overseas security assistance management/liaison elements can be improved.

5. Alternatives 2, 3 and 4 are the best courses of action as they allow for sufficient U.S. personnel and flexibility to accomplish the security assistance mission and to demonstrate the intent of the Executive Branch to adjust MAAG organizations and functions in accordance with current realities.

6. Detailed procedures associated with the implementation of the selected alternatives will be required.

7. The focus of the terms of reference for this study were on MAAG requirements, alternatives and costs. However, in responding to the NSSM, several major issues relative to future MAAG-type operations were raised. These included: alliances implicitly formed through FMS; third-country participation in MAAG-type organizations; roles of MAAGs beyond arms transfers, etc. These issues are worthy of a further study which should further refine the functions of security assistance management/liaison organizations.

8. A special manpower survey team should survey the larger missions to assure that their staffing is at an austere level.

1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 44, NSSM 243 (1). Confidential. Holcomb forwarded the study to Scowcroft under an October covering memorandum, the date of which is illegible. According to Holcomb, the study was drafted by the IGPMA, which included representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, ACDA, JCS, CIA, and OMB. Davis then forwarded the study for comment under a covering memorandum, October 19, to Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Bush, Ikle, and Lynn. (Ibid.)
2. Document 85.
3. On 30 June 1976, the President signed legislation which required disestablishment of ten MAAGs by 30 September 1976. After 30 September 1977 no MAAG may operate in any foreign country unless specifically authorized by Congress. Up to three US military personnel may, however, be assigned to the Ambassador’s staff to carry out security assistance functions in any country where there is no MAAG. In addition, no MAAG-type functions may be performed by any defense attaché, after 30 September 1977. [Footnote in the original. The legislation referenced above is the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. See footnote 4, Document 89.]
4. Until the disestablishment of 11 MAAGs, the number of MAAGs had remained about constant since the mid-1950s. Personnel authorizations, however, have been reduced sharply during the past 15 years. From a total strength authorization of 7,192 in 1960, MAAG authorization had declined to 1622 spaces as of 1 September 1976—a reduction of 77 percent. [Footnote in the original.]
5. The annexes are not printed.
6. In each alternative, reimbursement by the host country for US defense personnel, assigned or attached, should be sought; teams would be supported by funds made available through MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. [Footnote in the original.]
7. As in some of the Latin American countries. [Footnote in the original.]