Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972

149. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 10, 1970, 11 a.m.

• SUBJECT
  • Defense Budget

• PARTICIPATION
• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. Ronald I. Spiers
  • Mr. Leslie H. Brown
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Dr. Gardiner Tucker
  • Dr. Donald Rice
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • Maj. Gen. Richard F. Shaefer
• CIA
  • Lt. Gen. R. E. Cushman
  • [name not declassified]
• OMB
  • Mr. George P. Shultz
  • Mr. James R. Schlesinger
  • Mr. Caspar Weinberger
• ACDA
  • Mr. Philip J. Farley
  • Vice Adm. John M. Lee
• CEA
  • Mr. Herbert Stein
• NSC Staff
  • Dr. Laurence E. Lynn
  • Col. Jack N. Merritt
  • Mr. David White

Dr. Kissinger: Our discussion today will be a continuation of the discussion at the last DPRC meeting.² At that time we reviewed the general categories contained in the defense budget, and following the meeting we asked for separate packages on these categories. We wanted each category evaluated separately. After that meeting, we had an internal review of the defense budget at San Clemente by the White House staff. At that time, we simply brought the President up to date on our discussions.³ In reviewing the tables that had been prepared, one of the things that concerned the President most was that these tables were telling him the impact of various budget cuts on current programs, but they were not telling him what the purpose of the programs was nor what overall effectiveness could be expected. Thus, after the San Clemente discussions, we circulated a number of questions reflecting the President’s concerns.⁴ Certainly all these questions can not be answered this year, but we must make a start.

With respect to SIOP, [less than 1 line not declassified].

Adm. Moorer: [less than 1 line not declassified].

Dr. Kissinger: We have also been told that over 85% of the force is targeted in a damage-limiting role. This would seem to lead me to ask: Just what are we trying to do with our weapons systems? What are we designing our forces for? Other questions which arise are: What are we trying to accomplish with tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? How do we intend to use these forces, if ever? How do these weapons relate to our NATO strategy?

The paper⁵ we have before us tells us how budget cuts will affect current programs. But the paper doesn’t tell us the value of the programs themselves. There is also the question of our air defense capabilities. On this subject the annex paper is very good.

Mr. Packard: Yes, the annex is a very good study.

Dr. Kissinger: The paper before us has developed three options for strategic weapons: continuing the current program, a limited reductions program, and a reduced program. It has also developed four options for our general purpose forces: the current program, a limited reduction program, a reduced program, and a low program.

We plan a NSC meeting on August 19 on this subject. Separate from this meeting, the military chiefs will have an opportunity to present their views to the President.

Bombers

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s look at some of the tables. In the table on page 10⁶ there are big differences in the number of bombers in the alternative programs, and also in the amount to be spent for air defense. Another consequence of a reduced budget seems to be the stretching out of programs such as the B-1 bomber.

Mr. Packard: In considering the defense budget, we must separate the different issues such as Safeguard, bombers, air defense, and general purpose forces.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, there are a number of problems to be solved. Of course, some, such as SIOP, can not be solved now.

On the question of bombers: What are they for? In relation to SALT, I’m worried that a unilateral reduction in bombers and in the Safeguard program would have a profound effect upon the SALT negotiations.

Mr. Packard: I agree completely. If we unilaterally reduce our bomber force, and do not continue with the Safeguard program, the SALT negotiations will be undermined.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem we face is this: The final SALT session in Vienna will be held this week, and the members will not meet again until November 2 in Helsinki. Thus, there will be no further substantive talks on SALT until after the budget has been locked up. It has been suggested that rather than reducing the number of bombers, we could simply reduce the number of crews. This would allow us to cut the budget without unilaterally reducing our visible bomber force.

Mr. Packard: Yes, there are several things that we could do to pare the budget without reducing the number of bombers. We should agree to maintain the current visible bomber force until the end of the year.

Dr. Kissinger: Does everyone agree? We shall not cut the visible bomber force until the SALT talks have been resolved, but the Department of Defense will attempt to reduce its operating costs within this framework.

Adm. Moorer: Everyone should understand that once a crew has been separated it will take more than one month to reactivate them. It will take at least one year to reactivate and retrain the crews that are going to be released.

Mr. Packard: That’s true. But we must reduce the budget while keeping the visible level of bombers up.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard) Could you work up a presentation for the NSC meeting on how to accomplish this? The plan should give the President an idea of the direction this action will take. I will assume that there will be no visible reduction in bombers until the SALT talks are concluded.

Dr. Rice: On page 13 we discussed this option.

Mr. Packard: We will work out the details.

Dr. Kissinger: Larry (Lynn) says that the option on page 13 reduces the number of bombers.

Dr. Rice: No, it just reduces the number of crews.

Adm. Moorer: Specifically, it reduces the number of crews on alert. Mr. Packard: It cuts out 24 alert sorties.

Mr. Farley: I agree that the preferred course is the one you have decided upon. But maybe we should still consider how important the bombers are in the SALT bargaining processes. Certainly the bombers are not as important as Safeguard, especially when you consider the modernization program involving the B–1’s.

Safeguard

Dr. Kissinger: What about Safeguard?

Mr. Packard: It must be continued.

Dr. Lynn: What will be our proposal to the Congress?

Mr. Packard: That we continue the current program. Our Congressional people tell us that we are now one vote ahead in Congress. We are telling the Congress that we only want to continue the current program, and that we are not recommending further increases at this time.

Mr. Farley: Does that change the figures on the number of sites?

Mr. Packard: I don’t know. The present plans call for 12 sites at a cost of $2 billion. Probably there will be a slight reduction.

Mr. Spiers: Does that mean that there will be no new sites in 1972?

Dr. Kissinger: There has been advanced preparation on a number of sites this year. What do we do with them?

Mr. Packard: Hold down the costs on these sites.

Dr. Kissinger: So we will be working on only three sites this year?

Mr. Packard: We will have to analyze that.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we get the analysis immediately?

Mr. Packard: We’ll have it in time for budget recommendations at the end of the year.

Mr. Johnson: It seems to me that we need it today.

Mr. Packard: We’ll come out not affecting the FY 71 budget level, or even the FY 72 level. The figures depend primarily upon the question of what we do with the additional sites.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it’s clear that we can’t do anything until the vote in Congress. But we should look at the implications of various steps in Safeguard. We need to get several alternatives from which to choose.

Titans

Dr. Kissinger: What about our Titans? Everyone agrees that they are not strategically useful, but they are the largest we have.

Mr. Packard: We have to have them throughout the SALT negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: How much does the program cost?

Dr. Rice: About $50 million a year.

Mr. Schlesinger: That could go down.

Mr. Packard: We will see if we can’t minimize expenditures without reducing visibility.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we have concluded that the impact of SALT on Titans, bomber levels, and Safeguard is to make it necessary to hold these programs at their current levels. On bombers, however, we will try to cut the budget without reducing the visibility. On Safeguard, we will need to look at the choices involving the various alternatives, but this will not be required at the next meeting. We have also agreed that the Titans should be kept until a SALT agreement is reached.

Air Defense

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s turn to the air defense question. The required level of air defense is not related to SALT. My view is that we don’t have a very clear concept of what our air defenses are supposed to accomplish. The annex is useful for this, but much more needs to be done. (to Packard) What posture do you propose?

Mr. Packard: I’ve looked at the question of our air defenses for some time. Our current force is designed to counter a high-level attack under all circumstances except severe jamming. Our current forces will not be effective against a low level attack. The table on page 4 of the annex shows that in the assumed cases, only 2 to 20 million fatalities would be averted by perfect air defenses. We could go to a lower level of air defense by taking out the surface-to-air missiles. However, this would not take us down to the recommended level.

Dr. Kissinger: The problem is that unless we know what is necessary, we can’t decide what level of air defense to develop. When we look at the number of Soviet missiles, it’s reasonable to ask whether they would use bombers to destroy the American population.

Mr. Packard: But we don’t want to invite them to use bombers.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we trying to prevent a bomber attack on the U.S. population then?

Adm. Moorer: We just don’t want to give the enemy a free ride.

Dr. Kissinger: Does the current defense program assume simultaneous air and missile attack?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: After the enemy missiles have struck, will our air defense be working?

Adm. Moorer: Some of it. If we have no air defense then we will lose sovereignity of our air space.

Dr. Kissinger: I need a definition of what sort of air defense we need. We agree that the present air defense can’t defend the U.S. population against a low level attack.

Adm. Moorer: But it’s effective today. The Soviets don’t have a low level attack force at this time.

Mr. Packard: The present system isn’t very effective even for an attack today. But we don’t want to give the enemy a free ride if they decide to attack us. That is the reason we are developing AWAC and other programs. If the budget is cut too low, then everybody would be able to fly around over our heads. However, we have a lot of tactical air divisions around the globe made up of F–4’s and F–100’s. Maybe we can make some of these planes available for our defense program.

Dr. Kissinger: The landing of the Cuban plane at Homestead Air Base when the President was only a few miles away is strong evidence that our current air defense system is not working.⁷

Mr. Packard: We can’t do anything about one plane. We don’t know whether it’s private or commercial, where it is going, or what it is up to.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t know what the right level should be for our air defense system. Can we get a statement of objectives? (to Packard ) Can we have some recommendations on improving our present system within the current budget, such as your suggestion of reassigning F–4’s? At least then we will have a yardstick by which we can measure our needs.

Mr. Packard: I don’t know how much we can do in a short time.

Dr. Kissinger: The annex is a good start.

Mr. Shultz: What budget level would be necessary to build an effective surveillance system?

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s do with air defense what we have done with the other topics in this paper. Let’s have a separate package on the different possible levels of air defense.

General Purpose Forces

Dr. Kissinger: In the MBFR study⁸ we reviewed many questions whose answers will affect our general purpose forces strategy: What is the role of tactical nuclear weapons? What should be our role in NATO? What role will the French forces play? Do we plan for the level necessary to defeat the Warsaw Pact forces? Is a 90-day supply of equipment sufficient in the NATO area?

Certainly we want to avoid the present situation, in which our main forces in NATO are in the least critical areas. Our main forces are now in areas which are the least likely to be involved in battle. Further, we have much larger stockpiles in NATO than any other areas.

When I looked at Tables 5 and 6, it seemed that the biggest difference was in the level of tactical air and naval forces, particularly in tactical air. There was a big difference in the number of tactical air wings under the various alternatives. The problem with deciding what tactical air level to support is like the question raised by our bombing study in Southeast Asia. We don’t know what we’re trying to accomplish with our tactical air program. The tables vary the number of air wings in Europe from 23 to 25. What does this mean? How many wings are required?

Adm. Moorer: All you can do is make the best estimate possible of the requirements.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m not challenging your judgment. All I’m saying is that there is a difference of two wings in the two plans. What does that mean? What can you do with 25 wings that you can’t do with 23?

Adm. Moorer: There’s only a difference in degree. What you must do is assume a scenario with each. Our forces are designed so that we will have to take no more than a prudent risk.

Dr. Kissinger: In the Southeast Asia bombing study we discovered that only 30% of the missions were being used for close support of ground troops. The remaining missions were for deep interdiction bombing. Is this a general planning rule? Or is this just the case in Southeast Asia?

Adm. Moorer: This percentage just applies to Southeast Asia. The attrition of planes in Europe would be much higher. In a war with Russia, our first goal would be to gain control of the air. Further, the Navy would have to protect ships rather than fly support missions for ground troops. The percentage of planes used in different missions in WWII changed as the war progressed. In WWII, close support of troops was only 15% of the overall air effort.

Mr. Packard: We have 4,600 U.S. tactical aircraft assigned to NATO. If you include the 2,500 NATO allied planes you arrive at a total of 7,100 allied aircraft in the NATO area. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have only 6,100. And we not only have more planes, but we also have better planes than the Warsaw Pact forces. When we talk about reducing the number of planes committed to NATO, we are only talking about removing F–105’s and F–100’s. Since these are our least capable planes, the reduction is not as significant as it might be.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we assuming that we are going to be attacked?

Adm. Moorer: The Soviets are producing Foxbat 2’s and Flagons.⁹ These aircraft are in full production.

Dr. Kissinger: How many planes would survive a Soviet attack?

Adm. Moorer: What kind of an attack?

Dr. Kissinger: An attack designed to achieve their objectives.

Adm. Moorer: At this time we are concentrating more and more of our fleets on fewer and fewer fields. This makes budgetary sense but increases vulnerability.

Dr. Kissinger: How many fields are they concentrated on now?

Adm. Moorer: Most of our planes are on five fields.

Dr. Lynn: Can they be dispersed rapidly or will they be caught off guard in an attack?

Mr. Packard: It depends on how it starts. Their planes have a shorter range than ours. If we can force them back, then we would minimize their effectiveness. But there is no simple answer.

Dr. Kissinger: In trying to decide the answer to this problem, shouldn’t we recognize that there is a big difference between a first strike by them and a first strike by us? Another question: In the MBFR discussion¹⁰ it was assumed that we would need tactical nuclear weapons early. Can any of the current fields be used for this purpose after an attack?

Adm. Moorer: Not all the fields would be usable, but some could be used. The use of tactical nuclear weapons would decrease the time needed to decide the outcome of the war. The tempo of the war would be increased and the outcome would be obvious sooner.

Dr. Kissinger: Whoever uses nuclear weapons first could make the air fields of the enemy unusable?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we shift between conventional and nuclear weapons on an aircraft?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Tucker: Every war game we have played results in extensive damage to both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: How sensitive is our nuclear force to the number of planes that we have? Is the effective nuclear capability significantly affected by the difference between 7,100 and 6,100 planes?

Adm. Moorer: As the battle progresses and planes are shot down, it would become significant.

Mr. Packard: The most important objective is to avoid nuclear war; and the smaller our general purpose force, the more likely that a nuclear war will occur early. Without general purpose forces, if a conflict starts the only alternative is to go to nuclear weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: Unless the Russians believe that a large conventional war makes nuclear war less likely. This is like the old circular discussion with the Europeans that building up conventional forces makes a nuclear war less likely, which makes a conventional war more likely, thereby making a nuclear war more likely. This is a serious question. Hillenbrand argues that if the Russians see that we have only a 90-day supply for our forces in Europe, they might conclude that we will have to go to nuclear weapons early.

Adm. Moorer: We keep conventional weapons in order to give them pause, that is, to provide a deterrent.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree that right now we don’t need to take any major steps in order to have a sufficient conventional war capability. What we do need is a recasting of the NATO structure.

Mr. Packard: But we don’t have sufficient conventional capabilities against surprise attacks.

Dr. Kissinger: The U.S. has only a 90-say supply for forces in NATO, but the Germans have supplies for only three weeks, and the Belgians for two days. In a conventional war, if the enemy broke through our lines this supply shortage would be critical.

Mr. Packard: If we have a satisfactory warning, then we can solve this problem.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we get a figure on how long it would take to solve the supply problem?

Dr. Lynn: We are doing that.

Adm. Moorer: We have wrestled with the supply problem in NATO for 15 years, but NATO just will not face up to it. A big question concerns the French. If we have to supply our forces in a hurry what will the French do? We would need their ports for a rapid supply operation.

Dr. Kissinger: NATO could refuse to face this problem in the 50’s and 60’s. However, [less than 1 line not declassified] and the balance might look much more attractive to the Soviets. In 1961 we could put SAC on alert; but now, can we afford not to answer these questions? I know that such questions would blow the lid off NATO, but these questions are facts of life. They are not even policy questions.

Mr. Packard: The U.S. tactical air program is in good shape. The question is, what would our European allies do? We can take out our lower-capability planes and cut costs without seriously affecting our situation. We could go down to 21 wings if all the F–100’s and F–105’s were removed. We can go down some without serious risk. Our ground forces are good, but they are not prepared to handle a surprise attack. However, the allies are in bad shape.

Dr. Kissinger: The only possible conclusion is that we must make our allies face the facts of life.

Adm. Moorer: For years the defense ministers in NATO countries have used our nuclear umbrella as an excuse for their inaction.

Dr. Kissinger: If we’re going to stumble through the 70’s in the same way, we want to know why. Some of our moves over Berlin did not make sense. But there was a question in the minds of the Soviets as to whether they should take steps that might lead to war. The President and the principals must decide whether to rock the boat in NATO, but we are agreed that we can’t go much further with our current discussions until we know what our NATO allies will be willing to do.

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: We must realize, however, that it will rock the boat.

Dr. Kissinger: And we must be careful how it’s presented. In the 1961–63 period we asked the right questions, but the way we asked them had a serious adverse affect. That is why we need the NSSM 84 study. ¹¹

Mr. Packard: That is why we shouldn’t reduce significantly our general purpose forces until some of these questions are answered.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. Reductions would be very dangerous given the current strategic balance.

Carriers

Dr. Kissinger: How does one think about the right size for our carrier forces?

Mr. Packard: I think we will have to come down to 12 carriers while continuing the S–3A program.

If you look at our overall naval program, you can see that we must keep our tactical submarines. The number of Russian submarines is going up. We must also keep the number of escort vessels up. If we keep these levels up, then only 12 carriers would be necessary. We would like to build less expensive ASW carriers.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t know what we need in the way of carriers. How do we decide this?

Mr. Packard: The ASW paper is well done.

Dr. Lynn: You have an advantage over us, we have not seen that paper.

Mr. Packard: Well, it shows where we come out on the issue of carriers. We will distribute the paper. Basically, it says that we will keep our present ASW program, and with the new developments that are already planned we’ll be in good shape. We would then be in a position to limit our tactical air program.

Dr. Kissinger: In some places there is no land to base aircraft on. Adm. Moorer: This has always bothered me about our swing strategy. The Soviets have a large force in the Pacific. Even if we are fighting a NATO war we will have to have a lot of ships in the Pacific. The objective of an aircraft carrier is to destroy the enemy. We can’t switch CVS/CVA uses. Fighting against ASW aircraft and against submarines is completely different. We must build smaller, simpler ASW carriers so that we can switch ASW’s to a strike posture. We must realize the differences in the various operations. We can put some anti-sub weapons on other ships. Generally, however, an ASW war is a war of attrition. Twelve attack carriers, with six in each ocean, is absolutely the minimum. At many places in the Pacific we have no bases, and the Pacific is very large. The Navy is required to cover a very large area there.

Mr. Johnson: Could you give ASW’s dual capabilities against carrier based air support and against submarines?

Adm. Moorer: We could take off the anti-submarine and go to air support planes.

Dr. Kissinger: We could go to smaller ships with more limited war functions.

Adm. Moorer: The big cost of a carrier is its electronic and other special equipment. The ship itself, the platform, is only 40% of the entire cost. The more aircraft you can put on a platform, the cheaper the overall operating cost of each plane. However, one ship can not be in two places at once, and we need to cover as much area as possible. These are the factors that must be considered in deciding on the size of vessels.

Mr. Packard: The first objective of the Navy is to insure freedom of the seas: both over, under, and on the seas. The second objective is to support amphibious operations where there are no bases. Only after these objectives have been reached should we argue whether we need carriers where we have land bases.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Johnson) What was your speech on Asia?

Mr. Johnson: What trade-offs between carrier and land-based air support and U.S. land forces will we be making in Asia? As negotiations proceed under the Nixon Doctrine, I suspect that we will have a need for more carrier-based and land-based air support and less need for U.S. land forces. I also assume that we will have fewer land-based air facilities. Thus, we will definitely need more carrier air support in that area.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you saying that we need a larger defense budget?

Mr. Packard: How safe do you want to be?

Dr. Kissinger: Alex’s question is one of basic strategy.

Dr. Lynn: In charting our budget needs in order to gain air-to-air superiority, what percentage of the total air effort would be required?

Adm. Moorer: You can’t separate the various functions of air power. Your first objective is to destroy the air fields of the enemy. After you have gained air superiority, you shift the mission of your Air Force. Thus, air power must be flexible.

Mr. Packard: The Israelis are a good example. In 1967 they bombed the air fields of the Arabs in order to gain air superiority. A percentage breakdown of the various missions is a very complex question.

Dr. Lynn: What force is required to gain superiority?

Dr. Kissinger: That question has already been asked.

Adm. Moorer: The first thing you must do is go for the other fellow’s planes.

Mr. Packard: If you look at current forces levels, we have a good chance of maintaining superiority without nuclear weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: The President doesn’t want to know what you can buy at different budget levels. He wants to know what the consequences at the various budget levels would be. The question he is asking is: If I give up this program, what does it mean? If you go down 1, 2, or 3 steps in the budget, how will you affect the situation? Apparently our strategic situation is pretty good. In the NSC meeting we need to decide what each level of military spending means. What will be the consequences of buying at the various levels. I will check with each of you on these questions before the meeting. (to Packard) I know your problems with planning the current budget.

Mr. Johnson: What needs to be done?

Dr. Kissinger: The current paper does most of the work. With one more round on this paper, with the ASW paper, and with an initial look at the carrier situation, we should have enough material for the NSC meeting.

SIOP

Mr. Packard: With regard to SIOP, [1½ lines not declassified]. Its maximum effectiveness is not in destroying population but in striking the military forces of the other side after the fight has started.

Dr. Kissinger: But conditions have changed in the last few years.

Mr. Packard: Not all that much. Targets are still air fields, silos, etc. In the short term our weapons, such as Poseidon, will be effective against these targets.

Dr. Kissinger: Is SIOP budgeting handled the right way? Under the conditions now emerging, won’t greater flexibility be needed? Of course, if we look at the options regarding SIOP today, we will be constrained by basic philosophical questions.

Mr. Shultz: What does all this come down to? Before the meeting began, Alex said that the military budget for FY 72 was $79 billion, but that $3 billion might be taken off. Where would the $3 billion reduction come from—the volunteer army program or what? Of course there are a lot of strategic questions to think through. But a lot of things discussed here today don’t seem to fit into the strategic needs. That would take my thinking for FY 72 somewhere below the $76 billion figure.

Mr. Packard: The biggest variable is Vietnam. At present we have to hold tight on our budget there. In our overall budget, we might come down under $76 billion a little, if we could come back up if necessary later on.

Adm. Moorer: We must keep in mind the question of credibility with both our enemies and our friends. To a great extent, the threat we face determines the budget we must have. If the U.S. is to maintain its position as a leader of the free world forces, we must not let our budget determine our military force level.

Mr. Shultz: I agree. But if an increase in the defense budget is needed, we will have to have a tax increase. If that is the situation, then there is much work to be done.

Dr. Kissinger: That should not be necessary. But we do need the answers to several questions. After the NSC meeting, we will make a stab at some of the answers. Until that time, we should continue our efforts to find ways to decrease the budget.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Document 145.
3. See Documents 147 and 148
4. See footnote 5, Document 148.
5. An apparent reference to a revised version of “Defense Planning, 1971–76.” Neither the paper nor its annex was found, but the paper’s seventh and final revision is Document 152.
6. The table, entitled “Comparison of Illustrative Strategic Forces” and included in Kissinger’s talking points, listed the number of strategic forces, including bombers, Titan and Minuteman missiles, Polaris/Poseidon boats, air defense interceptors, SAM missiles, and planned Safeguard sites, available under the Current, Limited Reduction, Reduced, and other programs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–98, DPRC General, Mar. 1970–Dec. 1970)
7. On October 5, 1969, a Cuban Air Force MIG–17 unexpectedly landed at Homestead Air Force Base, located near Miami, at the same time that Air Force One was at the base preparing to fly President Nixon to Washington after his stay at Key Biscayne. (New York Times, October 6, 1969, p. 15)
8. An apparent reference to NSSM 92, “Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Between NATO and Warsaw Pact,” issued on April 13. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, 1969–1976, Document 21. Regarding the MBFR papers prepared in response to NSSM 92, see ibid., Document 32, footnotes 4 and 5.
9. The Foxbat and Flagon were Soviet high-altitude interceptor aircraft.
10. The Verification Panel discussed MBFR on July 30. See ibid., Document 32, footnote 4.
11. NSSM 84, “U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO,” was issued on November 21, 1969. It is scheduled for publication ibid., volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.