Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

205. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, June 20, 1978.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Conclusions from the June 12 SCC Meeting on SALT

You raised a number of questions on my June 15 package to you (attached) submitting the June 12 SALT SCC Summary and corresponding instructions to the delegation for your approval.²

You note that you think the protocol limit on new types permitting MX is best and that you like the idea of MAP being assessed for Minuteman. The new types and MAP issues are, of course, related, and the interagency SALT working group is now assessing the alternatives on both and how they play against each other. If the analysis shows that MAP is feasible in SALT verification terms for Minuteman, this would open the possibility of accepting the Gromyko proposal for a no-exceptions ban on new types in the 1985 agreement.³ If we went this way, we could then MAP Minuteman, drop MX (or rather hold it as a post-1985 option), and build whatever counterforce capability required into Trident II which could itself be developed to have the potential for conversion into a post-1985 MX.

If, however, MAP represents unmanageable verification problems, then another mobile basing mode will have to be found⁴ and the option for a pre-’85 MX preserved.⁵ In this event possible options for resolving this issue in SALT would include a protocol limit on new types with an exception for each side, or putting over the new types issue to SALT III.

At this point, I think we need to stick to our current new types position until we can see our way more clearly through this thicket of issues. We will review the issue at another SALT SCC now scheduled for June 26, looking to a future Vance-Gromyko meeting.

As you also noted, Jones’s ideas on Backfire are indeed reasonable. We will have to review precisely what we would keep and what we would drop in the current list of assurances we have presented to the Soviets. We will very likely need to reject the flight profile⁶ the Soviets have offered us and tell them that we will rely on our own analyses as the benchmark and basis for evaluating Backfire’s performance and any upgrading.

We will especially need to consider how we play this new Backfire card with the Soviets and what we try to get for accepting a slimmed down version of our original proposal. Since it would represent a substantial step on our side we should try to get something substantial from them such as movement toward us on new types. We will be back to you once we have taken a look at the substance and tactics of a possible new Backfire approach.⁷

On the SALT III principles,⁸ the footnote you questioned should not be there. It refers to an earlier proposal opposed by the JCS to delete a reference to survivability. The issue was settled by accepting a JCS proposed phrase at the top of page 2 of the principles referring to “measures to increase confidence in the mutual security of permitted strategic offensive arms.”

On your question re “grey areas” the approach we have developed with the Allies is to go on record about future grey area limitations in a way that holds open all our options both on substance and on the negotiating forum. As you may recall, the French oppose any grey area negotiations, but if they take place prefer that SALT be the forum. The Germans are quite interested in grey area negotiations but want a forum other than SALT. The British are skeptical of grey area negotiations and ambivalent about how they might be negotiated. Finally, neither we nor the Allies know what we want to achieve in such negotiations nor which grey area capabilities we are prepared to forego. We have a PRM on this issue under preparation⁹ and plan systematic substantive consultations with the Allies to begin in the fall.

In this situation, our plan is to make a unilateral statement in SALT in connection with the Principles that any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.¹⁰ This puts down a marker on “grey areas” with the USSR but keeps open all our options while we work the problem through here and with the Allies.

Recommendation

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A of the attached package.

That you approve the instructions to the SALT Delegation at Tab B of the attached package. The footnote on page 2 of the principles will be deleted.¹¹

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote “Zbig, JC” at the top of the first page.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Carter double underlined “If” in this sentence and wrote “true” in the margin next to the sentence.
4. Carter underlined “another mobile basing mode will have to be found” and wrote a question mark in the margin next to it.
5. Carter underlined “the option for a pre-’85 MX preserved” and wrote “true” in the margin next to it.
6. Carter underlined “reject the flight profile” and wrote “true” in the margin next to it.
7. Carter underlined “how we play this new Backfire card” in the first sentence and wrote “expedite” next to the last sentence of this paragraph,
8. The SALT III Principles as approved for the SALT Delegation (with “Agreement” replacing “Treaty”) are attached to a memorandum from Brzezinski to Mondale, Vance, and Brown, June 23. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78)
9. Presumably a reference to PRM 38, “Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control,” issued on June 22.
10. Carter underlined “any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems” and wrote “ok” in the margin.
11. Carter approved both recommendations and in reference to the second wrote, “as edited. Also, why not include in SALT III principles? Do not use ‘Treaty’ any more. J.”