Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

204. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 27, 1978, 8 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• SALT, CTB, Africa, Human Rights

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
• Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Ambassador Paul C. Warnke
• Ambassador Malcolm Toon
• Mr. David Aaron
• Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
• Mr. Hamilton Jordan
• Mr. Jody Powell
• Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
• Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
• Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
• Ambassador V. Makarov
• Minister Counselor A.A. Bessmertnykh
• Mr. V.G. Komplektov
• Mr. N.N. Detinov
• Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

SALT

In embarking upon discussion of SALT problems, Gromyko wanted first of all to note the positive outcome of Secretary Vance’s last visit to Moscow.² It would be hard to measure in specifics how much had already been accomplished. At the same time, on some issues serious problems remained. The President was surely aware of the Soviet leadership’s positive assessment of the state of affairs today in terms of working out agreed limitations on strategic offensive arms, and the approach based on principle, which the Soviet side had brought to the negotiation of that accord. These principles had recently been clearly set forth to Secretary Vance during his last visit to Moscow by L.I. Brezhnev and by Gromyko himself. He would not hesitate to repeat what he had already said—that the Soviet side was most resolutely in favor of completing the work on the new agreement and signing it as soon as possible. He was convinced that this would meet the national interests of both our countries to an equal degree, and would have long-term positive effects on our relations with each other. Furthermore, it would break the dangerous trend of the continuing arms race. The fact that the arms race was unfortunately continuing could hardly be disputed by anyone familiar with the facts. The Soviet approach was now concretely embodied in the specific and truly major steps taken by the Soviet side with the objective of finding mutually acceptable solutions, i.e., solutions acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Naturally only an approach of this kind could produce appropriate results. It should be sufficient to recall the major steps the Soviet side had taken here in Washington last year during the meetings with the President³ to which the President had referred in his remarks. After those meetings the Soviet side had acted accordingly, appropriately dealing with the strategic problems involved in the limitation of strategic arms, and that policy had also been consistently pursued by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva.

Gromyko noted that unfortunately it had not yet proved possible to complete the new agreement. Why this was so had been addressed by the Soviet side in its assessment of the current state of affairs at the negotiations; the Secretary was surely aware of that assessment and Gromyko would not want to lose time repeating it. He simply wanted to emphasize again that the Soviet approach, based on principle, had not changed; as demonstrated during the recent discussions with the Secretary of State in Moscow, the Soviet side continued to do all in its power to resolve outstanding issues. It would go without saying that in that process it was absolutely necessary not to deviate from the agreed principle of equality and equal security. That principle was the very cornerstone on which the SALT negotiations rested. Without observing it strictly it would not prove possible to find appropriate solutions for the issues before our two countries. When Secretary Vance was in Moscow about one month ago, he had told the Soviet leadership that President Carter personally and the U.S. Government were resolutely in favor of prompt resolution of the questions still at issue. The Soviet side was in favor of that, too, believed that all remaining issues must be resolved and was prepared to make every effort toward that end.

Gromyko would first address the question of a ban on new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. This was not a new question; it had been discussed with the President last fall, and with the Secretary of State quite recently. In Moscow it had been discussed in the context of the agreed maximum level for launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs. The Soviet side had informed the Secretary of State, and Gromyko wanted to confirm this today, that in the event, and only in the event of mutually acceptable resolution of the question of new types the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree that the level for MIRVed ballistic missiles be established not at the earlier figure of 1,250, but at 1,200. In taking this decision the Soviet side had taken into consideration the importance President Carter personally attached to the question of levels, to which he had referred on several occasions. He would recall that at their second meeting here in Washington last September President Carter had said that if the Soviet side agreed to establish the level of MIRVed missiles at 1,200, the United States might meet the Soviet side in the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Originally the Soviet side had proposed that for the period of the Protocol a ban be placed on all flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with a single reentry vehicle. The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs would also be banned for the same period of time, except that such a ban would not apply to RSM–52 SLBMs for the USSR and to Trident-I SLBMs for the United States. In view of the fact that, as the Soviet side understood it, the U.S. side preferred that the question of new types of ICBMs be resolved within the framework of the Treaty with a term through 1985 rather than within the framework of the three-year Protocol, the Soviet side had in the course of the talks in Moscow expressed its readiness to accept this variant of resolving the question, bearing in mind that in that event an exception would be made for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, which each side would have the right to test and deploy during that period. At the same time, there would be a ban on new types of SLBMs, except that it would not apply to RSM–52 SLBMs for the USSR or Trident-I SLBMs for the United States. If the U.S. side preferred that the aforementioned provisions for SLBMs remain in effect only for the term of the three-year Protocol rather than for the term of the Treaty, the question could be resolved in this manner as well. The Soviet side had repeatedly set forth appropriate arguments and had frankly stated the reasons why it believed it necessary to have an exception for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. Gromyko was sure that even if the Soviet side had not marshalled its own arguments in favor of that exception, the President’s experts would have explained the reasons to him. That need had been prompted by the actual state of affairs in this area, and was in large measure due to the steps the Soviet side had taken to meet the U.S. position with regard to MIRV verification. In this connection he had in mind, above all, the preliminarily agreed principle of counting all ICBM launchers of a type as MIRVed if they had at least once been tested with MIRVs. That had been a major concession on the part of the Soviet Union and had been appropriately regarded as such by the U.S. side as well. This, in conjunction with establishing a special maximum level of 820 for MIRVed ICBMs had been agreed upon at this very table in Washington last year. The Soviet side had also agreed that all ICBM launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk would accordingly be counted as MIRVed, although most of them even today had not been MIRVed, as the President must surely be aware. At the same time, the testing and deployment by each side of one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, the need for which, he would repeat, was prompted for the Soviet side by practical necessity, would not in any way change the strategic situation that had emerged, and thus would not be contrary to the objectives of the agreement being worked out. (Gromyko repeated “would not be contrary to the objectives.”) However, there was no way that the Soviet side could agree to the U.S. having the right to test and deploy one new type of ICBM equipped with MIRVs rather than with one reentry vehicle, since these were an entirely different category of missiles and were different, inter alia, from the standpoint of their impact upon the strategic situation. Gromyko doubted if anyone would dispute this fact. After all, it was the U.S. side itself that had on many occasions emphasized the destabilizing impact of MIRVed ICBMs. Therefore, he would repeat, the Soviet Union could not in any way agree to this variant of resolving the issue.

As for SLBMs, Gromyko recalled that some time ago the U.S. side had proposed that an exception be made from the ban on flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs, for one new type of such missiles for each side. The Soviet side had agreed to such an exception, but it could not in any way agree and could not accept that such an exception violate the principle of equality, equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage. And yet, in actual fact the U.S. proposal was aimed at precisely such unilateral advantage in providing that the exception should apply to Trident–I SLBMs for the United States and to RSM–50 SLBMs for the USSR, rather than to RSM–52 SLBMs. Such an approach could not be justified from the standpoint of both the substance and the letter of the Treaty being worked out. After all, both RSM–52 SLBMs and Trident-I SLBMs were new missiles, missiles of the second generation of MIRVed SLBMs. At the same time, already agreed provisions of the Treaty stated quite directly that existing types of MIRVed SLBMs were Soviet RSM–50 SLBMs and U.S. Poseidon SLBMs. How then could one now refer to RSM–50 SLBMs as new missiles? That would be tantamount to calling a chicken a fish. For this reason the Soviet Union had resolutely defended its position that the exception from the ban on new types of SLBMs apply to RSM–52 SLBMs for the USSR and Trident-I SLBMs for the United States. Both were new types of missiles. In that way each side would have the right to develop one new type of missile. Thus there would be no grounds in the future for any disputes or arguments about these SLBMs.

The Soviet Union considered the two aforementioned variants for a solution to the question of new types of missiles as being fully justified, and was prepared to reach agreement on that basis. He would ask the President to take a look at these proposals very closely.

Nonetheless, having once again carefully weighed all the aspects of the question of the ban on new types of missiles, the Soviet Union believed it possible to reach agreement on the basis of still one more variant for resolving this question. The U.S. side had proposed that the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs be banned for the term of the Protocol. The Soviet Union was now suggesting to go even further and to ban the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, without exception, for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, regardless of whether they were equipped with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle. Along with that there would also have to be a ban for the term of the Treaty on the flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs, here again with an exception from such a ban for RSM–52 and Trident-I SLBMs. In stating its willingness to accept such a solution of this issue, the Soviet side would indeed forfeit the opportunity to satisfy its practical needs to which he had earlier referred. What those needs were the President would be well aware of on the basis of what his experts could tell him. Nevertheless, guided by the interests of successfully completing the new agreement, the Soviet Union was once again demonstrating its good will in taking into account the U.S. position on this question.

Contingent upon agreement by the U.S. side to one of the variants of resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, as set forth above, the Soviet Union would be prepared to take one more step to meet the position of the U.S. side. Gromyko had just presented three variants for a solution to this issue, and it would be up to the United States to decide which would suit it best. For a long period of time now it had been a matter of importance of principle for the United States to put a limit on the number of additional warheads that could be placed on Soviet ICBMs, above all on Soviet heavy missiles. Countless were the fears expressed in connection with those missiles in terms of a Soviet threat, a first strike, etc. The Soviet Union would now tell the United States officially that it was prepared to include in the Treaty a provision to the effect that in the course of modernization of existing types of ICBMs, which had been flight-tested as of January 1, 1977, the sides undertake not to increase the number of warheads on such missiles. Gromyko was well aware of the fact that the U.S. side had attached great importance to such a limitation. Secretary Vance had made that very clear during his recent visit to Moscow. Thus it would be possible to find a solution to this question as well in the context of the proposals Gromyko had presented today. He repeated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to include such a provision in the Treaty on the condition that the U.S. side agreed to one of the aforementioned variants for resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, and also bearing in mind the following: (a) that a mutually acceptable solution be found for the definition of new types of ICBMs, i.e., that the sides agree on the criteria with the help of which limits would in fact be established on the modernization of existing types of ICBMs; (b) that the sides assume the obligation to limit the maximum number of cruise missiles with ranges between 600 and 2,500 kilometers that could be installed on each bomber carrying such missiles, namely that that number be no more than 20; (c) as the Soviet side understood it, the U.S. side had now agreed that the overall aggregate of strategic offensive arms be reduced from 2,400 to 2,250. That, too, was a question to which the President had always attached great importance. Taking this into account, the Soviet side would be prepared to agree that such reductions be carried out over a period of 12 months beginning December 30, 1980. Thus, the Soviet side was prepared to shorten the time for reductions by 6 months as compared to the time it had earlier proposed for achieving necessary reductions, although for purely practical reasons this was a very difficult decision for the Soviet side to take. In this connection, Gromyko would ask the President to take into account the fact that any other solution to the question of timing of reductions, one that would come closer to what the U.S. side had suggested, would, for purely practical reasons, be totally impossible for the Soviet Union to comply with. Gromyko would therefore ask the President not to insist further, and to accept the Soviet proposal in this regard, bearing in mind that the Soviet side could not go any further. Indeed, in this connection, what was it we were talking about? After all, what was involved here was dismantling or destruction of systems in excess of established limits. Surely there could be no question here of threatening or undermining the security of either side. The Soviet side was once again moving to meet the position of the U.S. side in order to finish with this question as well, thereby ensuring genuine progress toward completing the new agreement. He would like to hope that the question of reducing the aggregates of strategic offensive arms and of timing of reductions could now be considered as agreed. He would hope that the President would simply say yes.

Gromyko handed the President a one-page document listing the three variants for resolution of the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, together with a working English translation. He asked the President to regard the proposals on new types set forth in that document as alternative proposals. The text of this document reads as follows:

“ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS

The Soviet side proposes the following three possible variants for resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs:

First variant. The flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs must be banned for the term of the three-year Protocol, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with only a single reentry vehicle.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the same period, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM–52 missile; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.

Second variant. The flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs must be banned for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with only a single reentry vehicle.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the term of the three-year Protocol or for the term of the Treaty, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM–52 missile; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.

Third variant. The flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, without exception, i.e., of those with a single reentry vehicle and those with multiple reentry vehicles, must be banned for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the same period, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM–52; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.”

Gromyko said that he had one more final question to address, one of an entirely different category. This was the question of the Soviet medium bomber TU–22–M, the Backfire, as it was called in the United States. He could only express regret over the fact that this issue was still being raised at the negotiations, although there was no justification whatsoever for that, neither de facto nor de jure. He had told Secretary Vance the other day that perhaps the Soviet side had been mistaken to discuss this airplane in the first place, because it was clearly not a strategic weapons system. However, the Soviet side had assumed that the questions raised about this bomber might be based on someone harboring an honest misconception about it. Still, he would not rule out that at some point the Soviet side might simply refuse to discuss this airplane any further. The President was surely aware of the fundamental position of the Soviet Union in this regard, which had been clearly set forth in the course of previous meetings and discussions, including the meeting with the President last year. That position had not changed and could not change, simply because the airplane itself had not changed. The fact that the U.S. side continued to raise this issue, and the way in which that was done, gave rise to serious doubts which went far beyond the limits of the issue itself. Frankly, he believed that the President and his advisors had been fed some false information concerning this bomber. It would be hard for him to tell whether or not this had been done deliberately. Whatever the reason, the Soviet side felt that the motivation for supplying wrong information about this bomber was opposition to the very idea of concluding a strategic arms agreement between our two countries. After all, there were surely those on the U.S. side who knew the true state of affairs. The bomber was not a needle in a haystack that could be hidden, never to be found. In any case, he could only sympathize with the President for having received such erroneous information. If the Soviet Union was now expressing its readiness unilaterally to provide certain clarifications, this was a reflection of its good will at the negotiations, and it should be properly appreciated. It was now high time to close out this contrived question. The fact that the question was still open made it difficult for the Soviet side to escape the conviction that those who were raising it constantly were pursuing much more far-reaching objectives. They surely knew very well that the Soviet Union had much more reason to raise questions about American aircraft that were not covered by the term “heavy bomber,” but could in fact strike Soviet territory. Thus, if the Soviet side had wanted to put obstacles in the way of concluding an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, it could have raised much more justified questions about U.S. aircraft. He believed, therefore, that this matter should be approached from a position of principle and not be allowed artificially to block agreement until the very last moment, in the hope that this would enable the U.S. side to obtain something further from the Soviet side. An approach of that kind will not lead to anything useful. The Soviet leaders sometimes engaged in half serious speculation concerning the reasons why that airplane was so awe-inspiring for some Americans. They had speculated that perhaps it was the name given that aircraft in the United States, or some feature of the external appearance of that aircraft that had so frightened many Americans. In any case, they had come to the conclusion that those who raised questions about it pursued more far-reaching aims than met the eye. He would ask the President to take another look at this matter.

In this connection, Gromyko once again confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to make a unilateral statement concerning the TU–22–M airplane. The text of that statement could be communicated to the U.S. side subsequently. Moreover, in view of the insistent wishes voiced by the Secretary of State during his recent visit to Moscow, the Soviet side had deemed it possible to revise the content of such a statement in a way designed to meet the wishes of the U.S. side. The President would recall that Gromyko had informed him of the content of such a statement when they had met at this very table last year. Thus, he was sure, the President would immediately see that the Soviet side had moved further than it had intended in an effort to demonstrate good will.

For all the above reasons, the Soviet side would be prepared to make the following unilateral statement which took into account the additional issues Secretary Vance had raised during his visit to Moscow. The Secretary’s questions in Moscow were not answered at that time due to lack of time, since they had been raised toward the end of his visit. The text follows:

“As a gesture of good will, the Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet medium-range bomber TU–22–M, called Backfire in the United States, has a radius of action of 2,200 kilometers when flying at subsonic speed with a normal payload at altitudes of 8,000 to 12,000 meters, and that it, i.e., the Soviet side, does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States. It does not intend to give that airplane such capability in any other manner, including by way of in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present production rate.”

Gromyko pointed out that the statement as just read included exhaustive data concerning the flight profile of the airplane in connection with its stated radius of action. These data had not been supplied earlier not because of any lack of good will, but simply because the Soviet side had thought the statement to be sufficient as it had then been drafted. Representatives of the U.S. side had repeatedly asked questions about the flight profile at which this aircraft had a radius of action of 2,200 kilometers. The answer was now contained in the statement as read. It specified the speed as subsonic, the altitude as 8–12,000 meters and the payload as normal. These data definitely confirmed the fact that the TU–22–M was a medium range bomber although, he would repeat, the Soviet side was sure that the President’s experts had been well aware of that fact all along. If any of them had not known these facts, the statement in its present form would raise the level of their awareness. Apart from that, and here again at the insistence of the U.S. side, the Soviet side had deleted the words “by way of information” from the last sentence of the statement, since Secretary Vance in Moscow had strenuously objected to these words. In fact, however, this had not changed anything since it would go without saying that this editorial change did not in any way change the nature of the Soviet statement; it was a unilateral statement made to demonstrate the good will of the Soviet side. Gromyko expressed the hope that the President would correctly understand and appreciate the willingness of the Soviet side to take into account certain wishes of the U.S. side and to make that unilateral statement more specific.

Gromyko said that this should finally put the Backfire issue to rest, and put it to rest right now, so that neither today nor in the future it be raised as an issue on which reaching agreement depended. Judging by everything said about the Backfire in the past, there were some people who did indeed wish to block agreement by using false information about this airplane. It was not in the interests of either country to encourage such people.

Gromyko had a few more words to say regarding the Backfire. The Soviet leadership had carefully followed discussion of this issue in the United States and had tried to identify those who made statements about it. Such statements were frequently made by representatives of the U.S. Congress, but sometimes also by representatives of the U.S. Administration. In this way one statement by one group provides a stimulus to statements by another group and reinforced and inflated the current myths that had been created around this aircraft. Eventually some of those who created the myths might even begin to believe their own misstatements. Since this whole issue was based on myths and not on reality, what was needed to resolve it was common sense and reason. It could be resolved much easier than many of the other issues already resolved. And yet, statements were still being made referring to the Backfire as the main political issue at the negotiations. The Soviet leadership simply could not understand such an approach. (Gromyko repeated the words “could not understand.”) He believed that it was necessary for both sides to approach all the questions at the negotiations from the standpoint of reason and facts. If the U.S. side agreed with that premise, then it was necessary for the U.S. Administration to take active steps to prove that this aircraft is not a strategic weapons system and cannot in any way constitute a block to reaching agreement.

To what he had already said Gromyko wanted to add that the unilateral text he had read would be transmitted to the U.S. side in written form at the appropriate moment. This would be done on the condition that no one say or imply that this statement was part of the agreement or that it was an official document. If anything to that effect were said, the Soviet side would deny it. Today he would limit himself to having read the statement verbally, but it would eventually be transmitted in written form.

Before concluding his presentation, Gromyko wanted to note the great importance the Soviet side attached to the fact that in the course of the recent meetings in Moscow it had proved possible to agree on the text of the Treaty article dealing with the obligation not to circumvent the provisions of the Treaty. Agreement on this article had been reached mainly as a result of the concessions made by the Soviet side. In this connection, the Soviet side would continue to proceed from the understanding of the obligations contained in that article as discussed in the course of reaching agreement on the text of the non-circumvention provision. What that understanding was was clearly recorded in the memcons of each side.

In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to draw the President’s attention to the new and major steps the Soviet side was prepared to take in the interests of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining questions at the negotiations. He expressed the hope that the U.S. side would reciprocate by similar efforts and that they would be able on that basis to conclude working out the agreement at last, ensuring that it would be signed and enter into force at an early stage. He would conclude his statement on this note and would be pleased to hear any comments the President might want to make.

The President first wanted to tell Gromyko that he had learned a lesson this morning. He could see that it had been a mistake to start their meeting so early. Had they started later, Gromyko might have been more forthcoming and cooperative. He wanted to respond briefly to Gromyko’s comments on SALT and put the whole discussion in perspective.

The President pointed out that we were talking about a Protocol period that would be relatively short—according to our proposal the Protocol would expire at the end of 1980. We were also discussing a more extensive agreement to last through the end of 1985. The two sides had agreed on some key numerical levels for the agreement. Referring to the various categories of arms, the significant numbers were 820, 1,200, 1,320 and 2,250. The Soviet Union had a special advantage in having 308 very large missiles which it had moved to MIRV. That continued to be a constant source of concern to the United States. However, this matter had been resolved with mutual concessions he believed, and we were willing to live with an agreement on the basis of these numbers. Two major items remained: one concerned the issue of new types of missiles and the other the characteristics and capabilities of the Backfire bomber, an issue Gromyko had discounted, although we attached importance to it.

We had some important differences concerning the ban on new types of missiles as it applied to SLBMs. In terms of their relative importance and advanced stage of development we equated the Trident-I SLBM to the Soviet RSM–50 SLBM. As an alternative, we equated our Trident-II missile to the Soviet RSM–52 missile. If the Soviet Union could not accept these equations, our position would be that during the term of the agreement through 1985 there should be no ban on new types of SLBMs. However one viewed any of the three options offered as a basis for agreement, we cannot accept that the Trident-I SLBM, a missile in an advanced stage of development, was equivalent to the Soviet RSM–52 SLBM, which we called the Typhoon, which was still in the conceptual stage.

On ICBMs we had put forward two alternative proposals. One applied to the Protocol period which was relatively brief, and would not impose a significant limit because after expiration of the Protocol there could be rapid deployment of new types of ICBMs. Our preference was that for the entire period of the Treaty through 1985 we put a significant limit on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs with one exception for each side. Since a new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle would not have any significance for us, we would prefer to have a reasonable and significant limit established for the Treaty period by providing one exception for each side, the excepted type of ICBM to be equipped with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle at the discretion of each side. We would in any case be bound by the 820 maximum limit for MIRVed ICBMs, but how we chose to use that limit should be a matter for us to decide. Either alternative was acceptable to us, but our preference would be one exception for each side, MIRVing to be decided at the discretion of each Party, and to be included for the Treaty period through 1985.

The President said there was another subject he wanted to touch on in passing—the dismantling schedule for excess systems. While it could best be negotiated at the level of the Secretary of State and the Delegations in Geneva, he saw no reason to extend that schedule an additional year. He noted that the two sides might reach agreement this year. As he understood the Soviet proposal, dismantling of excess systems would not be completed until the end of 1981, i.e., 3½ years from now. We were convinced that if dismantling commenced at the beginning of 1980, the missiles to be dismantled could be rendered inoperative within 2 or 3 months, and dismantling could be completed by the end of 1980. In this connection we were talking about 150 missiles and, as he understood it, this certainly was within the bounds of Soviet capabilities. On occasion the Soviet Union had built missiles faster than that; thus it should be able to dismantle missiles already deployed within the time period we had proposed.

The President turned to the Backfire issue. On the basis of the information he was receiving from all his advisors, who had no motive or desire to mislead him, he felt very strongly that this bomber had intercontinental capabilities, certainly if it were refueled in flight or stationed at advanced Arctic bases. In a time of crisis the total range of this aircraft was what concerned us and not just the radius of action. We believed that Gromyko had taken a step in the right direction in describing the flight profile related to the stated radius of action. However, the President noted, this language did not preclude substantial increases in the range of the Backfire, and did not preclude refueling capabilities. We were concerned about this just as we were about the absence of a ban on mounting long-range cruise missiles on the Backfire bomber. Further, the statement Gromyko had read also had not provided specifics concerning a production rate base on which we could depend. Was the Soviet side willing to accept our estimate of the production rate? This was a question Gromyko might answer, since we needed to have mutually agreed numbers for the production rate in order to eliminate this matter. The President’s own belief was that the more specific the Soviet side could be, the easier it would be for us to resolve this question. As he had understood Gromyko’s statement, the Soviet side felt that this was not a concern for the Soviet Union and should not even be discussed; for us, however, the Backfire was a formidable weapons system if stationed at advanced Arctic bases or equipped with long-range cruise missiles, or produced at a higher rate. All of these were serious problems for us, to which we attached great significance.

The President said that these very briefly were his concerns with the differences between us he saw as still remaining. He asked if Gromyko might want to respond briefly before the President turned to discussion of questions other than SALT.

Gromyko first addressed the possibility of the Backfire being equipped with long-range cruise missiles. He said that, as regards this, the Soviet Union would certainly very strictly abide by the obligations the sides would assume in their regard under the Treaty. The Soviet Union would abide by these obligations just as, he was sure, would the United States. Here he could not add or subtract anything. As for the production rate of the Backfire bomber, on several occasions the U.S. side had been informed in official statements that the production rate of that airplane would remain approximately at the present level. This had also been said to President Carter’s predecessor in practically the same terms. As for in-flight refueling, there was nothing Gromyko could add to what he had said. The draft statement he had read stated very clearly that the Soviet side would not give that aircraft intercontinental capabilities, including by means of in-flight refueling. If anyone wanted to indulge in speculations to the effect that this aircraft could be refueled five or six or ten times, he would only ask the President to consider how many American aircraft could be refueled in the same manner. In that event the Phantom would certainly have to be considered a heavy bomber. He was sure the President would not agree to have it so considered, but would ask him to let the Soviet side know if he did agree. As for the Phantom, this would not simply be theory. Phantoms had actually crossed the Atlantic a number of times; thus, if anyone were to raise such questions, it should be the Soviet side rather than the U.S. Phantoms could certainly reach the territory of the Soviet Union, particularly with in-flight refueling. Furthermore, some of them were based in various areas from where they could easily reach Soviet territory. What could the President reply to this?

The President said that one could, of course, speculate back and forth. He believed that a clear statement from the Soviet side would be helpful here. Would the Soviet Union disagree with a unilateral statement to be made by the United States, specifying that it was our estimate that the Soviet Union was producing two Backfires per month? We needed to have clear understanding in this matter.

Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet statement would be at the disposal of the United States. It clearly said that the rate at which this aircraft had been produced and was being produced now would remain in effect. He recalled that the same thing had also been said to President Ford in Helsinki at a meeting he himself had attended.⁴ This had been the occasion of signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At a meeting between President Ford, L.I. Brezhnev and Secretary Kissinger, President Ford had been told that the production rate of that bomber would not be changed. Also at that same occasion the Soviet side had not disputed the production rate data in the possession of the U.S. side. There a statement had been made, and Gromyko had repeated it today. Of course, it would be up to the President how best to explain this to the U.S. Congress and U.S. public opinion.

The President repeated his question: if we made a unilateral statement to the effect that the production rate of the Backfire bomber was two aircraft per month, and that the Soviet Union agreed with that figure, would that statement remain unchallenged?

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would take responsibility for its own statement. What was included in that statement had not been questioned by the U.S. side. Surely the President had data from his own experts. The production rate would remain approximately the same. As to how this should be explained, that would be entirely up to the President. Gromyko would only ask him not to force the Soviet Union to specify numbers; for the Soviet Union this was a matter of principle. There should really be no question here. The Soviet Union knew that the U.S. knew what the production rate was, and the U.S. knew that the Soviet Union knew that the U.S. knew, etc. It would seem there should be no question here at all and no need for polemics between the two sides. Indeed, how could one take two different figures for the production rate? One figure had been stated in Helsinki, and a different one here in Washington. If this was going to continue, Gromyko could not hope to keep up. Just last year the President had named a figure that was different from the one he had named today. Surely his experts could be more precise.

The President said we needed to have a clear understanding here. We had spoken of a figure of 2½ planes per month, i.e., 30 per year. The President needed to tell the American people that our assessment of the production rate was reliable, and that that production rate would not be exceeded. He did not want to find himself in a situation five years from now to discover that the production rate had been, say, 4 planes per month. We needed to tie down this matter.

The President had an additional question to ask: did the Soviet Union intend to retain the refueling capabilities of the Backfire bomber? This was a question to which we needed to have an answer.

Gromyko pointed out that, after all, he had never said that the Soviet Union would assume the obligation to deprive the Backfire bomber of any refueling capability. He had emphasized several times—in Moscow and here—that the Soviet Union would not give that aircraft an intercontinental capability in any manner, including by means of in-flight refueling. This was what he had particularly emphasized today. As for the production rate, he believed he had answered the President’s question. The Soviet formula remained. If the President would translate that rate into numbers, and if he would not deviate from the numbers he had when the Soviet Union first proposed that text, there would be no grounds for any polemics between the two sides now, or two or three or four years from now. However, in this connection, he would not want the U.S. side to speak on the basis of one figure one year and a different figure next year.

The President thought he should be frank to tell Gromyko that the Backfire statement suggested by Gromyko was not satisfactory. The total range of that aircraft, that would not be increased in the future, was adequate now with one refueling to strike our country. This would be a serious problem for us, because on a one-way flight without refueling the Backfire could cover 4,400 kilometers, and with refueling could easily reach U.S. territory. The President did not discern anything in the statement Gromyko had read that would state that the 2,200 kilometer range would be retained, that the aircraft would not have refueling capabilities. Above all, he did not want Gromyko to underestimate the difficulty this aircraft presented for us in terms of a SALT agreement.

(The meeting was briefly recessed to allow Mrs. Rose Kennedy to say hello to Gromyko. After resumption of the meeting, and some kind words by the President and by Gromyko with regard to Mrs. Kennedy, Gromyko returned to the subject under discussion.)

Gromyko said that when he returned to Moscow he would have to report to his colleagues in the Politburo, chaired by Brezhnev, that President Carter and Secretary of State Vance had argued that with additional refueling the TU–22–M bomber could reach U.S. territory, and that this was a matter of major concern to the United States. He would ask the President to imagine what the reaction of the Politburo would be. It would mean that in preparing the new agreement the U.S. side was thinking and talking about a Soviet aircraft which could reach the United States with one refueling. This will naturally also mean that the same arguments could be turned around and applied to large numbers of U.S. aircraft. Could one really say that the two sides were thereby enhancing mutual trust during preparation of the new SALT agreement? No one in the Soviet Union will have an understanding for such an approach. He apologized for saying this to the President quite forthrightly. It was better to say this directly than to harbor such thoughts secretly. He would ask what the real reason was that the U.S. Administration was frightening itself over this question. During the recess he had already said jokingly that the United States seemed to be putting out too many detective stories.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

1. Source: Department of State, Marshall Shulman Files, Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot File 81D109, Gromyko to U.S., 5/26–27, 1978. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Drafted by Krimer.
2. See Documents 200 and 201.
3. See Documents 183 and 184.
4. See Document 102.