Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

2. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel¹

Washington, October 31, 1972, 4:05–5:47 p.m.

SUBJECT

• SALT

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
• John N. Irwin, II
• B. Scott Custer
• Frank Perez
• John P. Shaw
• DOD
• Kenneth Rush
• Dr. Gardiner Tucker
• Paul H. Nitze
• Archie Wood
• JCS
• LTG Royal B. Allison
• CIA
• Richard Helms
• Carl Duckett
• ACDA
• Gerard Smith
• Philip J. Farley
• OST
• Dr. Edward David
• AEC
• James Schlesinger
• NSC Staff
• Helmut Sonnenfeldt
• William Hyland
• Col. Jack Merritt
• Col. William DeGraf
• Jeanne W. Davis

Mr. Kissinger: Professor Duckett?

Mr. Duckett: [10 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Why do they want a larger missile than the SS–9?

Mr. Duckett: We don’t know. Possibly for MIRVing.

Mr. Kissinger: Can they use the same holes?

Mr. Duckett: Yes, in fact it seems to be [number not declassified] smaller than the SS–9 hole. If the missile were as large or larger it would require some scheme to get it out of the silo because of the heat that would be generated. They need another stage to push it out of the hole—that’s known as a cold launch.

[10 lines not declassified] In any event, we believe the existence of a big new missile has been confirmed.

Mr. Kissinger: Would they use this to replace all their SS–9’s?

Mr. Duckett: We believe that’s what they have in mind.

Mr. Kissinger: Why are they building the new holes?

Mr. Duckett: It may be for additional hardening. Or, they may want to have enough additional holes so that they can replace them one or a few at a time and would not have to take their SS–9’s out of action while they were being replaced.

Mr. Kissinger: So they will start putting 25 of the new missiles into the new holes.

Mr. Duckett: Yes, and as soon as they are ready they can tear down 25 SS–9’s.

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

At the ABM sites in Moscow it looks as though all four radar pedestals will have large parabolic-type antennae. We think it is more likely that these are for communications—possibly satellite communications—than directly related to ABM. There is, however, a new development in a cable bridge which suggests there may be some tie between this area and the ABM radar. This seems to be a very hard site and could be a command and control center.

At Sary Shagan the two old ABM launchers have been removed which brings them down below 15 which is the legal limit. You will recall the original movable radar. Now there are two more pedestals which starts to look like a big research and testing program. They will be able to have three radars under test simultaneously which is bigger than we expected.

Mr. Kissinger: What conclusion do you draw from this?

Mr. Duckett: That, despite SALT, the Soviets intend to continue with a very active R&D program. They could be testing a system associated with hard point defense. If not, it could still be troublesome. It could allow a very rapid buildup and deployment.

Mr. Kissinger: Right. It would only take six months to install them.

Mr. Duckett: Yes. They could be getting themselves postured in a way we don’t like.

Dr. Tucker: What we do about that is MIRV. MIRV is important to penetrate.

Mr. Duckett: On the number of ABM launchers, they are now down to 13 at Sary Shagan. They have taken out the two oldest launchers and one Galosh.

Mr. Nitze: Could they put new ABM launchers on the old pads?

Mr. Duckett: They could put them back at any time. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Nitze: This is something we should talk about. The agreement says they should be dismantled according to agreed procedures.

Mr. Duckett: In Complex L they have bulldozed over the sites. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: If they proliferate radars, could they proliferate missile launchers to go with them?

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Could they build radars in sheds and we wouldn’t know about them until they are in place?

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Schlesinger: They probably have a committee which is working out changes in their procedures so as to avoid early detection.

Mr. Kissinger: How long after their testing could they be in mass production?

Mr. Duckett: Probably in less than a year.

Mr. Kissinger: How many of these would it take to cover a substantial part of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Duckett: With the SA–5 we figure 100 locations and about 250–300 radars. If the SA–5 had an ABM capability it would give them substantial coverage.

On the Y-class submarine that was being modified, it is apparent that this is a major modification. They have cut the whole top off. They have now brought a second boat in alongside the first, so this is more than just [5 lines not declassified]

Dr. Tucker: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I want today to have a preliminary discussion of the first phase of SALT II. I understand this phase will be fairly brief—from November 21 to shortly before Christmas. First we might discuss the matter of the Standing Consultative Commission and its operations and then some general principles for SALT II. I believe there is some agreement within the government that we should try to make the quantitative limitations a little more permanent. We might begin to discuss what if anything we want to do about qualitative limitations. (to Mr. Smith) When are you leaving?

Mr. Smith: Tentatively on November 17. We plan to touch base with the North Atlantic Council on the 20th and the talks open on the 21st.

Mr. Kissinger: We could do some preliminary thinking on how to proceed. We’re in reasonably good shape on SCC, aren’t we? We’ll move a memorandum to the President for resolution of the representation question. We have no substantive problem about what it should do, do we?

Mr. Smith: No.

Mr. Kissinger: The issue is whether our SCC delegation should be the same as the SALT delegation or whether it should have independent status.

Mr. Smith: We are all agreed that it should have independent status eventually. The only question is whether it should not be the same as the SALT delegation or tied to the SALT delegation while the SALT talks are going on.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand ACDA and JCS want to keep it on the SALT track and State and OSD prefer a more independent status.

Gen. Allison: We think it should be independent, but for the first meeting perhaps two or three delegates could wear two hats—both an SCC hat and a SALT hat. But we think the SCC should be established as a separate body.

Mr. Kissinger: Personally I have no view on this. The President will decide. (to Mr. Smith) Could we have your views on the substance of the work? What would it be useful to do?

Mr. Smith: I don’t think we should start with any large areas ruled out. I would like to have a broad hunting license. For example, I would like to discuss equal aggregates and try to draw the Soviets out. They will want to talk about forward based systems right away. We might see if they have any interest in qualitative controls. I think we should go into all the possibilities including Defense’s concern over throw-weight constraints. We could talk about reductions in theory. I think we should try to push back the cloudy area on exactly what is within the ball park. I think we’ll have trouble with the Congress if we tell them we are only going to talk about numbers and that there are no possibilities in the qualitative field.

Mr. Kissinger: Why would we have trouble with Congress?

Mr. Smith: The liberals will say we are not trying to get controls on testing or on throw-weight.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we should first discuss how we can approach the subject of quantitative limitations intellectually at these meetings, then go on to qualitative limitations. This can be done without any prejudice to including qualitative limitations. How can we go about discussing quantitative limitations?

Mr. Smith: The Soviets will probably see if there is any softness in the U.S. position on the equality of numbers. We should meet this head on and make it clear that we have no interest in any arrangement that does not give us the right to have equal numbers of strategic systems. The question would be what systems to include at the first instance and what mixtures would be allowed. For example, if they insist on inclusion of mothballed bombers, we would demand freedom to mix.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me be the devil’s advocate. Senator Jackson would say that we already have a freeze that is disadvantageous to us. How could we claim equality by throwing in more systems to be counted—the F–111’s, mothballed B–52’s. He could say that this is a fraud; that we are making a permanent agreement freezing all the inequities of the interim agreement.

Mr. Smith: If we want equality in aggregates we will have to classify more systems as being strategic with the freedom to mix.

Mr. Kissinger: Then our answer to Jackson would be that if we don’t want more ICBMs, we should have more mothballed bombers that can be converted.

Mr. Smith: If we don’t have the same numbers we should have the right to convert.

Mr. Irwin: Are you equating one bomber with one missile launcher?

Mr. Smith: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Jack [Irwin], what do you think?

Mr. Irwin: I think we should stick on equality first. The question is the best way to define equality. I wouldn’t disagree with Gerry [Smith] if we have the capability and the right to go to equality directly or to shift from one system to the other. But I’m more sure on the principle than I am on the method.

Mr. Kissinger: Ken [Rush], what do you think?

Mr. Rush: I agree with Gerry [Smith] that we should be able to shift.

Mr. Nitze: This reinforces the desirability of getting reductions thereafter.

Dr. Tucker: There’s a difference between including mothballed bombers and including fighter bombers or F–111’s.

Mr. Nitze: Only the FB–111’s are called strategic.

Mr. Irwin: Do we have any FB–111’s in Europe?

Mr. Nitze: They’re all in the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger: What’s the difference between the F–111 and the FB–111?

Dr. Tucker: The B is the bomber version.

Gen. Allison: They have a larger stress factor and larger wing span.

Dr. Tucker: There’s a serious question whether it is politically feasible to include strategic forces over the present level.

Mr. Kissinger: This would not be a requirement, only an option.

Dr. Tucker: Yes, but we may not exercise the option.

Mr. Kissinger: Wouldn’t the only other course be to force them to reduce? How would we do this? Say they can’t have more than 1054 ICBM’s? As I understand it, Gerry [Smith] doesn’t exclude this. The question is whether to begin with Smith’s approach as a step toward reduction or some other. (to Gen. Allison) Can the Chiefs live with equal aggregates?

Gen. Allison: What are put into the aggregates are matters of definition. It depends on how you start. Do we take our total forces and say this is the aggregate?

Mr. Kissinger: How can you establish a total aggregate that doesn’t define what it is?

Gen. Allison: What about F–111’s; medium bombers? Do we include them?

Mr. Kissinger: Is it in our interest to include Soviet medium bombers? With freedom to mix, if they have an aggregate of 2500 and include mothballed bombers we have the option to increase our land-based force. We might have to give up something to get the freedom to mix. What would we lose by including mothballed bombers in the aggregate total?

Gen. Allison: The difficulty lies in whether we should decide in principle on equal aggregates before we decide what goes into it. Then how do you deal with the asymmetries on both sides? They have great capability in air defense, SLCM’s etc. They will talk about our forward based systems.

Mr. Kissinger: The JCS want the principle of equal aggregates. How do we define it?

Gen. Allison: Central strategic systems [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: You would exclude FB–111’s. You don’t mind including mothballed bombers?

Gen. Allison: No.

Mr. Kissinger: If we include their tankers they will want to include ours.

Gen. Allison: Yes, but they’re an entirely different kind of airplane.

Mr. Kissinger: Paul [Nitze], what do you think?

Mr. Nitze: I think Gerry Smith’s on the right track. We have to define what goes into the aggregate.

Mr. Helms: How can you add up to an aggregate if you don’t know what you’re adding.

Mr. Irwin: Are we going to have illustrative examples or just speak generally? Can you talk aggregates without going into specifics?

Mr. Nitze: There’s also the question of their Backfire bombers.

Mr. Kissinger: The principle of equal aggregates should be discussed but it’s hard to visualize getting Congressional approval.

Mr. Smith: We should be firm that we’re not interested on any basis other than equal aggregates.

Mr. Kissinger: They might try to freeze us permanently into fixed numbers. They might agree on equal aggregates and not on freedom to mix.

Mr. Nitze: They have been in favor of freedom to mix in the past.

Mr. Smith: They could change their position.

Mr. Rush: Also, the Air Force wants to build some more B–52’s.

Dr. Tucker: Those in Southeast Asia are running out of service.

Mr. Kissinger: We should give illustrative examples of equal aggregates. We should make it clear what we’re not authorized to include. I’m going to shoot for an NSC meeting before Gerry [Smith] leaves.

Mr. Smith: I hope we can get something to the North Atlantic Council by November 9.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we get this in shape?

Mr. Smith: I have a draft report to NAC which has been gone over by State and Defense—there are a number of splits.

Mr. Kissinger: Send it over here.

(Mr. Smith handed Mr. Kissinger the draft paper.)²

Mr. Kissinger: How about forward-based systems?

Mr. Smith: Our position should be as in the past. These systems have marginal strategic utility. The Soviets have similar systems. We should learn more about what they have in mind. At the end of SALT I they were more interested in our submarines. They may be thinking about forward-based submarines, or about the capability of our fighter-bombers in the Far East. They also talk about our ringing them with nuclear bases. We need to find out more about what’s irking them.

Mr. Kissinger: I worry that when we explore something we make it legitimate. If we’re not willing to consider it, why should we explore it?

Mr. Smith: If our government decides to do nothing on forward-based systems, that’s okay. But we said at Helsinki that after the central systems were taken care of we would consider non-central systems.

Mr. Kissinger: In the same agreement?

Mr. Smith: That wasn’t clear.

Mr. Nitze: It would be part of the same negotiations but at the very end.

Mr. Smith: If we get a good deal otherwise with equal aggregates, and forward-based systems are the only missing link, we should consider them seriously. The Europeans might like it. A ceiling would be potentially a floor.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the Defense view?

Mr. Rush: We shouldn’t use forward-based systems as a part of the negotiations at all nor should we compensate for their not being included.

Gen. Allison: I agree.

Mr. Irwin: I agree, if we could get away with it. But I agree with Gerry Smith that if we can get controls on the central systems and the forward-based systems only are left, we could accept equal controls.

Mr. Nitze: At a minimum we should bat down their arguments for inclusion of forward-based systems.

Mr. Smith: If we take a flat position, we will find ourselves in the same place we were in 1971. We had to decide then whether to make it into a breaking issue. I can’t see breaking down completely on forward-based systems. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try.

Mr. Kissinger: We’re agreed on an equal aggregates proposition but we don’t have an idea of what to include. On FBS, should we exclude altogether or see what the Soviets have in mind—see how they bring this together with their non-central system.

Mr. Irwin: What if we take a flat position at first, then break off. Would we be better or worse off?

Mr. Smith: I can’t give you a useful judgment. It depends on the U.S. position in extremis.

Mr. Irwin: If we’d be worse off, I could accept your initial argument.

Mr. Rush: I favor no fall-back position at all. A fall-back position is likely to become our position. It will leak. This is a vital issue and we should leave it out. We can’t refuse to talk about it, but we should put it off to the end and not let it become a breaking point midway in the negotiations.

Mr. Smith: We did just that in 1970–71—put it off to the end. Then the Soviets wouldn’t come up with numbers. They insisted on acceptance of the concept first. Unless the Soviet approach is different, we would just get back into the mud.

Mr. Rush: Sticking to our position is more important than early progress in the talks.

Mr. Shaw: There is a middle road we might take. We have discussed this with NATO and they seemed to approve. It would apply to both the U.S. and Soviet non-central systems. There would be no numerical ceiling but neither side would take any action to undermine the viability of the agreement.

Mr. Schlesinger: Would we include forward-based systems in the equal aggregates or not?

Mr. Smith: They would not affect the aggregate at all. There are other ways to think about it. If the Soviets were asked to make a deal on their SLBMs, ICBMs, etc., with no limit on our carrier-based aircraft, for example, they would ask why they should agree.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s have the Working Group do a paper for the President laying out the choices on forward-based systems and on equal aggregates. FBS have never been considered a part of the equal aggregates, have they?

Mr. Smith: No. But in the Working Group paper there are examples of how to take FBS into account.

Mr. Kissinger: You want to brief NAC on the 9th. I doubt if I can get the President’s attention before the 8th, but I will try.

Mr. Smith: One difficulty is that FBS is a subject that NAC wants to get its teeth into. We have held them back. If we take the position that it’s out, they won’t believe it. They will want to set up a working group and we will have to have NAC consideration of forward-based systems.

Gen. Allison: I agree.

Mr. Nitze: We have two problems: what we tell NAC and what to say to the Russians. We shouldn’t say more to the Russians than we do to NAC.

Mr. Irwin: They will know what’s in NAC. (to Kissinger) You say everyone agrees on equal aggregates and we should come up with something for the President to consider. Are you implying that this would contain numbers?

Mr. Kissinger: No, we don’t need numbers. But if we don’t want to include FBS, let’s not raise it as an issue. Let’s give him an idea of what we’re thinking about. A primary issue would be whether to include mothballed bombers under the categories listed. How many do we have? 79?

Dr. Tucker: We should define what we want to include on the Soviet side too, then decide what U.S. items are consistent. We don’t want freedom to mix if it would give them undue freedom.

Mr. Nitze: Or if they included Backfire if we included FB–111’s.

Gen. Allison: They’re quite different aircraft.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we have a few words about qualitative limitations.

Mr. Schlesinger: We should be careful not to be trapped by terminology. There is nothing more quantitative than throw-weight, particularly when forces are MIRVed. Throw-weight should be part of our consideration of equal aggregates.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean this would give us the right to triple our Minute Man force?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Either that or give us the right to build larger missiles.

Mr. Schlesinger: Throw-weight is quite different from other qualitative limitations. Throw-weight is measurable, [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Smith: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Gen. Allison: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any question that our land-based missiles yield a lower throw-weight than theirs?

Mr. Nitze: Throw-weight provides a more direct dimension than the measurement of silos.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s be more concrete about equal aggregates. Would they yield to us on throw-weight?

Mr. Schlesinger: No.

Mr. Irwin: If we throw our bombers in, yes.

Mr. Nitze: But the throw-weight of missiles and the payload of bombers are not comparable.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we agree to equal aggregates with freedom to mix, but the throw-weight of the aggregate must be equal?

Mr. Nitze: Equal aggregates of numbers of launchers. The aggregate throw-weight of each side must be equal, but we would measure only missiles.

Mr. Kissinger: Then the Soviets would have to reduce the number of their missiles.

Mr. Nitze: Yes, if they were to have less than [number not declassified] pounds.

Mr. Kissinger: Would this give us the right to build up to [number not declassified] pounds?

Dr. Tucker: It would be more meaningful to set a lower limit.

Mr. Kissinger: They won’t be eager to agree. My experience with the Russians indicates that if we can’t threaten them with something they won’t play the game. If we say unless they agree to limitations on throw-weight we will build up our force to their throw-weight, it might mean something. Fairness won’t compel them to do it.

Mr. Nitze: If the limit is high enough, it would be an inducement for us to build up to the limit. We would likely get reduced accuracy if that were the game.

Dr. Tucker: [2 lines not declassified] can be converted to a strategic imbalance. We can’t have that.

Mr. Kissinger: Must this be introduced in the discussion of principles at the first round? Are we all agreed that when we present our position on equal aggregates we should insist on equal throw-weight?

Gen. Allison: No. This analysis depends on a series of things. We assume the Soviets follow the same path as we do. [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Let me understand this. They have [less than 1 line not declassified] and we have [less than 1 line not declassified] What do we stand to gain if there is no limit. What could we do?

Gen. Allison: If we go to all-up Minute Man we could conservatively [less than 1 line not declassified] if we find we need it.

Mr. Irwin: Then you would have no limit on throw-weight?

Gen. Allison: Right.

Mr. Kissinger: They have an extraordinarily larger missile force than ours.

Gen. Allison: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: We have no such missile under construction. Why are we likely to suffer more from throw-weight limitations?

Gen. Allison: We want [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I had understood there would be a total limit on throw-weight within which each side would be free to apportion throw-weight.

Dr. Tucker: The principle is equal aggregate throw-weight. The question is whether to put limitations on throw-weight of individual missiles.

Mr. Smith: If the purpose is to get an improvement in the Minute Man vulnerability issue, this doesn’t do it. As accuracy improves we can do the job with throw-weight limitations. [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I have enormous intellectual difficulty in coming to grips with qualitative limitations. Whether we have an agreement or not, we would certainly have in mind the Soviet’s throw-weight capability and our answer to it. Do we ease the problem by throw-weight limitations or are we willing to live with our intelligence estimates and adjust our own position accordingly? Under the offensive freeze we’re now prohibited from building missiles larger than the existing silos plus 15%.

Gen. Allison: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: We would keep the existing holes.

Mr. Smith: We could work out anything. We wouldn’t have to stick to the terms of the interim agreement.

Mr. Kissinger: The only point in having throw-weight limitations is to have them below the present figure.

Mr. Schlesinger: If they put larger missiles in the SS–9 holes, they are adding to their throw-weight.

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: They have larger holes, therefore they have a better chance at a bigger payload than we do.

Mr. Irwin: If we keep the limitations in their present form.

Mr. Kissinger: Is it inconsistent that they should increase the payload of the SS–11 as they have of the SS–9?

Mr. Smith: We’re in the process of increasing our payload through superior technology.

Mr. Kissinger: The side that has the larger holes can have the larger payload. They’re bound to catch up to us in technology.

Mr. Nitze: Then we get into MIRV and accuracy constraints.

Dr. Tucker: The problem is not just Minute Man survivability. At any time the Soviets can make their missile force a Minute Man killer. We can’t solve the question of Minute Man vulnerability. If the Soviets have a two-to-one advantage in throw-weight, we will back down. Throw-weight imbalance converts into strategic imbalance in the long run.

Mr. Smith: How would you handle our advantage in throw-weight from our higher bomber level?

Dr. Tucker: We could move toward equality of their missile throw-weight with our bomber payload.

Mr. Smith: It would require the demolition of all their SS–9’s to get to the four million pound level. I can’t say they would blow up their SS–9’s.

Mr. Kissinger: And we would keep everything? That’s a good deal.

Dr. Tucker: Any salable deal must involve both U.S. and Soviet reductions. It would mean Soviet reductions in SS–9’s over time and some SS–11’s, and U.S. reductions in our bombers, even mothballed bombers, and some ICBMs. If we trade for equal numbers and throw-weight, we would give up half our Minute Men which would be a significant advantage to them. We can get throw-weight equality which would give us stability for several years.

Mr. Kissinger: We have the bureaucratic problem of how to get this decided.

Mr. Irwin: Before we decide, we have to look at the qualitative arguments to see how they are or are not related. It’s hard to decide in isolation.

Mr. Kissinger: Say we set the throw-weight limitations at five million pounds. The JCS doesn’t believe this would actually curtail the Soviet throw-weight that much, and it would keep us from increasing. If we set it at the existing Soviet level of [less than 1 line not declassified] it wouldn’t bother the JCS. It really won’t constrain the Soviets in their present configuration, but it might constrain them if they wanted to put new larger missiles in the SS–11 holes. We must consider first whether we want throw-weight limitations at all and, if we do, should we set them low or at the present Soviet level so as to give us a comfortable margin for increase.

Gen. Allison: I propose we also add limitations on the throw-weight of specific missiles.

Mr. Kissinger: I hadn’t heard that before.

Dr. Tucker: That came up in discussing illustrative proposals. We shouldn’t get into that until we understand the principle.

Mr. Kissinger: We will have to have another meeting this week. Now can we have a brief presentation on qualitative limitations.

Mr. Wood: When you talk of the effect of qualitative limits on reducing the vulnerability of land-based ICBMs, the extent of the destruction depends on the number of ICBMs attacked and the reliability, yield and accuracy of the weapons. The Soviets probably have [number not declassified] ICBMs [number not declassified] of which may be large. They have this force deployed today. The only thing protecting our Minute Men is the inaccuracy of the Soviet force. They have enough ICBMs to cover us whether they are MIRVed or not, therefore limitations on accuracy are essential for Minute Man survivability. Without MIRV, with [number not declassified] missiles, they could have a reliability factor of [number not declassified] If MIRVed, reliability would fall to [number not declassified] No sane person would attack with these reliability estimates, but we still have to consider it. In theory, our counter-force capability would remain. But qualitative missile limitations would cut more than one way. Suppose we were reduced to [number not declassified] Minute Men. The ABM treaty permits six Moscow radar complexes. With a MIRV ban we would not have enough RV’s to destroy the Moscow radars.

(Handing out charts)³ I’d like to hand out three curves from the qualitative limitations paper. You can see on Curve A that as Soviet accuracy improves, Minute Man survivability drops to [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: What’s the point?

Mr. Wood: If there are no effective accuracy restrictions we could not solve the Minute Man survivability problem.

Dr. Tucker: Without accuracy controls we can’t solve the problem. Can we get accuracy controls?

Mr. Kissinger: This is too important a subject to compress into the little time we have left. We’ll schedule another meeting of this group on Thursday. Mr. Wood can make his presentation more completely and someone can make the case in favor of qualitative restrictions. The conclusions of this paper point in the opposite direction. Gerry [Smith], will you be responsible for finding someone to make a 10-minute presentation in favor of qualitative restrictions. Mr. Wood will talk against them. We will confine the Thursday session to this subject.⁴

Mr. Irwin: Gardiner Tucker should also speak to the verifiability of this in comparison to throw-weights.

Dr. Tucker: All right.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3/15/72–6/4/74 [1 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. All brackets except those that indicate text not declassified are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Odeen and Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a briefing memorandum on October 24 in which they explained: “The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the major issues underlying SALT Two and to get views on how we should proceed in the first round of SALT.” (Ibid., Box H–12, Verification Panel Meeting, 10/31/72, 1 of 3)
2. The October 26 draft report to the NAC is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–013, Verification Panel Meeting, SALT, 11/2/72.
3. The charts were not found.
4. No minutes of the November 2 Verification Panel meeting have been found.