1. Note From the Soviet Union to the United States1

1. The Soviet side confirms its consent to resume the negotiations between the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms on November 21 in Geneva, with a view that this phase of the negotiations would be short in time (a month or a bit longer) and would be of preparatory nature. Then the negotiations would be continued at the beginning of the next year.

2. The Soviet side proceeds from the possibility and desirability of further progress in limitation and reduction of strategic arms that may follow on, and it approaches the negotiations with the American side accordingly. At the same time agreement stated in the already concluded agreements, constitutes a good common basis for moving ahead.

We believe, furthermore, that the exchanges of views, that took place between the leaders of both states, deem it possible to make a conclusion about the existence of coinciding elements in the approach of the sides to the forthcoming new phase of the negotiations on limitation of strategic arms, which resume after the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons have entered into force.

Both sides seem to agree upon concentrating their efforts on the following:

a) Solution of the questions arising in connection with putting into operation the machinery of the agreements which have already been concluded, i.e. the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement as well as the Agreement on measures to lessen the danger of outbreak of nuclear war. Both sides spoke in favor of agreeing, first of all, in this respect on the Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission and the procedures of its functioning so as to contribute to ensuring the confi [Page 2] dence of the sides in the implementation of the provisions of the agreements in force.2

b) Achievement of agreement on more complete measures of limiting strategic offensive arms and possible conversion of the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms into permanent agreement with the appropriate expansion of its contents.

c) Consideration of the possibilities that both sides undertake to exercise restraint in the areas, not limited by the agreement, as well as not to start new major programs in the field of strategic offensive arms.

It goes without saying that at the forthcoming negotiations it would be necessary to consider thoroughly the ways leading to the solution of those problems. If both governments give their respective delegations to the negotiations instructions of this very kind it would facilitate progress in achieving mutually acceptable agreement.

3. Both sides, as it seems, will have yet to work quite intensively on how to resolve the task of converting the Interim Agreement into permanent one. It appears to us, that permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, including the provisions of the Interim Agreement, that limit the number of ICBMs on submarines, as they have already been agreed upon by the sides, should in our view also contain, in accordance with the principle of equal security and of inadmissibility of unilateral advantages, the solution of such questions, as:

—Withdrawal of advanced based nuclear means along with the liquidation of appropriate bases;

—Liquidation of ballistic missile submarine bases on the territory of third countries and limitation of the operation areas of such submarines;

—Limitations with regard to strategic air force.

We would be prepared to discuss, besides that, the questions of measures, excluding the development of offensive strategic arms, the deployment of which would increase the danger of nuclear war, for example, the question of prohibiting: stationing of strategic ballistic missiles on submarines and on any fixed or mobile launchers, placed on [Page 3] the sea and ocean bed, including territorial seas and internal waters; construction, testing and deployment of cruise (winged) missiles of intercontinental range; stationing of ballistic missiles on air-based launchers etc.

We would also be prepared to discuss other questions related to the problem of limiting strategic arms.

4. Taking the above into consideration the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States in the process of pending phase of negotiations could work up a joint working program, which would possibly include the list of questions for further negotiations on strategic offensive arms. In our view the above mentioned questions might be a good basis for working out this program.

In the course of the work of the delegations in Geneva or upon completion of the mentioned phase it could be possible to additionally discuss through the confidential channel questions of mutual interest as well as to exchange views with regard to a direction of the work of the delegations.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14. Top Secret. A handwritten note reads: “Handed to K[issinger] by D[obrynin] 1:30 pm, 10/24/72.” No further record of the meeting has been found.
  2. The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the SALT I agreement) and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, 1972, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 317 and 316, respectively. The ABM Treaty called for establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission to “promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions” of the Treaty. For documentation on the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on June 22, 1973, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.