Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972

37. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE OPTIONS

Option I. This option would

• —limit the number of land-based ICBM and IRBM/MRBM launchers to those operational or under construction at the time the agreement was negotiated;
• —ban mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems;
• —limit the number of fixed ABM launchers and the number of ABM-associated radars.

It would put no constraints on

• —sea-based offensive missile systems;
• —MIRVs or on any other improvements to ICBMs or their launchers;
• —characteristics of ABM systems.

Option II. This option would

• —limit the total number of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive ballistic missile launchers to those operational or under construction at the time the agreement was negotiated;
• —permit land-mobile ICBMs within the allowed combined total of ICBMs and SLBMs;
• —ban land-mobile IR/MRBMs;
• —limit the total number of fixed, land-mobile and sea-mobile ABM launchers and ABM-associated radars;
• —prohibit further construction or relocation of fixed launchers for IR/MRBMs.

Option III. This option would

• —limit the respective numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational or under construction at the time the agreement was negotiated;
• —ban land-mobile strategic offensive missile systems;
• —ban enlargement of existing silos, changing the basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and relocation of launchers;
• —limit the number of fixed ABM launchers and the number of ABM-associated radars;
• —prohibit land and sea-mobile ABMs.

MIRV testing and deployment would be allowed.

Option IIIA. This option is identical to option IV [III?], except that it would

• —permit each side to substitute SLBM launchers for ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis;
• —limit the respective number of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational at the time the agreement was negotiated; i.e., launchers under construction could not be completed;
• —limit the numbers of heavy bombers/tankers, medium bombers/tankers and SAMs to those existing in each category at the time the agreement was negotiated.

MIRV testing and deployment would be allowed.

Option IV. This option is identical to option III, except that it would

• —prohibit deployment of MIRVs;
• —ban further flight testing of MIRVs and MIRV-related systems. There would be no restriction on the improvement or flight testing of other offensive missile system characteristics.

Option V. This option would

• —limit the respective numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational at the time the agreement was negotiated;
• —ban mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems;
• —limit the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM-associated radars;
• —prohibit changes in verifiable strategic offensive and defensive missile and launcher characteristics, except that the testing and deployment of exoatmospheric penaids would be permitted;
• —ban the deployment of MIRVs and the further flight testing of MIRVs and MIRV-related systems;
• —limit the numbers of strategic bombers and air defense missile launchers to existing levels;
• —prohibit verifiable changes in the size and external configuration of existing weapons types or systems;
• —prohibit all strategic missile flight testing, except for an agreed number of pre-announced confidence firings of present types of missiles on agreed ranges.

Option VA. This option would

• —limit the respective numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers to those operational at the time the agreement was negotiated;
• —allow replacement of deployed offensive strategic missiles by operational missiles of the same category whose throw weight was not more than twice that of the replaced missile (this would permit the planned deployment of Poseidon and Minuteman III but with single warheads only);
• —permit each side to substitute SLBM launchers for ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis;
• —ban mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems and limit the physical dimensions of such tactical systems;
• —ban the deployment of MIRVs and MRVs and the further flight testing of MIRV-related systems. Agreed procedures would permit the conversion to single RV systems of missiles which had been tested with MRVs or MIRVs;
• —limit the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM-associated radars and prohibit mobile ABMs;
• —prohibit changes in certain specified characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic launchers and missiles;
• —prohibit all strategic missile flight testing, except for an agreed number of pre-announced confidence firings on agreed ranges;
• —limit the numbers of heavy bombers/tankers, medium bombers/tankers and SAMs to those existing in each category at the time the agreement was negotiated;
• —prohibit the introduction of new types of strategic bombers or SAMs and certain changes in the size and external configuration of these existing systems.

Option VI. This option would

• —limit the number of fixed ICBM launchers and associated missiles to 1000 on each side;
• —limit the total throw weights of these ICBMs to not more than 3,000,000 pounds for the Soviet Union and 2,000,000 pounds for the U.S. after January 1, 1972. By this date, the Soviet ICBM force would consist only of SS–11s, SS–13s and up to 120 SS–9s, all in silos.
• —ban land-mobile ICBMs or, alternatively, permit them within the limit of 1000 launchers;
• —limit the numbers of SLBM and SLCM launchers and submarines to those operational or under construction;
• —prohibit flight testing of new ICBM or SLBM RVs or of new missiles of volume greater than 65 cubic meters or throw weight capability of greater than 2000 pounds;
• —prohibit flight testing and deployment of multiple RVs except for the Polaris A–3.

The Soviets would be permitted 64 ABM launchers with 1 reload each at Moscow and the U.S. would be permitted 128 launchers at Washington, D.C. Each side would be permitted to have only the ABM-associated radars needed to support its system.

Option VII. This option would

• —require the destruction of at least 100 ICBM launchers each year, beginning with launchers whose associated missiles are largest in volume, until each side has no more than 600 operational after July 1, 1975. The U.S. would destroy 1 B–52 bomber and 1 missile for each SS–9 launcher and missile destroyed by the Soviets;
• —limit the total number of SLBM, IRBM, and MRBM launchers to 700 after July 1, 1971, and the total number of ICBM, SLBM, IRBM and MRBM launchers to 1300 after July 1, 1975;
• —prohibit the deployment of additional land-mobile strategic missile launchers prior to July 1, 1975;
• —require that new or modified offensive missiles not exceed 50 cubic meters in volume;
• —permit each side to deploy a nationwide ABM system consisting of not more than 500 fixed land-based interceptors plus associated radars;
• —limit the total number of SAM batteries deployed to 1200 after July 1, 1971;
• —specify that no SAMs with a volume greater than 1 cubic meter could be deployed after January 1, 1970;
• —limit the total gross take-off weight of operational strategic bombers on each side to 150,000,000 pounds after July 1, 1975.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–025, NSC Meeting 11/10/69 SALT (NSSM 62). Top Secret. Attached but not printed is a chart that provided the limitations imposed by each option. This paper is annex A to a briefing memorandum that Kissinger sent to Nixon for the NSC meeting scheduled for November 10.