Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972

3. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

Summary of Paper

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

Arms Limitation Talks

Recent interest in pursuing strategic arms limitation talks is motivated not only by the present state of the strategic balance but also by the likely outcome of attempts by either side to increase its relative capabilities in the absence of an agreement.

1. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union can launch a massively destructive attack on the other after absorbing an all-out attack on its strategic forces.

2. Neither side in the foreseeable future can hope to be able to alter significantly this ability to damage the other.

3. The present costs of strategic forces are large and will get significantly larger if additional programs go unchecked.

Therefore, negotiating a strategic arms limitations agreement can have at least three objectives in terms of the strategic balance:

1. By reducing the strategic arms competition, an agreement could reduce many of the uncertainties which now influence our programs.

2. Just by talking, we might gain valuable information and improved understanding with the Soviet Union on how each side sees nuclear forces and strategy.

3. In the long run, the costs of our strategic forces will probably be lower with an agreement than without one.

The primary question on strategic grounds is, should we go forward with strategic arms limitation talks in the near future or delay a decision pending completion of the military posture review (in six months or, if the strategic portion is accelerated, in two months)? Regarding this issue, there are two questions:

1. What would be the consequences of waiting six months in terms of the strategic balance?

2. What might the conclusions of the military posture review suggest concerning the U.S. position for possible talks with the Soviets? How soon could enough of the review be completed to reach these conclusions?

Attachment

Sentinel ABM System

The approved program calls for the deployment of a system designed to protect the U.S. against a light ICBM attack from China in 1975. The system has been called “anti-Chinese” because (a) most of its radars face only in the direction from which Chinese ICBMs would be launched, (b) the area defense is vulnerable to effective penetration aids which the Soviets, but not the Chinese, could develop by 1975, and (c) the system emphasizes area defense; an anti-Soviet system of this size would emphasize terminal defense of cities. On the other hand, the system can save 10–20 million U.S. lives in a Soviet attack if the Soviets do not install penetration aids on their missiles, and it can be expanded for defense of our ICBMs, defenses for our cities against Soviet attacks, or both.

The system is funded at $1.8 billion in FY 70, and the total cost is estimated at $8.5 billion. The Defense Department has delayed all Sentinel construction activity pending a review of the program. The options include: (a) proceeding with the approved program, (b) further delaying the program or stretching it out for FY 70 savings of $340–550 million, (c) redirecting the deployment to the defense of Minuteman sites and continuing Research and Development for a total cost of $4.7 billion (FY 69–70 savings of $1 billion, $3.8 billion overall), (d) cancelling the Sentinel deployment and continuing research and development.

Continuing Sentinel would be consistent with three options—Dominance, Improving the Balance, and Maintaining the Balance. Further delaying or cancelling Sentinel might be consistent with a policy of Maintaining the Balance, Stable, or Minimum Deterrence. However, the overall implications depend largely on whether an ABM defense of Minuteman or an anti-Soviet ABM defense of our cities or both are chosen instead, either now or later.

a. The arguments for proceeding with the approved program are:

(1) The planned deployment schedule would provide virtually complete protection in the early 1970s when the intelligence community estimates that the Chinese could have as many as 10 ICBMs. Without Sentinel U.S. fatalities could be as high as seven million in a Chinese first strike with 10 ICBMs.

(2) The planned deployment provides a basis for a larger anti-Soviet system. If the Soviets do not react to Sentinel, the thin defense might reduce U.S. casualties in a nuclear war with Russia by 10–20 million, or about 8–15 percent.

(3) Moving ahead on schedule would increase Soviet incentives to engage in negotiations on strategic arms limitations.

(4) Moving ahead would also provide early protection against accidental or irrational launch of ICBMs against the U.S.

(5) The Soviets could have a Sentinel-like system deployed by the mid-1970s.

b. The arguments for further delay or cancellation are:

(1) We have an effective deterrent against China in our strategic offensive forces for the foreseeable future. Since Sentinel would contribute only marginally to increasing the credibility of our deterrent, a delay would not endanger our security.

(2) Few believe that an anti-Chinese system justifies the current cost of Sentinel; currently estimated cost is significantly higher than when the decision was made and costs are rising.

(3) The Chinese ICBM program appears to be slipping. We now estimate that the Chinese will have 12–21 ICBMs in 1975.

(4) Delay would permit a careful evaluation of the real issue: should we look on Sentinel as a down payment in a defense of Minuteman (in which case we could save $3.8 billion), on a larger anti-Soviet ABM system (in which case we would need to spend $10–20 billion more), or both?

(5) Work on the Soviet Moscow ABM system has slowed down considerably and the Soviet system is a primitive one. Thus, we have no reason to believe that the Soviets may get very far ahead of us in ABM capability.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meeting Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Top Secret. This summary of a 21-page paper, entitled “Strategic Policy Issues” was included in the President’s briefing book for the February 14 NSC meeting. The full text of the summary is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 6.