3. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff1
Summary of Paper
[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]
Arms Limitation Talks
Recent interest in pursuing strategic arms limitation talks is motivated
not only by the present state of the strategic balance but also by the
likely outcome of attempts by either side to increase its relative
capabilities in the absence of an agreement.
- 1.
- Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union
can launch a massively destructive attack on the other after
absorbing an all-out attack on its strategic forces.
- 2.
- Neither side in the foreseeable future can hope to be able to
alter significantly this ability to damage the other.
- 3.
- The present costs of strategic forces are large and will get
significantly larger if additional programs go unchecked.
Therefore, negotiating a strategic arms limitations agreement can have at
least three objectives in terms of the strategic balance:
- 1.
- By reducing the strategic arms competition, an agreement could
reduce many of the uncertainties which now influence our
programs.
- 2.
- Just by talking, we might gain valuable information and improved
understanding with the Soviet Union on how each side sees nuclear
forces and strategy.
- 3.
- In the long run, the costs of our strategic forces will probably
be lower with an agreement than without one.
The primary question on strategic grounds is, should we go forward with
strategic arms limitation talks in the near future or delay a decision
pending completion of the military posture review (in six months or, if
the strategic portion is accelerated, in two months)? Regarding this
issue, there are two questions:
- 1.
- What would be the consequences of waiting six months in terms of
the strategic balance?
- 2.
- What might the conclusions of the military posture review suggest
concerning the U.S. position for
possible talks with the Soviets? How soon could enough of the review
be completed to reach these conclusions?
Attachment
Sentinel ABM System
The approved program calls for the deployment of a system designed to
protect the U.S. against a light
ICBM attack from China in 1975.
The system has been called “anti-Chinese” because (a) most of its
radars face only in the direction from which Chinese ICBMs would be launched, (b) the area
defense is vulnerable to effective penetration aids which the
Soviets, but not the Chinese, could develop by 1975, and (c) the
system emphasizes area defense; an anti-Soviet system of this size
would emphasize terminal defense of cities. On the other hand, the
system can save 10–20 million U.S.
lives in a Soviet attack if the Soviets do not install penetration
aids on their missiles, and it can be expanded for defense of our
ICBMs, defenses for our cities
against Soviet attacks, or both.
The system is funded at $1.8 billion in FY 70, and the total cost is estimated at $8.5 billion.
The Defense Department has delayed all Sentinel construction
activity pending a review of the program. The options include: (a)
proceeding with the approved program, (b) further delaying the
program or stretching it out for FY
70 savings of $340–550 million, (c) redirecting the deployment to
the defense of Minuteman sites and continuing Research and
Development for a total cost of $4.7 billion (FY 69–70 savings of $1 billion, $3.8 billion overall),
(d) cancelling the Sentinel deployment and continuing research and
development.
Continuing Sentinel would be consistent with three options—Dominance,
Improving the Balance, and Maintaining the Balance. Further delaying
or cancelling Sentinel might be consistent with a policy of
Maintaining the Balance, Stable, or Minimum Deterrence. However, the
overall implications depend largely on whether an ABM defense of Minuteman or an
anti-Soviet ABM defense of our
cities or both are chosen instead, either now or later.
- a.
- The arguments for proceeding with the approved program are:
- (1)
- The planned deployment schedule would provide
virtually complete protection in the early 1970s when
the intelligence community estimates that the Chinese
could have as many as 10 ICBMs. Without Sentinel U.S. fatalities could be as
high as seven million in a Chinese first strike with 10
ICBMs.
- (2)
- The planned deployment provides a basis for a larger
anti-Soviet system. If the Soviets do not react to
Sentinel, the thin defense might reduce U.S. casualties in a nuclear
war with Russia by 10–20 million, or about 8–15
percent.
- (3)
- Moving ahead on schedule would increase Soviet
incentives to engage in negotiations on strategic arms
limitations.
- (4)
- Moving ahead would also provide early protection
against accidental or irrational launch of ICBMs against the U.S.
- (5)
- The Soviets could have a Sentinel-like system deployed
by the mid-1970s.
- b.
- The arguments for further delay or cancellation are:
- (1)
- We have an effective deterrent against China in our
strategic offensive forces for the foreseeable future.
Since Sentinel would contribute only marginally to
increasing the credibility of our deterrent, a delay
would not endanger our security.
- (2)
- Few believe that an anti-Chinese system justifies the
current cost of Sentinel; currently estimated cost is
significantly higher than when the decision was made and
costs are rising.
- (3)
- The Chinese ICBM
program appears to be slipping. We now estimate that the
Chinese will have 12–21 ICBMs in 1975.
- (4)
- Delay would permit a careful evaluation of the real
issue: should we look on Sentinel as a down payment in a
defense of Minuteman (in which case we could save $3.8
billion), on a larger anti-Soviet ABM system (in which case
we would need to spend $10–20 billion more), or
both?
- (5)
- Work on the Soviet Moscow ABM system has slowed down considerably and
the Soviet system is a primitive one. Thus, we have no
reason to believe that the Soviets may get very far
ahead of us in ABM
capability.
