Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972

27. Summary of Response to National Security Study Memorandum 62¹

Washington, undated.

ALTERNATIVE I

I. Description of Proposal

1. The number of fixed land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Within this number, launchers could be replaced or relocated on a one-for-one basis.

2. The number of fixed land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Replacement, relocation, or conversion of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited.

3. There would be a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

4. There would be a ban on the deployment on each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based antiballistic missile launchers and associated antiballistic missiles (including reload missiles) and of ABM-associated radars. Land-mobile antiballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

II. Significant Features

Pros and Cons

• —First step without affecting US force programs.
• —Avenues are open to build toward greater counterforce capability.

Verification

• —No major verification problems although limited Selective Direct Observations (on-site inspection) would be helpful.

Strategic Analysis

• —Both sides maintain a high retaliatory capability.
• —Neither side can avoid over 100 million deaths even by striking first.
• —Both sides show an improved war-waging capability over the “no agreement” situation. Soviet capability improves more substantially than US.
• —The number of US ICBMs surviving a Soviet Counterforce first strike would be less than without an agreement.
• —No incentive for Soviets to cheat since US retaliatory capability would not be affected significantly.

Insurance against Soviet Violation or Abrogation

• —Ample US safeguards against violation or abrogation.

Effect on Allies

• —Should present no significant problems for allies.

Moratorium

• —A moratorium would affect only the Soviets because the US is not building any additional systems controlled by this alternative.

III. Dissenting Views

• —Science Advisor wants an agreed limit on number of missile flight tests (pre-announced and confined to known test ranges).
• —DOD believes Soviets have developed a simple MIRV that can be tested without US knowledge and that US can deploy a MIRV system without further testing.
• —DOD has reservations (on principle) about any moratorium.
• —JCS opposes limitation on ABM-associated radars.
• —DOD believes data insufficient to make judgments on cost savings.
• —Re strategic sufficiency, DDR&E and ISA do not believe uncertainties with respect to both US and Soviet weapon systems have been sufficiently taken into account. JCS believe too much emphasis is placed on fatalities and urban/industrial damage as measurements of strategic capabilities.

ALTERNATIVE II

I. Description of Proposal

1. The total number of land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 500 km or more) and strategic offensive sea-based ballistic missile launchers would be limited to those presently existing or under construction. Within that overall ceiling, each side would be permitted to vary the mix of such land-based offensive missile launchers (fixed or mobile) and sea-based offensive missile launchers as desired.

2. The number of fixed land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate and medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Replacement, relocation, or conversion of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited. There would be a complete ban on land-based mobile missile systems of intermediate or medium range. Flight testing of strategic offensive land-based missiles of intermediate or medium range in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

3. Numbers of sea-based offensive cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently operational or under construction.

4. There would be a ban on the deployment of more than an agreed equivalent number of antiballistic-missile launchers and associated antiballistic missiles (including reload missiles) and of ABM-associated radars.

II. Significant Features

Pros and Cons

• —First step toward arms limitation but without disruption of present US military programs.
• —Would have little effect in slowing the arms race or limiting strategic capabilities.

Verification

• —The main verification problem is associated with the variable mix of systems—there would be difficulties in counting mobile ICBMs and submarine launchers.

Strategic Analysis

• —Both sides maintain a high retaliatory capability.
• —Neither side can limit damage below very high fatality levels. US can save 43 million at Safeguard ABM level by striking first but even then suffers 100 million deaths.
• —Both sides show an improved war-waging capability over the “no agreement” situation. Soviet capability improves more substantially than US. (Note: This improvement is difficult to understand since the “no agreement” force levels in 1978 are higher than those for Alternative II.)
• —The number of US ICBMs surviving a Soviet counterforce first strike would be less than without an agreement, although there would be more on-line SLBMs available than without an agreement.
• —Soviet cheating (500 additional ICBMs or ABMs) would not have a significant effect on US retaliatory capability.

Insurance against Soviet Violation or Abrogation

• —Ample US safeguards are available.

Effect on Allies

• —Should present no significant problems for allies.

Moratorium

• —A moratorium would affect only the Soviets since the US is not building any additional systems controlled by this alternative.

III. Dissenting Views

• —JCS opposed to ban on ABM-associated radars.
• —Science Advisor wants an agreed limit on number of missile flight tests (pre-announced and confined to known test ranges).
• —DOD believes data insufficient to make judgments on cost savings.
• —Re strategic sufficiency, DDR&E and ISA do not believe uncertainties with respect to both US and Soviet weapon systems have been sufficiently taken into account. JCS believe too much emphasis is placed on fatalities and urban/industrial damage as measurements of strategic capabilities.
• —DOD has reservations (in principle) about any moratorium.
• —DOD believes Soviets have developed a simple MIRV that can be tested without US knowledge and that US can deploy a MIRV system without further testing.

ALTERNATIVE III

I. Description of Proposal

1. The number of land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km. or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Enlargement or relocation of these launchers would be prohibited.

2. The respective numbers of sea-based ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement as to their number.

3. The number of fixed land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction. Replacement, relocation, or conversion of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited.

4. There would be a ban on mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

5. There would be a ban on the deployment on each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles (including reload missiles), and of ABM-associated radars. Land-mobile anti-ballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

II. Significant Features

Pros and Cons

• —Would place a numerical limit on all strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers, but would permit technological improvements as a hedge against loss in strategic capabilities.
• —Would allow US to proceed with planned programs while denying further increases in offensive forces to the Soviets.
• —Could shunt arms competition into other channels such as bombers, MIRVs, missile payload and accuracy.
• —Could be difficult to negotiate because of greater adverse effect on Soviet programs.
• Verification
• —Most difficult verification task is monitoring ban on land-mobile strategic launchers.
• —Some SDO would be of value.

Strategic Analysis

• —Both sides retain a formidable retaliatory capability, although at high ABM levels the Soviet capability drops below what it would be in a “no agreement” situation.
• —Neither side has a significant damage-limiting capability, and both sides would suffer over 100 million deaths after striking first.
• —Both sides improve their war-waging capability over the “no agreement” situation, although this is difficult to understand because US forces remain the same for both cases and Soviet forces are greater in the “no agreement” case.
• —The number of US ICBM’s surviving a Soviet counterforce first strike would be less than without an agreement.
• —There would not be an appreciable drop in US retaliatory capability if the Soviets cheated, adding 500 ABMs or ICBMs.

Insurance against Soviet Violation or Abrogation

• —Ample US safeguards against violation or abrogation.

Effect on Allies

• —Should present no significant problems for allies.

Moratorium

• —A moratorium would affect only the Soviets because the US is not building any additional systems controlled by this alternative.

Cost Savings

• —None for either side, at least for the near term.

III. Dissenting Views

• —Science Advisor wants an agreed limit on number of missile flight tests (pre-announced and confined to known test ranges).
• —DOD believes Soviets have developed a simple MIRV that can be tested without US knowledge and that US can deploy a MIRV system without further testing.
• —DOD has reservations (on principle) about any moratorium.
• —JCS opposes limitation on ABM-associated radars.
• —DOD believes data insufficient to make judgments on cost savings.
• —Re strategic sufficiency, DDR&E and ISA do not believe uncertainties with respect to both US and Soviet weapon systems have been sufficiently taken into account. JCS believe too much emphasis is placed on fatalities and urban/industrial damage as measurements of strategic capabilities.

ALTERNATIVE IV

I. Description of Proposal

1. The number of fixed land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement on their number. Enlargement or relocation of these launchers would be prohibited.

2. The respective numbers of sea-based ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently existing or under construction, subject to agreement as to their number.

3. The number of land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently existing or under construction. Replacement, relocation, or conversation of such systems to those of intercontinental range would be prohibited.

4. There would be a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

5. There would be a ban on the deployment of each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles (including reload missiles), and of ABM-associated radar. Land-and sea-mobile anti-ballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

6. The deployment of MIRV’s and the further flight testing of MIRV’s, FOBS, and related systems would be prohibited.

7. Flight testing of missiles would be preannounced and conducted on agreed ranges.

II. Significant Features

(Note: The only difference between this alternative and Alternative III is the addition of a MIRV ban. This alternative is opposed by JCS, ISA and DDR&E.)

MIRV Ban

• —As defined in the proposal the ban on MIRV testing would meet most of the criteria considered essential in the MIRV Panel Report² to improve detection.
• —Development, but not testing, of operational MRVs (Polaris A–3) would be permitted.
• —If the Soviets choose to claim that the SS–9/MRV is operational it could be deployed but not tested.
• —All strategic missile firings would be pre-announced and conducted on agreed ranges.

Strategic Analysis

• —Without MIRVs, US retaliatory capabilities decline, especially for 500 ABMs and Safeguard (though not stated in the paper, almost half of the damage would be inflicted by US bombers).
• —Soviet retaliatory capabilities are noticeably higher than in the “no agreement” situation.
• —Neither side would gain a significant advantage by a first strike in terms of saving lives.
• —This option is inferior to the “no agreement” situation in war-waging capabilities, though it is better than Options I, II and III. It is also worse for the Soviet Union at the Safeguard ABM level.
• —Because of the MIRV ban about 230 more US ICBMs survive at the Safeguard ABM level when compared with the “no agreement” situation.
• —At the Safeguard ABM level Soviet cheating (500 additional ABM interceptors) would significantly degrade US retaliatory capabilities.

Moratorium

• —The MIRV flight test can to be made at the outset of talks as a matter of priority and for a fixed period (six months to a year).

Cost Savings

• —Some likely in this option.

III. Dissenting Views

• —JCS believe this alternative to be unacceptable because of our doubtful ability to verify a MIRV ban. Uncertainties regarding Soviet ABMs should not preclude US MIRVs. A ban on MIRVs would reduce coverage of time-urgent targets and would preclude development of penetration aids. There would be adverse effects on both US and Soviet space programs.

ALTERNATIVE V

I. Description of Proposal

1. There would be a quantitative and qualitative freeze on those aspects of strategic offensive missile systems that can be adequately verified.

2. The number of land-based launchers for intercontinental-range missiles (ranges of 5000 km or more) would be limited to those presently operational.

3. The respective numbers of sea-based ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched cruise missile launchers would be limited to those presently operational.

4. The number of land-based launchers for missiles of intermediate or medium ranges (i.e., 1000 km or more) would be limited to those presently operational.

5. There would be a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based strategic offensive missile systems of ranges greater than 1000 km. Flight testing of land-based strategic offensive missiles in a mobile system configuration would be prohibited.

6. There would be a ban on the deployment on each side of more than an agreed equivalent number of fixed, land-based antiballistic missile launchers and associated antiballistic missiles (including reload missiles), and of ABM-associated radars. Land-and sea-mobile antiballistic missile systems would be prohibited.

7. The deployment and testing of MIRV’s, FOBS, and related systems; new types of missiles; or missiles incorporating new verifiable improvements (such as increased accuracy or payload weight) would be prohibited.

8. Flight testing of strategic missiles would be limited to an agreed number of preannounced tests of existing missiles on agreed ranges.

II. Significant Features

(Note: This is a modified “stop where we are” proposal. It is opposed by JCS, ISA and DDR&E.)

Pros and Cons

• —It would, in effect, freeze the status quo, except for an agreed ABM level; thus preserving strategic stability based on each side having a sufficient assured destruction capability.
• —It would mean abandoning a number of future programs, including MIRVs, in an agreement that included significant verification uncertainties and risks of cheating.

Verification

• —Since almost all improvements in missile technology are banned this alternative is heavily dependent on intelligence capabilities, over which there is a controversy.
• —The verification section stresses the necessity of telemetry.
• —It acknowledges that telemetry could be denied by the USSR, but asserts we would detect this effort, and suspect an evasion.
• —It acknowledges that while changes in existing missile systems would be detected, verification might be delayed until late in the test program.

Strategic Analysis

• —Both sides could maintain a relatively high retaliatory capability (the US would decline, however, and be highly dependent on bombers at the Safeguard ABM level).
• —The US would not be able to prevent very high fatalities. (Note: According to the statistics the US could save 45 million lives by striking first, at the Safeguard level).
• —Damage potential of both significantly less than no agreement, but the Soviets suffer more than US.
• —Almost 600 more ICBMs survive a first strike than under no agreement at Safeguard level.
• —Addition of 500 ABMs clandestinely, at agreed Safeguard level would significantly degrade US retaliatory capability.
• —Hedges—Main one is to keep MIRV production lines ready.

Moratorium

• —Would include new construction of ICBMs and SLBMs, developmental flight tests of MIRVs etc., and developmental flight testing of new missiles or verifiable missile improvements (JCS and OSD oppose).

III. Dissenting Views

• —In general the JCS position is that there are too many risks in verification capabilities to justify giving up US programs, that the analysis is too optimistic in expecting the Soviets to give up launchers under construction, that bombers cannot be controlled, that throw weight limitation not desirable.
• —They recommend it be eliminated from further consideration.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 873, SALT, Volume II, June–July 1969. Top Secret; Noforn. Drafted by the SALT Steering Committee (see footnote 1, Document 14). Kissinger sent Nixon this summary of the response to NSSM 62 as an attachment to an undated memorandum with the recommendations that Smith be instructed to prepare an opening position for SALT that contained more than one alternative package based on I, II, and III in the summary and that the possibility of broadening the alternatives to include MIRV proposals be held open. Although Kissinger’s memorandum bears the handwritten remark that the President saw it on July 22, Nixon did not initial either approval or disapproval of the recommendations. Nixon did, however, send a letter to Smith instructing him to follow this course of action in the SALT negotiations (see Document 26).
2. On July 7 Lynn sent Kissinger a draft of the MIRV Panel’s “Report on the Technological Consequences of a MIRV Flight Ban.” Lynn’s covering memorandum described the report as “by far the best piece of work this Government has done to date on the MIRV issue.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 18, NSC Files, MIRV Panel) Regarding the revised report, see Document 29.