Office of the Historian

236. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith)1

Washington, March 9, 1972, 4:45 p.m.

S: Two things. If any serious disposition to go to high level concept2 I would like a chance to argue case against it. Rather than NSC that would last an hour.

K: Thing I suggested yesterday3 was I don’t believe there was a serious intention to go to high level concept in American proposal but as I understand meeting yesterday, there was a possibility for going two for two.

S: If you want to go two for two it can be on basis of low levels. Small number of interceptors.

K: In 4 marks [ MARCs] not as missile field but if 15 or 20 it will be [make] sense but 100 for 50 missiles, you wonder. Even one radar for each missile you wonder.

S: 15 interceptors per radar.

K: If you have a level of 150 with 50 in a missile field then logical for [omission in the original] radars.

S: And that’s a mark [ MARC] concept. So if you go to [omission in the original] you are in hard defense contract.

[Page 697]

K: I think I can persuade the President—dropping my role as traffic cop—I believe with your idea on Hearthside [Hard Site]. I didn’t focus until yesterday on Hearthside [Hard Site] and going 2 for 2.

S: That’s not important. Use terminal [terms?]precisely and get high level and qualitative limitations. We won’t go into high level if it involves [omission in the original]limitations.

K: If we adopt Hearthside [Hard Site] I will get you an appt. with the President. I reported yesterday to the President and on SLBM he is prepared to let you slip on completion date but not a freedom to mix idea.

S: He is right.

K: Can you keep your delegation under control? This is not a decision. Just a reaction. I think he will approve changing the date but not freedom to mix or changing soft pads.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.↩
  2. Reference is to ABM alternatives that would allow a high-level hard-site defense of ICBMs, permitting the deployment at one ABM site of interceptors and radars in unlimited numbers.↩
  3. The Verification Panel met on March 8 from 11:11 a.m. to 12:37 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1969–3/8/72.↩