175. Telegram From the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to the Department of State 1
794. Subject: Draft Agreement on Limiting Strategic Defensive Weapons.
Following is draft language of provisions for an agreement on limiting strategic defensive weapons called for in NSDM–117.2 Note paras 2, 4, and 6 contain bracketed alternative language explained further in separate telegram.
Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,
Proceeding from the fact that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
Convinced that limitations on strategic arms would result in a reduction in the competition in strategic arms and a decrease in the risk of war,
Recognizing the direct relationship between strategic defensive and offensive arms and the necessity to limit both,
Having agreed upon certain measures constraining ongoing strategic offensive arms programs, pending conclusion of a definitive agreement [Page 554] limiting strategic offensive systems which will be the subject of subsequent negotiations between the parties,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms competition and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between states,
Have agreed as follows:
The parties undertake to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt such other measures relating to strategic defensive arms limitations as provided in this agreement.
- An ABM system is a system for rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory.
As used in this agreement, components of ABM systems are:
- (a) ABM launchers—i.e., ABM interceptor missile launchers;
- (b) ABM interceptor missiles; and,
- (c) ABM radars—i.e., radars for acquiring and tracking ballistic missiles and their components, and for tracking and guiding interceptor missiles.
[Mr. Nitze would substitute the following language for paras. 1 and 2 of Article 2 and renumber para. 3 as para. 2:
“The obligations provided for in articles 3, 4, and 5 of this agreement shall cover:
- (a) ABM interceptor missiles—i.e., interceptor missiles constructed for an ABM role, deployed in conjunction with other ABM components, or of a type indistinguishable from missiles tested in an ABM role;
- (b) ABM launchers—i.e., launchers for such ABM missiles;
- (c) ABM radars—i.e., radars constructed for an ABM role, deployed with other ABM components, or of a type indistinguishable from radars tested in an ABM role;
- (d) Other large phased-array radars—i.e., those having a product of power (in watts) and aperture (in square meters) greater than one million.”]3
- The ABM systems limited by this
agreement shall include:
- Operational systems;
- Systems under construction;
- Systems undergoing overhaul, repair, or conversion; and
- Systems undergoing development and testing.
- Each party undertakes not to deploy components of ABM systems except as specified in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article 3.
- Each party may deploy ABM
launchers, ABM interceptor missiles
and ABM radars in its own territory
and only at one of the following:
- One site within a circular area having a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers, centered on its national capital, or
- Three (3) sites for defense of ICBM fields, each within a circular area having a radius of sixty (60) kilometers and each centered on a point in ICBM fields west of the Mississippi River for the U.S. and east of the Ural Mountains for the USSR.
- Within the area referred to in subparagraph (a) of paragraph (2) of Article 3, a party may deploy no more than: one hundred (100) fixed ABM launchers, one hundred (100)ABM interceptor missiles located on or in the vicinity of ABM launchers, four (4) modern ABM radar complexes, and mechanical-scan, dish-type ABM radars operational as of July 1, 1971.
- Within the area referred to in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 3, a party may deploy no more than: three hundred (300) fixed ABM launchers, three hundred (300)ABM interceptor missiles located on or in the vicinity of ABM launchers, and five (5) modern ABM radar complexes.
- A modern ABM radar complex is a circular area of no more than three (3) kilometers in diameter within which are deployed components of any ABM radar which first became operational after July 1, 1971, or any phased-array ABM radar.
- Except as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 4, the parties agree to consult through the standing commission provided for in Article 10, prior to construction of non-ABM phased-array radars, having a product of power (in watts) and aperture (in square meters) greater than one million, which are in addition to those operational or under construction on July 1, 1971.
- The Soviet Union shall have the right to retain the large phased-array radars operational or under construction as of July 1, 1971. The United States shall have the right to construct an agreed number [Page 556] of additional early-warning radars to provide a capability equivalent to those Soviet large phased-array radars which provide early-warning which were operational or under construction on July 1, 1971.
[Mr. Nitze would substitute the following paragraph for all of Article 4:
“The parties undertake not to deploy ‘other large phased-array radars’ as defined in Article 2, subparagraph (d), of paragraph 1, except as mutually agreed.”]
The limitations provided for in Article 3 shall not apply to components of ABM systems used for development and testing located within current test ranges or within agreed additional test ranges. Each party may have no more than fifteen (15) fixed ABM launchers, at these ranges.
1. Each party undertakes not to develop, produce, test, or deploy sea-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems, or components for such systems.
2. Neither party shall deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components.
2. Neither party shall deploy ABM systems which do not require ABM interceptor missiles and which are capable of countering, destroying, or rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory.
3. Each party undertakes not to develop, produce, test, or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to develop, produce, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems with rapid reload capability for ABM launchers.
- The parties undertake not to modify any types of missile systems or their components other than ABM, whatever their original [Page 557] design mission, so as to convert them for ABM use or give them a dual anti-aircraft and ABM role, and not to develop or deploy new missile systems or their components other than ABM for such a role.
- The parties undertake not to test missiles other than ABM interceptor missiles in an ABM mode.
With a view to converting this agreement into a definitive arms limitation agreement on strategic offensive as well as strategic defensive arms, the parties undertake to continue active negotiations for definitive limitations on strategic offensive arms.
- For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this agreement, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal, operating outside the national territory of the other party, together with the corollary limitations and cooperative measures provided for in this agreement designed to supplement national verification capabilities.
- Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 9.
- Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national means. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
To promote the objectives and assist in the implementation of the provisions of this agreement, the parties will establish promptly a standing commission within the framework of which they will:
- Consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous.
- Provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed, including the offering of selective direct observation in order to clarify ambiguous situations.
- Consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification.
- Consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this agreement.
- Consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this agreement, including proposals for amendments.
- Consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.
Each party agrees not to prejudice the viability of or circumvent the effectiveness of this agreement through transfers to third countries of strategic arms limited under this agreement.
Either party may propose amendments to this agreement. Amendments shall enter into force after adoption in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this agreement.
This agreement shall be of unlimited duration.
- Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other party six (6) months prior to withdrawal from the agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
- After [x] years have elapsed from the entry into force of the agreement, and if the parties have not reached agreement on definitive limitations on strategic offensive arms as a result of negotiations referred to in Article 8, either party shall have the right to withdraw provided it shall have given notice of its intention to withdraw six (6) months in advance. Such notice may not be given until [x] years have elapsed after entry into force of this agreement.
- Adoption of this agreement shall be in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party. The agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments which shall take place simultaneously in Washington and Moscow.
- This agreement shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Pending the entry into force of this agreement, or receipt by either party of written notice from the other of its inability to approve it in accordance with its constitutional processes, each party agrees to comply with the undertakings in this agreement as if it had entered into force.
Done in the city of — in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, the two texts having equal authenticity, this — day of —, 19—.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 881, SALT, SALT talks (Helsinki), Vol. XV, May 1–July 1971. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; SALT. A stamped notation on the telegram reads: “Sent to San Clemente.” Nixon and Haig were in San Clement July 6–18.↩
- Document 171.↩
- All brackets are in the original.↩