134. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, February
22, 1971.
PARTICIPANTS
-
Henry A. Kissinger
-
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
I said I was prepared to discuss the letter that Dobrynin had said we might send to
Kosygin (copy attached).
Dobrynin corrected my
statement by saying I had proposed the letter. He had merely agreed to
it. I said, it is true, I had proposed the letter, but he had suggested
that at our next meeting—which was today—I should have a draft.
Dobrynin agreed with that
formulation.
Dobrynin read the draft very
carefully and then asked me a number of questions; for example, with
respect to paragraph 5.c., he asked what was the meaning of the phrase
that there could be no new construction started after April 1. I said
since there was a limit of no construction of any sort after January 1,
it seemed to me that this was self-explanatory. Since the Soviet Union
would not be able to finish anything that they started after April 1, it
wasn’t probable that they would start anything. Dobrynin said it would be easier for
them to accept the terminal date than the starting date; in other words,
they would agree not to do any construction of any kind after January 1,
1972. Dobrynin also questioned
whether it was realistic to propose an agreement on offensive weapons be
reached by July 1, 1972. I agreed that that could be extended to January
1, 1973. Dobrynin suggested that
we eliminate the two paragraphs on MIRV’s, since it was self-evident that these would be
permitted. He also questioned paragraph 6.c. in its context because he
thought that this would be a better explanation for paragraph 7, rather
than it by itself and, in any case, it was up to the discretion of each
side whether it wanted to give such a list.
Dobrynin also questioned whether
it was better to have a five-year expiration clause or whether we could
have it in the same manner as the nuclear test ban with both sides
having the right to abrogate when
[Page 406]
their supreme national interest was involved. I
told him this would certainly be a fair counter-proposal to make by
their side. Dobrynin did not
question the three missile sites but suggested that the Soviet Union
might come back to NCA limitations. He
said he would have a massive translation job to do that night and
promised me an early answer. He thought this should be well wrapped up
before March 15.
Attachment
Washington, February 22,
1971.
Draft Letter From President Nixon to Chairman of
the Soviet Council of Ministers Kosygin
2
Dear Mr. Chairman:
- 1.
- I have carefully reviewed the exchanges of our representatives
during the past 15 months in regard to the limitation of
strategic armaments. I have been struck by the serious and
forthright manner in which these talks have been conducted. This
properly reflects the crucial importance, both for the future of
relations between our two countries and for the peace and
security of peoples everywhere, of the responsibility we jointly
share to work toward a safer and more rational world
order.
- 2.
- I have studied your proposal for an agreement limiting ABM’s and understand the
considerations you have advanced in support of this proposal. I
am sure that you have likewise examined the proposals and
considerations which my representatives have advanced concerning
the relationship between limitations on strategic defensive and
strategic offensive weapons.
- 3.
- It seems to me quite possible to take proper account of the
concerns and interests which underlie the proposals which we
have each advanced. To achieve the breakthrough which we both
desire and which peoples everywhere await, I propose to you that
our respective delegations to the next session of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks, beginning in Vienna on March 15, 1971,
should be instructed to make maximum possible progress toward an
agreement containing the following elements:
- 4.
-
Strategic Defensive Armaments
- a.
- As you are aware, the proposals which have been
advanced by the United States hitherto have envisaged
either a complete elimination
[Page 407]
of ABM deployments or a limitation of such
deployments to the protection of National Command
Authorities. These proposals are made in the context of
the various comprehensive limitation proposals, covering
both offensive and defensive strategic armaments, put
forward by the representatives of the United
States.
- b.
- I would still be prepared to consider the complete
elimination of ABM
deployments.
- c.
- However, in consideration of the situation in the
negotiations to date, I now propose an agreement under
which each of us would maintain, or complete, the
strategic defensive (ABM) deployments we have already initiated.
Specifically, in your case this would mean the ABM defense now being
deployed in a circle around your capital city of Moscow.
In our case, this would mean completion of ABM deployment for the
protection of three of our land-based ICBM sites. I am convinced
that a limitation thus based on actual programs already
under way in both our countries would be both equitable
and speedily achievable.
- d.
- The agreement would stipulate the collateral measures,
for example in regard to the deployment of various types
of radar, whereby assurance would be provided that
ABM deployment would
be strictly confined to the agreed objectives.
- e.
- Research and Development and certain agreed forms of
modernization of the permitted deployments would not be
precluded by the agreement.
- f.
- Each side would inform the other side of the
indicators by which it would judge the activities of the
other side with respect to strategic defensive armaments
after the agreement is in force and which could raise
questions concerning the viability of the
agreement.
- g.
- The agreement would have an initial fixed duration,
for example, of five years.
- 5.
-
Strategic Offensive Armaments
- a.
- I have taken note of the current status of the
construction of fixed land-based ICBM launchers in the
USSR.
- b.
- I propose that the agreement to limit strategic
defensive deployments, would include a commitment by
both sides to negotiate by an agreed date (for example,
July 1, 1972) an agreement to limit offensive strategic
armaments.
- c.
- It would also be understood that as of an early agreed
date, for example April 1, 1971, all new construction of
land-based ICBM
launchers would cease. It would also be understood that
work to complete launchers under construction could
continue for another agreed period but would in any case
cease as of January 1, 1972.
- d.
- It would be a part of this understanding, reached in
connection with the formal agreement on strategic
defensive limitations, that modernization
[Page 408]
or replacement
of land-based ICBM’s
would not be precluded, provided that these activities
do not affect the understanding not to initiate new
land-based ICBM
construction as of an agreed date, and to cease work to
complete previously initiated land-based ICBM construction as of
January 1, 1972.
- 6.
-
Multiple Warheads
- a.
- I have carefully examined the record of the
discussions on this subject that have taken place
between our representatives.
- b.
- It would appear that the understanding associated with
an initial agreement in the form that I have proposed
above could not include limitations with respect to the
various types of multiple warheads which both of us are
developing and deploying.
- c.
- However, in connection with an initial agreement I
would plan to inform you, as part of the associated
understanding, of the indicators by which we would judge
your activities and which, in our view, would raise
questions concerning our security interests. You would,
of course, be free to provide me with a similar list of
indicators concerning the Soviet Union’s judgment of
activities on the part of the United States.
- 7.
- Apart from the inherent right to abrogate the agreement, each
side would of course be at liberty to take such steps with
respect to its own weapons programs as are not explicitly
precluded by the agreement, or the understanding associated with
it, and which it deems necessary to safeguard its security
interests in the light of qualitative and other changes in the
other side’s strategic weapons programs.
- 8.
- Mr. Chairman: I consider that the foregoing basic approach to
an initial agreement holds promise of being translated into a
successful agreement this year. I will be prepared to instruct
my representatives at the Vienna sessions in accordance with it
on the assumption that you will similarly instruct your
delegation. Our representatives will have a great deal of work
to accomplish to translate this general approach into the terms
of an agreement. I know that both our delegations will exert the
utmost effort to achieve success.
- 9.
- I suggest that we examine the status of their work after
approximately six to eight weeks and then determine what, if
any, additional guidance we may wish to provide to ensure
success for this significant endeavor.
- 10.
- I am deeply convinced that we have within our reach a mutually
acceptable initial agreement, and I assure you that I will
devote my full energy and authority to remove any obstacles that
may stand in the way of a successful outcome. I know that your
colleagues and you approach this historic task in the same
spirit.
