99. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

4658. Polto 20. For the Secretary from Sisco. Department pass to selected posts and to Schlesinger and Clements.

Subject: Cyprus—Discussion With GOG Leaders.

I have just completed long discussions with GOG leaders (PM and FM) and including surprise and unannounced participation of General Ioannides and General Bonanos, #2 in the country.
I go with something from the Greeks to Ankara since I believe they are beginning to realize how serious the situation is and how equally serious it would have been for me to go to Ankara empty-handed. What I bring is probably not enough, but I have something. I have been authorized by the GOG to convey the following to the Turks.
Greece has agreed to go to London to consult the UK as a guarantor power in the spirit of the London–Zurich agreement. The PM said he had in mind for talks to take place on Monday.
Greece agrees to use its influence with the Government of Cyprus to work out practical arrangements which would strengthen [Page 330] the role of the UN on: effective control of certain seaports and airports in order to insure against importation of clandestine troops, arms and material coming into the country, and to assure regular roatation by Greek and Turkish units.
I got nowhere on the question which interested the Turks most, namely, a willingness to give the Turkish community access to the sea [garble—via?] some port or ports under UN supervision. As I expected, GOG saw this proposal as a form of separatism or partition (which it is) and it was therefore politely but firmly rejected. GOG rejected anything smarting of partition, and I did not therefore put forward outright partition proposal which Ecevit gave me in my second meeting yesterday,2 since it might have cooled them on going to London.
I will of course make the most of all of this with the Turks and argue that the above can constitute the beginning of a serious process and that we will maintain a continuing interest as UK continues contact with GOG and Turks as a guarantor power in the spirit of the London–Zurich agreement. I do not believe it will be enough, and I believe it will be necessary to launch my recommendation of last night re constitutional arrangements3 (Clerides) in order to bulwark the above and to try to secure a commitment from GOT that it will not intevene militarily.
Finally, I have the distinct impression that no matter what is done in this situation, the Turks see it as an ideal time to achieve by military intervention a longstanding objective, namely, double enosis.
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–1976, Entry 5405, Box 26, Cyprus Crisis, July 1974. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Received at 1749Z.
  2. See Document 96.
  3. See ibid.