220. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford1
Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report…2
“I have sent you two detailed reports3 of my 24 hours in Ankara, and I want to outline very briefly in this message the principal highlights and where matters stand.
My overall principal observation is clear: The congressional aid cut-off has had a shattering effect on the Turks, but the position taken [Page 717] by you against the cut-off has kept the lid on the situation here in Turkey. All of the principal political leaders will try to continue to hold the line against anti-Americanism for at least a few weeks more.
Secondly, I believe we have made real headway with the present government and the outside political leaders in convincing them that a total settlement has to be achieved in the next two or three months or the situation could deteriorate significantly: Karamanlis would be weakened; Makarios would increase his troublemaking; the problem would be internationalized; and the Soviets would be able to exploit the situation.
Third, I believe we have also made headway with key leaders in getting them to examine seriously Greece’s willingness to accept the principle of a bizonal federation if the Turks are willing to consider as a matter of principle the reduction of the size of its zone of occupation. This would be the starting negotiating framework.
Fourth, the problem can no longer be approached piecemeal looking for independent gestures on one side or the other. The negotiations, which would be conducted by Clerides and Denktash, would have to have as its objective a total settlement. Because the aim would be to get a total settlement, we are not able to point to certain interim evidences of progress as a way of convincing the Congress to lift the cutoff. In other words, either in a couple of months a total settlement will have been achieved, or there will be a sharp deterioration in the situation—no interim step-by-step progress can be expected.
In these circumstances, therefore, there is only one answer for us as it relates to the congressional problem; there must be a total repeal of the aid cut-off, nothing more or less. My hope is that if we can get the parties in the next few weeks to agree on the principles of bizonal federation and some reduction of territory, that this will be the real starter of the negotiations. I am aiming to achieve this with or without an aid cut-off, though obviously if we could achieve the actual or potential repeal of the aid cut-off it would not only be a stimulus in starting the process of the negotiation but it would help carry it through to a successful conclusion. But the reversal of the cut-off cannot wait for the negotiations. We have, at most, till the end of April to get it changed before reprisals will occur.”
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 6, HAK for President. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum.↩
- This message was transmitted to Scowcroft in telegram Hakto 31 from Ankara, March 12. (Ibid., 3/75–12/75, HAKTO 2)↩
- Documents 218 and 219.↩