212. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1

Hakto 2. 1. I would like you to show the President the letter from Prime Minister Ecevit 2 contained in Tosec 60 and give him the following message from me:

2. “As we feared, the reaction to the irresponsible actions of Congress are now beginning to set in. As was bound to happen, the Turkish Prime Minister is questioning whether or not the United States can be depended upon as an ally. All that we had hoped to achieve now is in jeopardy because the Turks do not wish to make concessions under pressure. We are faced with a hopeless situation unless we can reverse these irresponsible decisions.

3. Specifically, the Prime Minister has told us that, despite our efforts to obtain an improved resolution from the Congress, the final wording will ‘cause serious difficulties’ going far beyond the field of military assistance. He predicts that there will be a strong Turkish public reaction and that he will have great difficulty in controlling the situation. He states flatly that the resolution complicates rather than facilitates the solution of the Cyprus problem. Ecevit asks why our Congress was not equally concerned when American-supplied arms to Greece were used in the 1960’s against the Turkish population of Cyprus. He feels that the congressional action calls into question the common understanding of our mutual security relationship. He thinks that Turkish opinion will conclude that the American Congress has a different approach and they will wonder whether they should continue to support such a one-sided alliance.

4. Despite the friendly but concerned tone of this letter, I fear that the whole basis for our approach and indeed the basis for my visit to Ankara, may have been undermined by the congressional action.

5. It is clear to me that our first priority after the congressional recess must be to reverse this action by the Congress. Not only will its continuance prevent us from achieving any solution to the Cyprus problem but it will most certainly have its effects on our ability to conduct an effective foreign policy.”

6. Warm regards.

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 4, November USSR, Hakto 1. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate. Kissinger was in Moscow to talk to Brezhnev about SALT and the Middle East.
  2. Dated October 22. (Ibid., Trip Briefing Books, Box 2, 10/20–11/9/74, HAK to President