Attached is the chronology you requested of significant intelligence
reporting and events leading up to the anti-Makarios coup. The conclusions seem to be:
One cannot conclude from the attached survey that we had what could be
called “warning” of an impending coup. What we did have were sufficient
storm signals to warrant some diplomatic action—which, in retrospect,
seems to have been weak and indecisive. Thus, it is possible that in
Athens our policy was interpreted as seeming acquiescence in Ioannides’ plans, especially since the
Greek junta could not know of the various pulling and hauling between
the Department and the Embassy.
Attachment
2
THE CYPRUS CRISIS UP TO JULY 15
Rising Tension
Longstanding differences between Athens and Makarios became acute following
Ioannides’ seizure of
power in November 1973. Ioannides regarded Makarios as overdependent on the support of the
Cypriot Communist Party and dangerously beholden to the USSR. He was, moreover, frustrated by
Makarios’ independence
from Athens’ influence and by his inability to affect Nicosia’s
policies, particularly in the context of the intercommunal
problem.
[Page 489]
Following the death of General Grivas in January, Ioannides launched a campaign to gain control of
EOKA–B, Grivas’ terrorist organization,
using the Cyprus National Guard led by officers seconded from the
Greek army.
For his part Makarios had
long regarded the National Guard as a hotbed of subversion
completely subservient to Athens and a force to be feared. He had
formed the Tactical Reserve Unit as a palace guard loyal to his
person. As EOKA–B violence
increased, he was busy expanding and arming the TRU, but he must have been aware that
it could never hope to stand up to the 10,000-man National
Guard.
Tension came to a head in early May when EOKA–B guerrillas stole arms from a National Guard
armory with the probable connivance of NG officers. In a letter to Greek Foreign Minister
Tetenes, Makarios protested anti-Makarios activities by the NG. By mid-May the collision course had
been set.
Consideration of US Démarche
On May 17 the Department proposed (103030)3 that Athens approach Greek leaders,
including Ioannides, to
convey US disquiet over the course of events in Cyprus. Athens
(3121)4 on May 24 recommended against such a
démarche on grounds that
- —Foreign Minister Tetenes had denounced the arms theft;
- —As a staunch anti-Communist who viewed Makarios as too relaxed
toward Communist activities on the island, Ioannides would react
negatively;
- —The GOG could not be
expected to take action against NG or EOKA–B
activities unless the GOC
distanced itself from leftist support and disbanded its
armed groups;
- —The démarche would be untimely because the GOG appeared to be reviewing
the NG’s role in
Cyprus;
- —A direct approach to Ioannides carried risks that could adversely
affect US security interests in Greece.
On the other hand, Embassy Nicosia (1002)5 on May 29
endorsed an early US approach to both the military and civilian
Greek leadership, arguing that NG
involvement in an EOKA–B move to
overthrow Makarios would
prompt a forceful Turkish reaction.
On May 29 Ioannides [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line
not declassified] that [Page 490]
- —Greece was capable of removing Makarios with little
bloodshed and he felt that Turkey would quietly acquiesce to
such a coup.
- —Nevertheless, he believed Makarios’ continuation
in office at least in the short run was in Greece’s
national interest. He said that he had not made a
decision on Greece’s policy toward Cyprus, but added that in
the long run Makarios would not serve Greece’s interests
because he was irrevocably leading Cyprus into Soviet
arms.
- —He could either pull Greek troops out of Cyprus and let
Makarios fend
for himself or remove him, but both options were distasteful
and extremely dangerous.
On May 31 Embassy Athens (3289)6 repeated its
reservations to a US démarche, asserting that other matters in
US-Greek relations and the Aegean dispute argued against US
involvement in the Athens–Nicosia tension. Athens estimated that the
GOG was not so important as to
risk action in Cyprus that could escalate dangerously. It said that,
in any event, the initiatives should rest with the parties to the
London–Zurich accords.
On June 8 the Department responded (121776)7 to the views of Embassies Athens and Nicosia by
informing Athens that it continued “to feel that some expression of
US concern in low key to GOG is
desirable, but we leave this matter to your discretion.”
On June 13 Embassy Athens reported that it raised the concerns
contained in the Department’s May 17 telegram with the Cyprus desk
officer in the Greek Foreign Ministry.
Makarios Prepares
By the end of May we began receiving information of Makarios’ plans for the drastic
reduction of the NG and the expulsion
of mainland Greek officers. During June Makarios intensified his public attacks on the
NG and promised to purge the
force. Meanwhile, violence on the island continued unabated and
Embassy Nicosia reported that Makarios’ campaign against the NG had not received widespread popular
support. Many Cypriots felt that the NG was a necessary counterweight to the ambitions of
the left and indispensable in a confrontation with the Turks.
On June 17 Embassy Nicosia (1153)8 suggested
that, without furthering Makarios’ efforts to establish control over the
National Guard, the US should continue efforts to convince Athens
that toppling Makarios would
generate instability.
[Page 491]
On June 19 Ioannides [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line
not declassified] that
- —He had not made up his mind on whether to pull out of
Cyprus completely or remove Makarios and then deal directly with Turkey
over the future of the island.
- —He believed Makarios had chosen this period of
Greek-Turkish tension over the Aegean to consolidate his
power and destroy Greek influence in Cyprus.
- —“The Turks would agree to the removal of their archfoe,
Makarios,” but
if not, he would propose an all-encompassing agreement to
settle all outstanding problems between Greece and Turkey.
His terms amounted to Turkish capitulation in Cyprus and the
Aegean.
- —He felt the only major obstacle to an agreement along
those lines would be the uncertain reaction of the USSR.
- —He suspected that the US would favor a Greek-Turkish
agreement that would remove all points of friction.
On June 24 Tasca (Athens
3936)9 expressed increasing concern over the
developing crisis in Cyprus. He thought it probable that the initial
stage of a head-on collision between Makarios and Ioannides had begun. He continued to oppose a US
démarche to Athens, noting that this would appear to question the
announced Greek policy of support for the intercommunal talks and
opposition to all violence on Cyprus. Instead Tasca recommended US approaches to
the UN and NATO Secretaries General to encourage them to work
directly with the London–Zurich signatories. On June 25 Embassy
Ankara (5012)10 concurred
wholeheartedly with Tasca’s
recommendation.
Agreeing with the gravity of the situation as posed by Tasca and that a formal US démarche
was not desirable at that time, Embassy Nicosia (1224)11 stated on June 27 that Makarios’ confrontation was with
Ioannides and the NG, not with EOKA–B. Nicosia felt that Ankara was likely to react
quickly against an “enosist coup.” The Embassy
proposed that Ambassador Davies warn Makarios of the dangers of confrontation in his
initial interview and stressed that Ioannides “should be reached,” adding that
“Any help NATO can provide is fine,
but we wonder if Luns has all
the arguments at his fingertips.”
The CIA reported June 28 [less than 1 line not declassified] that
Ioannides [less than 1 line not declassified] he would
continue taking action to thwart Makarios’ tactical moves while developing with his
advisers [Page 492] a contingency
plan should Makarios force
Greece into a showdown situation. In its NID of June 29 the CIA noted that Ioannides had speculated the
previous week on the possibility of removing Makarios and entering into an
“all-encompassing” agreement with Ankara, but that he considered
such a move dangerous and was unlikely to attempt it soon unless
Makarios pressed the
NG issue too far.
On June 29, against a background of
increasingly sharp démarches between Nicosia and Athens over the
National Guard, the Department (141500)12 instructed
Ambassador Tasca to
inform Ioannides that
the US would be strongly opposed to any effort to remove
Makarios from power
by violent means.
Tasca in his reply July 1
(4179)13 objected to such
a démarche and recommended waiting until Ambassador Davies could provide an assessment
following his initial contacts with Makarios and other Cypriot personalities. He
contended that
- —the GOG was fully aware
of the US opposition to any resort to violence and support
for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem through
intercommunal talks;
- —he had expressed this US position the previous week to
Archbishop Seraphim, who is close to President Ghizikis and Ioannides;
- —he would “again refer to our interest in a peaceful
settlement” when he would see Ghizikis the following day.
Subsequently Ambassador Tasca
reported (4254)14 that in his July 2 conversation
with Ghizikis he expressed his
satisfaction at the reiteration of Greece’s attachment to the
intercommunal talks and opposition to violence. He felt that his
conversation would be reported to Ioannides.
No additional cabled instructions were sent to Athens, but in the
following days Department officers were in telephone communication
with Embassy Athens for specific information on how the US position
had been conveyed to Greek leaders. In its cable of July 11
(4378)15 Embassy Athens stated that in addition
to Tasca’s approaches, noted
above, other Embassy elements had “used their own channels to convey
the US position against any resort to violence on Cyprus.” The
Embassy added CIA information that
upon learning of Tasca’s
meeting with Ghizikis,
Ioannides said that
Tasca’s “policy line with
regard to Cyprus and the Aegean controversy was particularly
pleasing.”
[Page 493]
[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line
not declassified] stated on July 3 that Ioannides had decided, for the
time being, against action to remove Makarios because of
- —the uncertainty of Soviet reaction and
- —fear that Turkey might misinterpret the move.
On July 2 Makarios wrote to
Ghizikis formally
announcing his plan to reduce the National Guard drastically and
demanding the recall of the mainland Greek officers. Makarios released the contents to
the public. On that day INR
commented in the Secretary’s Summary that Makarios’ decision to expel over
90 percent of the mainland officers would precipitate a
confrontation with the Ioannides regime.
On July 5 [less than 1 line not
declassified]CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] reported
that Prime Minister Androutsopoulous confided that Athens would
attempt to persuade Makarios
to postpone his plans. Androutsopoulous’ tone was conciliatory. In
its NID of July 8 CIA estimated that
the GOG would try to stall attempts
by Makarios to reduce the
number of mainland officers and thus buy time. In the Secretary’s
Summary of July 7 INR thought that
Makarios was likely to
feel that Athens’ argument for not immediately complying with his
request to remove the officers was only a ruse to keep Greek forces
on the island. According to the INR
comment, his suspicions would be heightened by Athens claim that it
could not control anti-Makarios activities by Greek nationals.
On July 5 Tetenes and the two
next highest officials of the Foreign Ministry resigned. The CIA had reported on June 21 [document number not declassified]16 that Tetenes had urged an accommodating
stance toward Makarios, and
the resignation may have been over his failure to dissuade Ioannides from action.
In a conversation with Deputy Assistant Secretary Stabler on July 9 (150100)17 Cyprus Ambassador
Dimitriou referred to
Makarios’ letter and
opined that Greece “won’t take this lying down.” He speculated that
Athens might withdraw the NG
completely and recall its ambassador.
[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA [less than 1 line
not declassified] reported on July 11 that Makarios’ response to Androutsopoulos’ request for a delay
in the implementation of the Archbishop’s NG plans was negative. Androutsopoulous said that
extremes should be avoided and a compromise sought. In its NID of
July 11 the CIA stated that an attempt by the Greek junta to remove Makarios could not be ruled
out.
[Page 494]
On July 11, reacting to Nicosia’s proposal of June 27, the Department
instructed (150449)18 Ambassador Davies to comment as follows in a
scheduled meeting with Makarios if he should raise the subject of
Greece–Cyprus relations:
- —the US has informed the GOG that resort to violence would exacerbate
Cyprus’ problems;
- —the GOG is aware of US
opposition to activities that tend to threaten stability in
the eastern Mediterranean, peaceful relations among our
allies, and the single, sovereign, and independent status of
Cyprus;
- —the US hopes that issues between Cyprus and Greece can be
resolved in a manner consistent with Cyprus’ sovereignty,
independence, and security and with the interests of
stability in the region.
Davies conveyed this
information to Makarios on
July 12.
On the same day [less than 1 line not
declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] reported
the statement of a Soviet diplomat in Athens that a strong Soviet
démarche would be sent to the GOG
warning against interference in Cyprus.
On July 13 in the Secretary’s Summary INR said that since receiving Makarios’ letter demanding the
recall of most of the mainland officers, Athens had reacted
moderately, but the Ioannides regime was capable of an attempt to remove
Makarios.
Information obtained by [less than 1 line not
declassified] CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] on July
12, received by the Department on July 15, purported that Ioannides felt removal of
Makarios at this time
would lead to ramifications too explosive to ensure success.
Ioannides added that on
July 12 a reduction of 100 mainland officers from the NG would be ordered.
As the record shows, there was ample intelligence prior to the July
15 coup of the heightening tension developing between the Greek and
Cypriot governments. Although much of it was conflicting, and even
intentionally misleading, the weight of evidence pointed to an
impending direct move against Makarios by Ioannides.
Ioannides may well have read
into the US warnings that reached him primary concern over
intercommunal violence. (According to a CIA [less than 1 line not
declassified][TDFIBDB–315/06765–74],19
when asked immediately after the coup about foreign reaction,
Ioannides replied, “the
Americans are okay.”) He could have concluded that he had a free
hand, insofar as the United States was concerned, as long as his
gambit was intra-Greek. Indeed, immediately following the coup on
July 15, the Sampson
government was at pains to reassure the Turkish Cypriot
community.
[Page 495]
It may be relevant to point out that during the months of spring and
early summer our attention was fixed on the Aegean dispute as the
arena that would most readily ignite into Greek-Turkish hostilities.
Although we felt that Cyprus would inevitably be dragged into such a
conflict, we were less certain that Cyprus would be the flash point.
Perhaps as a consequence, our sensitivities to Cyprus-related events
were less sharp than they should have been. Be it noted, however,
that our reasoning was shared by Makarios. He undoubtedly decided to use the
opportunity of what he thought would be Ioannides’ preoccupation with Turkey to assert
control over the NG. He miscalculated
only in that he greatly overestimated Ioannides’ understanding of Turkish imperatives.
