12. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Regional Staff Meeting1
(The meeting convened at 3:18 p.m., Secretary Kissinger presiding as Chairman.)
Secretary Kissinger: Who would like to lead off?
Mr. Lord: Mr. Secretary, we thought this was a timely paper2 not only because of reports of our relations with Greece and to take advantage of Ambassador Tasca’s presence but also because it points up the basic dilemma we have in our foreign policy with many countries of different ideological views. We tried in this paper to treat this dispassionately in the U.S. interest as opposed to straw-man options, and Mr. Thornton of my staff will give a very brief presentation paper, and Ambassador Tasca and Mr. Davies perhaps could fill in some of the details of the discussion.
Secretary Kissinger: Unless everyone has already read it.
O.K.; can you do it in five minutes?
Mr. Thornton: Yes, sir.
The reason for going about a policy review for Greece now is that we have a new man since last November, which the paper characterized as not only in accord with our policies politically but also it’s not moving towards representative government.[Page 48]
Second, it’s been giving us a little more time in an adversarial approach, particularly relating to the Souda Bay agreement.
Now, with Ambassador Tasca here, it’s an eminently good time to press this interest.
There is the FMS question, Souda Bay renegotiation, and the home-porting thing.
What we’re trying to do in here is to raise the question of a general approach to the regime, to look at this in a broad framework of relations with Greece—and, particularly, as Win said, with our particular interests with Greece—so when we get to individual actions, we’re not going to build policy incrementally—rather, we’ll have some focus.
Greece, again, like many other places, confronts us with the usual dilemma of how you deal with a regime that is important to your short-term national interests and long-term also and provides very definite security advantages but, at the same time, causes us problems in dealing with it simply because of the political nature of the regime.
In addition, in Greece, you have a particular problem, as we see it, in balancing off short- versus long-range.
In other words, it’s what you get today as opposed to what you may get some years from now.
I would like to make some judgments on what this paper says on this. The first is this regime of Ioannides—we will name it after him—is not going to last very long. The experts who drafted this part of the paper said a year would be a generous estimate; and even with this type of regime, this narrowly based dictatorship is probably not going to be around too long.
The second is one which is not particularly critical in Greece—
Secretary Kissinger: Why is that? I mean, who is going to overthrow them? In fact, there are two contradictory statements in there. One says they can stay in office there indefinitely if they are united; the other says they can not stay there for more than a year.
Mr. Thornton: Yes. The fact that it is not going to be able to cope with the problems and there’s going to be increasing discontent. The likelihood is they would have another military regime. And, who knows? Maybe another one after that. But ultimately, if there’s a center of gravity, it’s going to be towards a political regime. I think the paper calls it “democratic regime.” Maybe one should say political regime rather than a military regime. And this would be over some period of years.
Mr. Tasca: Well, I think the point on that, I might underline, is the regime you have now is the most narrowly based regime they’ve ever had I think in this century—in their history—since 1821, since the revolution of 1821. Actually, there are only about, say, 20 or 30 officers— [Page 49] maybe 10 or 12—and they have no other support. This regime is in a politically isolated country. They have nobody for them. And even the businessmen who used to be for Papadopoulos are very skeptical. They are concerned and they are worried about what this regime is going to do to business. And, of course, that has other implications—which I will touch on later. But there is an instability in the fact that this narrowly based regime does represent only a sector of the military picture. They are one part of it. If you take the air force, the air force at best is neutral towards this regime. The navy is definitely hostile, and Admiral Arapaca—there’s nothing he would like better than moving against the regime, if he had an opportunity to do it. And, as far as the army is concerned, I think that there’s a lot of instability developing, and the intelligence is showing it, because of a situation in which every major officer from brigadier general up to lieutenant general is new in his job since last June and all the colonels are new, or nearly all the colonels are new—and where a brigadier general, with his majors and captains, gives orders to the two-star generals and the three-star general is an abnormal situation; it’s one that has the seeds of disillusion in one form or another.
Secretary Kissinger: How does the brigadier general give orders to the major general?
Mr. Tasca: Because he’s the one that master-minded the coup in November.
Secretary Kissinger: Who is the brigadier general?
Mr. Tasca: That’s Ioannides.
Secretary Kissinger: Oh. He is a brigadier?
Mr. Tasca: Yes, he is. He’s preferred to operate in the background. There’s a group of officers who are majors and lieutenant colonels and they decide what the policy is and then they give orders to the civilians, and the civilians order the so-called government that is nothing but a group of men that are administering the major policy decisions that are made by Ioannides and his officers.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes; but now, assuming all of this is correct, what policy decision does it involve for us?
Mr. Tasca: Well, what it involves for us is that in the struggle that’s developing between the more senior officers and Ioannides—well, there are a number of elements. First of all, it’s important that within this struggle that’s developing I think that our interests, in terms of security, would lie at whatever weight appropriately we can throw in the direction of the people who want to get back to some normalization—which means getting back in contact with a reasonable majority of the Greek people—to assure that our security interests will not be jeopardized with the regime they have with the United States and with NATO—which is now increasingly the case, and which is the main [Page 50] thrust of Androutsopoulos and was of Papandreou—which is what this whole policy objective is about.
The second point is that as far as the Greek people are concerned—
Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute. Before we get to that—
Mr. Tasca: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: —how do we associate with the Greek people?
Mr. Tasca: Well, I’d like to submit, Mr. Secretary, that I think our policy in this Administration to date has been reasonably successful. It’s been difficult, but I don’t think there’s any other policy to be followed today—
Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?
Mr. Tasca: Which is, the way I’ve interpreted it, protecting the higher part of our security interests—but, at the same time, making it clear that the United States has a part in Greece which, I also submit, cannot be compared with any other country—because they are a nation which has a history and a cultural tradition and a place that’s different—and we do feel that we want the Greeks, because of our bilateral relations—and the Congress of the United States has made it very clear that if we don’t make progress in this sense we won’t even be able to maintain our security relations. Sooner or later, with the repression that’s going on in Greece, we’re going to lose in the Congress of the United States; we won’t be able to give them the military credits, the military supplies. And if they don’t do that they will go French. If they don’t do that, they will go Arab. And that, in my judgment, would mean Quaddafi and Libya—because they have had relations there; they have trained the Libyan air force and the Libyan navy.
The third point is: As far as NATO is concerned, the British have adopted it. The Scandinavians have adopted it—
Secretary Kissinger: I still don’t understand what you think our policy is.
Mr. Tasca: Saying publicly that we’re for democracy in Greece, the way we’ve said in the past.
The last thing that was said was said by Secretary Rogers back in ‘73,3 and I don’t think we should change that. If we change that, we’ll face a whole new host of problems that we don’t want to face. And if [Page 51] I go to Congress and testify before the Rosenthal Committee,4 if he asks me if we’re still publicly for democracy in Greece and I say we think it would be nice to do it if [but] it’s their business, I think we’re going to raise a lot of other problems in Congress.
Secretary Kissinger: Which is pretty close to my convictions.
Mr. Tasca: Well, all I can do is tell you how I see it. And I think it’s a mistake to change our policy at this time.
Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I haven’t seen any great results from our policy. You want us to say once a year that—
Mr. Tasca: Mr. Secretary, I’m not sure there have been no results. First of all, we’ve maintained our security interest during this period. I think during the Arab-Israeli war, if we had gone to the Greeks and we said, “This is important because we’re going to have a confrontation with the Russians,” they would have come through.
I think, as far as NATO is concerned, it would have been possible during the NATO meetings to come to the fore because of the posture we took.
I think, as far as the Congress is concerned, the testimony I’ve given, we’ve had a lot of support in the Congress, because we were able to show that we publicly made it clear to Greece we thought in terms of our security relations—which is what I happen to believe: that the Greeks have got to get back to some kind of representative government.
And so I think, when you look at those factors, I’d say our policy, considering the difficulties, has been rather successful. I think it’s been quite successful. The fact that we could get the Dutch—Vanderstahl5 [sic]—to go along with our policy—and the Dutch, the Scandinavians and the Danes. And I think we’ll find with [the] British Labour Party is going to take a very strong position on Greece, as they’ve already shown in the last week, where a fleet visit has been set.
That means that that posture is a posture that’s going to help us with our Congress, as well as the public opinion that counts—the one that’s going to be running the country again, and with our own public opinion.[Page 52]
Now, that’s the way it looks to me.
Secretary Kissinger: Joe, this is one area in which you haven’t started a crisis yet. What do you think?
Mr. Sisco: Well, I’m not entirely satisfied with our present policy, and I have never been entirely satisfied with the totally hands-off policy that we have pursued. I feel that our present policy does not sufficiently and clearly enough disassociate ourselves from Greece in this respect.
I detect two developments that bother me: One, any Greek leader that you talk to today, in our discussions on the base, takes the point of view that there is not really a mutuality of interest between ourselves and Greece within the NATO framework—in other words, any time we discuss a base—and they’re talking in terms of quid pro quo. It’s basically in the context that that they are doing us a favor.
I want to put it very crudely. I don’t think the present—
Secretary Kissinger: That puts them in a very unusual position within NATO.
Mr. Sisco: Well, not so unusual.
I think, in that respect, this is fundamental in our dialogue with the Greeks. And I don’t think it’s a very healthy one.
Secondly, if the assessment is correct that this is the most narrowly based government in the history of Greece—and if the assessment is correct that Ioannides is not apt to last over this next year, that it may be a palace coup or a coup within the group—then it seems to me that the policy of, I believe, too close association with this present crowd is going to cause difficulty for us—
Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute. Who is associated? What is your definition of “too closely associated”?
Mr. Sisco: Well, I think that, basically, to the degree to which you have a public opinion in Greece, that Greece—the Greek people—basically feel that we are fully behind this present group.
I think there was a period of time under Papadopoulos where they made certain commitments—actually wrote a letter to the President, specified dates—none of which they carried out.
Secretary Kissinger: But, again, why should we assume that it is in the United States’ interest? Where else are we requiring governments to specify dates for elections in communications to the United States?
Mr. Sisco: Well, Greece has a unique relationship to the United States in this regard. This goes all the way back, insofar as movement towards representative government. It goes all the way back to commitments that Papadopoulos made to the President.[Page 53]
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I know, but that’s what we made it do.
My question is: Why is it in the American interest to do in Greece what we apparently don’t do anywhere else—of requiring them to give a commitment to the President to move to representative government?
Mr. Tasca: Because—may I add a note on that, Mr. Secretary?—
Mr. Sisco: Go ahead. I want to say something further.
Mr. Tasca: —well, I think because Greece and the Greek people—in terms of their position and public opinion in Western Europe—are quite unique. You can go back to the constitutional Greece or the Greek lobby—whatever you want to call it—and they’ve got a position in Western Europe and the United States that Brazil and Chile and these other countries don’t have. None of those countries has a Androutsopoulos5a—a Greek refugee who’s been activitated [active?] and who for four years has been leading a very vigorous fight on our policy in Greece.
Secretary Kissinger: But that just means we’re letting Androutsopoulos’ particular group make policy.
Mr. Tasca: How do you stop it?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I’m just being the devil’s advocate. You can say the Department of State doesn’t have a Political Science Division. It conducts the foreign policy of the United States. It deals with any government—communist or non-communist—within the context of the foreign-policy objectives of the United States. That way you don’t get caught with each individual government in giving approval and disapproval. Why is that wrong?
Mr. Tasca: Well, that may help you with other countries, but it wouldn’t get you to first base as far as Greece is concerned.
Secretary Kissinger: Why not?
Mr. Tasca: Because Greece has had a foreign factor since 1821 and since the revolution. We’re right in the internal Greek foreign institutions, whether you like it or not; we’re part of their value system, part of their political process. And we ought to get out of it. But it’s going to take time to get out. In the meantime, we’re going to be responsible.
Secretary Kissinger: But if we’re going to be manipulating their domestic structure, we’re not going to be able to get out. If we make pronouncements about their domestic structure, we are obviously doing it for some effect.
Mr. Tasca: Well, I think we are having some effect. This isn’t something you can measure. But, after all, within the Greek armed forces—that’s where the first game is going to be played. It’s going to be very important how the United States stands. These people are going to be watching us. If we change our policy and we give them the impression [Page 54] that we’re not as much of a democracy as we were, we in effect are intervening in the Greek situation—we’re intervening in favor of Ioannides.
Now, another thing about Ioannides to remember—
Secretary Kissinger: Well, in that case we cannot change our policy because whenever we change to a neutral stance, we’re going to be accused of interference or non-interference.
Mr. Tasca: Well, another thing, Mr. Secretary: That depends on what happens to the Greek situation.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, what’s your definition of democracy in Greece?
Mr. Tasca: Well, there’s some reasonable consensus of, let’s say, the majority of people. And the institutional form of that consensus is something for the Greeks to define.
Secretary Kissinger: And we hold that view with Greece—not Yugoslavia, Morocco, Algeria. How about Algeria?
Mr. Tasca: I don’t think it’s the same kind of a problem.
Mr. Thornton: Well, Mr. Secretary, nobody thinks we can influence the situation in Algeria. In Greece it’s different. This is a qualitative difference.
Secretary Kissinger: Why should we not adopt the position that we, therefore, don’t influence things?
Mr. Tasca: Then you’re intervening. You’re intervening in favor of Ioannides now.
Mr. Lord: The paper suggests an interventionist approach. The issue seems to follow a policy of complete hands-off—which the paper says is probably going to be, for the maximum benefit, short-term. So it’s a very reasonable short option, it seems to me. Or there are shadings—which we call a nose-holding option. You don’t go for election time; you merely make statements that you can proffer—that we would like to have democracy. But some kind of symbolic test which would be very close to a hands-off policy, which may give you some representation on the Hill—or you can refer it back to the previous policy of trying to influence them privately or publicly—which leads toward democracy, which gets more intervention. But I don’t think we should set it in terms of pure policy here.
Mr. Sisco: I wouldn’t think so either.
Secretary Kissinger: But we surely can’t be arguing about whether I’m going to revoke something my predecessor said in August ‘73, which did not make front-page headlines in most newspapers that I read.
Mr. Lord: As I understand present policy, over the last few months we haven’t been saying anything about democracy. Therefore, we have to be clear in our own mind what is “present policy.”[Page 55]
Mr. Tasca: We haven’t said anything publicly about democracy. In my discussions with him, the position I’ve taken is that it’s their business, and, in the press of discussing that, from the standpoint of bilateral relations and cohesiveness of the NATO Alliance, there ought to be some real advantages in their moving ahead. But it’s their business, without any question of deadline or dates.
But the question, increasingly, that’s being asked by people in the opposition and some very distinguished people who brought Greece into NATO, is that they’re surprised that since Rogers has left no statement has been made publicly on this subject. And I may very well get that on the Rosenthal Committee—why is that so—
Secretary Kissinger: And what will you say?
Mr. Tasca: What will I say? That’s what I want to get instructions about.
Secretary Kissinger: Tell them to ask me.
Mr. Tasca: All right.
Secretary Kissinger: I’m up there often enough.
Mr. Tasca: May I put one other note on the security side—because I want to be sure that’s put on the table too. There’s one thing about these people that is worrisome, and that is: They’re very primitive in their foreign-policy approach.
And there’s evidence now that they could easily get into an argumentation with Turkey on the question of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. I think the oil-exploration problem in the Aegean Sea does tend to indicate that these people might get into a real confrontation with the Turks on that. And I think that would raise all the problems that Cyprus did.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but that’s a foreign-policy problem. That I think we are capable of making judgments on.
Mr. Davies: Mr. Secretary—
Secretary Kissinger: What would satisfy the Rosenthal Committee would be a Secretarial statement every year—or is there some quota?
Mr. Tasca: I don’t know. I don’t think it’s a matter so much of satisfying Rosenthal, because I think his posture—as I understand it—I appeared before them in ‘71—I think their posture is something that would not be in harmony at all with our objectives, or the national interest, as I understand it—as we conceive it in the area. But what I’m thinking about is some kind of posture that we can use to defend the position that we’re taking, opposing as an alternative the kind of thing that might raise more questions than it answers.
I think we’re talking about a fairly restricted range in terms—we’re not talking about any extreme change in policy but trying to keep this [Page 56] in a position where we don’t raise new problems. And I submit that by keeping the kind of posture we’ve had—Ioannides expects it; he’s not going to be surprised—it helps us to reconcile these very difficult elements.
We’ll still have problems, but we’re in a better position than saying, “It’s none of our business. It’s their business.”
Secretary Kissinger: What is the subject of this meeting—whether we should change what Rogers said in August? Has anyone proposed this? What exactly are we trying to accomplish here?
Mr. Thornton: Well, the paper is kind of set up to accomplish where we come down within the range at either extreme, for that matter, or somewhere on one of the various possibilities within the range between hands-off and intervention—and not only in terms of, let’s say, the Rosenthal Committee but also in terms of what is going to protect our long-range interests as well as short-term interests.
Mr. Lord: There are two aspects of the problem—to what extent does anyone think you should pressure the Greeks privately—and I don’t sense much sentiment for that. The other question is: To what extent do you say anything publicly about their political system.
Secretary Kissinger: But, with all respect, this issue is being put in a hopelessly abstract manner because the issue isn’t between democracy and non-democracy. And we don’t support—whether Rogers or I make a statement once a year is relatively unimportant. What our Ambassador does day in and day out is a helluva lot more important.
And if they get the idea we’re against it, that’s one thing. If they get the idea we’re an active force for it, that’s another thing. But before we can even make that judgment, one would have to know what the likely political evolution is as between Papandreou and this fellow.
I don’t know whether it’s in our interest to rush to the defense of Papandreou—
Mr. Tasca: No. I agree completely.
Secretary Kissinger: —even if he’s for democracy. So even before one can make any judgment of what the likely evolution is, of what our right stance is, I would like to get some assessment from Bill what the likely evolution is—
Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.
Secretary Kissinger: —and what we are starting. I mean, if we are pressing them and if we make our displeasure known to a certain point and if we’re as influential as you say we are, then we’re going to trigger a political process or we’re going to demonstrate our impotence. If we demonstrate our impotence, we’re going to drive these people into a Quaddafi situation. If we don’t correct them, then before we can make [Page 57] a reasonable decision we’ll have to know what the likely evolutions are that can occur.
The Papandreou situation is a possibility—that’s one thing. We’ve worked with him before. And, if we can work with him, obviously, from our point of view, it would be best to have a government that protects our security interests and doesn’t put you before the Rosenthal Committee. If, however, we cannot get this, if we have to choose between our security concerns and some other evolution, then we have a tough problem.
If you could produce a Papandreou tomorrow in a stable government, I wouldn’t even want to know how you did it. But before we make any decisions like this, I think we ought to know what the probable evolutions are and what the probable impact is about taking a certain course.
I think we can survive Congressional hearings if we know what’s right. And we should know what we really want in Greece, what is in our national interest. If we can combine that with our moral values, so much the better—and with the Congressional pressure.
So, Bill, could you produce something fairly quickly and let the Ambassador see it?6
Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.
Mr. Tasca: May I make one very brief comment on this, Mr. Secretary? I think the way we would appraise the problem which you raise—which is, clearly, the most fundamental issue—is, as of right now, there’s very likely no7 opportunity that the army would allow Papandreou to come back and any normalization would have to take place on the basis of Papandreou not coming back. This is not to make it possible for Papandreou to come back and make it impossible for the communists to have any voice in the new government. So you’ll be talking about—
Secretary Kissinger: Of course, you could be wrong, because I knew Papandreou when he was an American professor working on monetary planning.
Mr. Tasca: But they don’t trust him, and the army certainly doesn’t trust him. And he’s very outspoken in some of the statements he’s made about taking Greece out of NATO and kicking the Americans out of Greece.[Page 58]
Secretary Kissinger: I’m not saying that Papandreou would come back. I have no judgment of who would come back, because they are great specialists in starting political upheavals whose consequences we don’t foresee—I don’t mean in Greece but as a nation. So if Bill—
Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.
Secretary Kissinger: —could do this, and then let you take a look at it—
Mr. Tasca: Yes, sir.
Secretary Kissinger: —then when do I have to make a decision? I mean, I don’t even know what the decision is that I’m being asked to make.
Mr. Lord: That’s the whole point. It’s not that you’re asked to make decisions. There is a feeling that perhaps incrementally you might slide into a posture—but maybe the right posture, that someone should know you’re doing it.
Secretary Kissinger: Basically we conduct foreign policy here, not domestic policy. We don’t muck around with the countries.
Now, before we change that course, I want to hear overpowering reasons why we should.
Now, it could be that Greece is a special case, I don’t deny that. I’m perfectly open-minded on that. But there’s no danger of my sliding into that posture. That is my posture. It’s one that I’ve tried to impose on Sisco when he didn’t slide cables past me when I was in the White House—
—which he did, not without success, from time to time.
Mr. Sisco: I think what the paper considers is a very, very narrow range; and it actually considers a narrow range within basically I think the guidelines of policy over the last four or five years. I don’t think anybody here assumes that we can influence the situation in Greece in the kind of decisive manner that was described here, and I don’t think that anybody has suggested this kind of an all-out interventionist policy because I just don’t think we’ve got this kind of capacity. I think that we’ve got security interests there.
The questions being posed in this particular paper between these ranges are: How do we protect that security interest—not only in terms of the present government but in circumstances where our assumption and our assessment is that this narrowly based government may very well be out of power a year from now, and how do we prevent whatever comes out a year from now from being a Quaddaffi Government or an anti-American Government? That’s the way I see the issue.[Page 59]
Secretary Kissinger: That’s a very important question. And if it is our judgment that this government is going to be substantially modified, then it is important for us to know whom to deal with—
Mr. Sisco: That’s right.
Secretary Kissinger: —and how to protect our interests in the next group so not to identify with it that our interests go down the chute with the next government.
Mr. Sisco: That’s right.
Secretary Kissinger: That does not mean whether we should take public positions against the government or we should have contacts with many of the leaders. I still would like to consider whether it is not better for us, in the long term in Greece, to have a very catholic approach to all political groups, and contacts with all political groups, and work with each political group that gets into office, unless it is violently anti-American—whether that is not a healthier posture for us to be in rather than to make public pronouncements of what we think about this or that political group—which would mean a degree of association with any government and a degree of association with any political group that may be functioning there and greater public aloofness, if that government is as precariously situated as you say that it is. That would raise many practical questions, aside from the moral questions which you raise (addressing Mr. Tasca).
Mr. Tasca: Well, I might say this: I don’t think that we should get into a position where we are ever supporting one particular government as against another government. And the general posture that we’ve taken—which I think is the right one—is that they can adopt any form that they want; and we do make contact with all elements but, when we think sometime of a government that has some kind of relationship to the people, some kind of leadership which is going to have to build the kind of government that’s going to help to strengthen our relations and also their posture in NATO.
Secretary Kissinger: It’s just a question of to what effect we’re doing it. If we don’t have the capacity to change the government, then we can do it for one of two reasons—either for our domestic reasons or to win the favor of a group that’s going to get into office in Greece—either as a result of what we say or no matter what we say.
If it’s the first, our domestic policy, you know, Rosenthal is a problem. But I think, on the whole, we do best on the Hill if we do what we think is right and let the Hill worry about their predilections.
On the whole, we’ve done well on the Hill with the approach that we defend our best judgment of the right foreign policy and take an occasional flap. If we believe that our action may change the government or may move it in a certain direction or that there is somebody waiting in the wing to take over, then I’d like to know who that is.[Page 60]
Now, that’s what I’d like to iron out in our analysis, and then we can make a judgment.
I’m not likely, while I’m in the Soviet Union next week, to make a pronouncement on Greek politics.
Mr. Sisco: I think you could apply, sir.
Secretary Kissinger: But if somebody can get some Congressional wives for me, it’s not bad.
Mr. Sisco: And you might support Security Council Resolution 242 in relation to Greece.
Secretary Kissinger: In fact, if we could reach Greece next week and the Soviet Union, I’d be a happy man.
O.K.; can you do that?
Mr. Tasca: Yes, sir.
Secretary Kissinger: And, Joe, I want to see you for a minute. Win, I want to see you for something.
(Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.)
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 1973–77, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meeting. Secret. The following people attended the meeting: Kissinger, Rush, Sisco, Donaldson, Sonnenfeldt, McCloskey, Holton, Eagleburger, Lord, Thornton, Maw, Weiss, Tasca, Davies, Churchill, Hyland, Hartman, Springsteen, and Vest.↩
- Document 10.↩
- In telegram 135038 to Athens, July 11, 1973, Rogers sent an oral message to Papadopoulos as follows: “We have consistently held that the form of government in Greece is a matter for the people of Greece to decide. We therefore welcome, as do all the friends and allies of Greece, Papadopoulos’s pledge that the Greek people will be given an opportunity for free expression on their opinion on their future, through the scheduled plebiscite and general elections. In the spirit of respect and affection that has long characterized relations between our countries, we cannot fail to stress the importance that must be attached to the exercise of genuine freedom of choice on the part of the Greek electorate. In the broadest sense, the conduct of the plebiscite and the elections to follow will inevitably have an effect on the alliance and on the traditional cordial relations between our two countries.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV)↩
- Tasca testified before Congress on March 27. This is presumably a reference to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal (D–New York).↩
- Reference is to Max Van der Stoel, Dutch Foreign Minister.↩
- The reference to Androutsopoulos is incorrect. Adamantios Androutsopoulos was Greek Prime Minister from November 1973 to July 1974. His name appears in the original minutes, but it is not clear whether Tasca and Kissinger misspoke or whether the note taker recorded the wrong name. A question mark, in an unknown hand, appears above Androutsopoulos’s name; however, question marks appear above several other names in the minutes, perhaps indicating uncertainty about spelling, rather than identity.↩
- Hyland sent Kissinger an INR analysis on March 29; a copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans.NEA and Tasca submitted comments separately on April 5. (Ibid.)↩
- An unidentified hand crossed out the word “the” and added “no.”↩