38. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Iran (Helms) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
99. 1. Am sending this message via this channel in interest of speed at this hour (0015L October 8 local). If you want it repeated via normal State channels, please advise.
2. Prime Minister Hoveyda, at Shah’s instruction, summoned me at 2315 local to read me cable to Shah from President Sadat transmitted via Iranian Ambassador to Cairo who saw Sadat early afternoon Egyptian time October 7.2 To summarize, cable gives optimistic description of Egyptian military position on East Bank of Suez Canal and of Egyptian prowess in crossing canal and establishing bridgehead there. Then cable requests Shah to inform President Nixon that Egypt until now, in order to avoid fighting, has been ready to accept peace under certain conditions. However, Egypt has now been obliged to fight and to take casualties. It still wants peace, a lasting peace in the area. Sadat wants President Nixon to know that if Israel will evacuate all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967, Egypt will be ready to negotiate sincerely to place these territories under the control of the United Nations, or under the control of the four big powers, or under some other international control to be agreed. As for Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt is prepared to accept international supervision of freedom of navigation through Gulf of Aqaba after Israeli withdrawal. Sadat wants Shah to explain foregoing to President Nixon so that casualties may be stopped as soon as possible.3
[Page 147]3. Since Sadat offer set forth above struck me as somewhat improbable, I asked Hoveyda and his bilingual assistant to translate the cable for me three times.
4. New subject: Iraq offer to renew diplomatic relations with Iran will be answered October 8.4 Iran will say that since Iraq broke relations, it is up to Iraq to make the offer, which Iran is ready to discuss provided Iraq is prepared to accept that the 1937 agreement is dead, that the British colonial heritage is a thing of the past, that Iraq will abide by existing norms of international law. In other words, Iran will not turn down offer out of hand to avoid giving Iraqis propaganda advantage but will not throw away Kurdish card by accepting on Iraqi terms. “British colonial heritage” refers to Iraq’s continuing insistence that the 1937 agreement about the Shatt al Arab still obtains.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 425, Backchannel Files, 1973, Middle East/Africa. Secret; Eyes Only.↩
- Kissinger sent a message for the Shah in telegram 199655 to Tehran, October 6, informing him that Egypt and Syria had attacked Israel and that the United States hoped to restore the cease-fire on the basis of the status quo ante. He hoped that the Shah would “undertake efforts paralleling our own.” (Ibid., Box 603, Country Files—Middle East, Iran, Vol. V, May–December 1973) Documentation on the 1973 war and U.S. efforts to negotiate a cease-fire is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973.↩
- The Embassy reported in telegram 7126 from Tehran, October 8, that Khalatbari had reiterated the Iranian position “that GOI would continue to back legitimate demands by Egypt, Syria and Jordan for return of their territories seized by Israel” in the 1967 war. The Embassy commented: “While it maintains friendly de-facto relations with Israel, which it values, Iran has to be careful not to offend Arabs both for reasons of external politics and internal conservative religious opinion which tends to sympathize with Moslem Arabs.” The Embassy judged that Iran was embracing caution, “giving strong lip service to Egyptian and Syrian ‘legitimate interests’” while advocating immediate action by the UN. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, [no film number])↩
- See footnote 3, Document 236.↩