220. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford1

Secretary Kissinger asked that the following report of his August 25 meeting with Sadat be passed to you:

“It has been a long and difficult day, with some further progress, some new difficulties, though not necessarily unresolvable, and a seemingly never ending series of details on which to achieve common ground.

“With Sadat today2 we came a bit closer on a possible agreed line which would get the Israelis out of the Giddi pass. He accepted the additional slivers of territory Israel has given on both the Egyptian and Israeli lines, and we will try to get agreement from Israel tonight on the location of the Egyptian strategic early warning stations. Sadat has also accepted the American presence in the passes.

“We went over in detail with Fahmy and Gamasy a text of an agreement,3 a copy of which I am sending. Sadat went further in the direction of the Israeli position than expected. For example, he has not only lived up to his commitment to include in the agreement a non-resort to force clause, but also met the Israeli insistence that [Page 816] blockades be barred. Cargoes of a non-strategic character will be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal. The text also keeps the agreement open-ended as Israel wants, and Sadat confirmed he will give us a letter committing Egypt to three annual renewals of the UNEF. There are still difficulties ahead on the precise terms of the zone of limitation, and there is a fundamental difference between Egypt and Israel to resolve over the corridor area leading to the oil fields; Egypt wants sovereignty, Israel’s position is that Egypt should exercise civil administration. We also need to work out a tripartite agreement governing our technical surveillance role in the passes.

“I expect a difficult session tonight with Rabin. The technical team I left behind in Israel to work with them on the memorandum of understanding incorporating the U.S. bilateral assurances Israel seeks have reported continuing differences. The Israelis are still pushing to limit our future freedom of action politically on this issue.”

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, Box 4, August 21–September 1, 1975, Volume I (6), Sinai Disengagement Agreement. Secret; Sensitive.
  2. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
  3. The final agreement is Document 226.