207. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]
[Kissinger:] I would like to go over the Israeli thing. De Borch-grave2 says we would be better going for an overall agreement. This thing looks like it is developing into something for which we will pay [Page 776] an exorbitant price. I don’t think we can agree to shifts in the line to put the passes in a bag.
I also don’t think we can concur to do nothing for 3–4 years without their agreement.
On the four American points, they can’t be checkpoints, but just warning posts, with simple radar.
We also can’t promise we won’t push them on Syria. Informally we can agree to what you and Rabin discussed.3 If it blows up, we should not be bitter but just move to an overall.
If Rabin will agree not to bend the lines west, there is a chance. But there is still a problem with the south. If they acted with some generosity toward Sadat, they would have a real chance. For the Egyptians to have a road, with the Israelis on the heights looking down on them . . .
President: Make sure you tell them we will put our people into the warning station, so if we have to go public . . .
Kissinger: If it breaks down I would go on television and say it hasn’t worked and we will go for an overall settlement. Don’t describe it in detail then. I could the next day give a detailed briefing. Then four to six weeks later we can put out our plan.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Arab-Israeli dispute.]
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 282, President’s File, July 1975, Folder 1. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at the White House.↩
- Arnaud de Borchgrave was an American journalist.↩
- See Document 183.↩