113. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Department of State1

Secto 264/4975. For Eagleburger only from the Secretary.

1. I want you to tell Dinitz that I am absolutely outraged by Allon’s letter and Dinitz’ oral message.2 I want you to convey this to him with some heat, pointing out that I had to push through a negative vote over the recommendations and protests of our entire bureaucracy. It is entirely false to say we were ambiguous with the Europeans. We went to every single country Allon suggested. In each case the reply was exactly the opposite of what Allon predicted. If the Israelis believe the Europeans on this, a confidential relationship between us becomes impossible.

2. Tell Dinitz I will not put up with this kind of ingratitude and shortsightedness any longer. He should know that our foreign policy is made in Washington not Jerusalem and I do not appreciate his government’s constant harassament any longer.

3. I am sending Scowcroft a message on military equipment.3

4. With respect to my forthcoming trip, Dinitz should not tell me the obvious. It is clear that no final decisions can be made after the Rabat summit. We will obviously not brief the press in an unproductive direction.

5. My schedule prohibits me from doing the Weizmann Institute before next March as I have said at least five times.4

Kissinger
  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 156, Geopolitical File, Israel, October 1974. Secret; Cherokee; Nodis, Immediate.
  2. Dinitz’s oral message, conveyed to Eagleburger, expressed a number of concerns, especially the Israeli Government’s fear of Arab attempts to “translate decisions taken in Rabat into a new UNGA Resolution aimed at upsetting U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.” (Telegram Tosec 332/238082 to Dacca, October 30; ibid.) Dinitz also presented Allon’s letter to Eagleburger. In the letter, Allon applauded the U.S. vote against the UN General Assembly’s invitation to the PLO, but he criticized the United States for not making a greater effort “to obtain the support of other countries for its position.” Allon concluded that “firm opposition by the U.S. to the Arab initiative which, if vigorously pursued, will no doubt secure the support of other like-minded nations,” and he sought assurance from Kissinger “that this will indeed be the course to be taken by the United States.” (Telegram Tosec 333/238083 to Dacca, October 30; ibid.)
  3. In telegram Tosec 332/238082 to Dacca, Dinitz expressed his hope that the U.S. Government would respond positively to Israeli requests for military equipment. (Ibid.)
  4. Dinitz also asked if Kissinger would be accepting an honorary degree from the Weizmann Institute. (Ibid.)