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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973
  4. Document 408

408. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1

Madrid, December 19, 1973, 1620Z.

Hakto 81. Call Dobrynin and tell him that I am concerned about the potential of Syria to cause trouble, particularly since it has decided to stay away from Geneva.2 We know there are those in Syria who favor a resumption of the fighting. If Syria attacks, Egypt may be drawn in.3 This is not only likely to torpedo the Geneva conference before it has had a chance, but create new risks and dangers in the area and difficulties for both of us. Tell Dobrynin to tell Moscow that we count on them to restrain the Syrians and to stay in close touch with us about the Syrian situation. We will, of course, restrain the Israelis. A resumption of fighting would have very unfortunate consequences for our relationship.4

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 42, Kissinger Trip Files, HAK Trip—Europe & Mideast, HAKTO 1–88, Dec. 8–22, 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only; Immediate.↩
  2. In telegram 14364 from Beirut, December 18, Buffum reported to Kissinger that Assad had decided not to attend the Geneva conference because of Israeli linkage of the POW issue and the fact that the conference would start by merely discussing disengagement rather than a peace settlement. (Ibid., Box 1180, Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, Middle East—1973 Peace Negotiations, December 18, 1973 thru Dec. 22, 1973 [2 of 3])↩
  3. As of December 19, the predominant view at CIA was that Assad did not want to undermine the conference but rather sought to pressure the Israelis into giving in to Arab demands. If this was the case, the Soviets and Egyptians could probably dissuade Syria from resuming hostilities. Assad, however, was under strong domestic pressure from the army and leftists in the Baath Party to launch another strike against the Israelis. (Ibid.)↩
  4. In telegram Tohak 154/WH37720, December 20, Scowcroft informed Kissinger that he had spoken to Dobrynin along the lines of telegram Hakto 81. Dobrynin had asked if U.S. concern was based only on Syria’s refusal to attend the conference or on something more specific. Scowcroft said he responded that there were some “worrisome indications” and the Ambassador said he would pass the message to Moscow immediately. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 42, Kissinger Trip Files, HAK Trip—Europe & Mideast, TOHAK 134–185, Dec. 8–22, 1973)↩