Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976

140. Memorandum From the Chief of the Latin America Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Raymond A. Warren) to Director of Central Intelligence Bush¹

Washington, November 4, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Panamanian National Guard G–2 Responsibility for Panama Canal Zone Bombings²

1. This memorandum is to advise you that Lt. Col. Manuel A. Noriega, the Chief of the Panamanian National Guard G–2 (GN/G–2), ordered the three recent bomb explosions in the Panama Canal Zone. [3½ lines not declassified]³

2. Background. Between 31 October and 1 November, three explosions took place in the Panama Canal Zone. Although no personal injuries resulted, at least nine cars and some property were damaged. The explosions have, of course, drawn great attention from all elements of the U.S. Government concerned with the security of the Canal Zone. At last report, the Governor of the Canal Zone had requested that the United States Southern Command provide sufficient troops to defend the canal area.

3. The Panamanian press is currently accusing the Zonians themselves of plotting to create a situation wherein they appear martyrs. At the same time, leaflets are circulating in Panama claiming that an ultra-nationalist anti-U.S. group is taking credit for the bombings. However, two disseminations, one from a highly sensitive Agency source, the second from an equally sensitive source of the U.S. Army’s 470th Military Intelligence Group, report that the Chief of the GN/G–2, Lt. Col. Noriega, himself ordered the bombing attacks and occasioned the distribution of the diversionary leaflets as part of a harassment campaign against the Canal Zone. According to the Agency report, Lt. Col. Noriega almost certainly had the approval of the Chief of Government, Brigadier Omar Torrijos for such an action. Although the Agency and Army reports vary somewhat on the actual individuals involved in the technical aspects of the bombings, it is clear that most if not all of these technicians have at one time or another received ordnance training from the U.S. Army or U.S. AID. Additionally, one of the individuals mentioned was among the twelve trainees who attended an Agency sponsored course on terrorist devices, threats, and response, held in the United States from 5 to 30 July 1976.

4. [11 lines not declassified] Lt. Col. Noriega [less than 1 line not declassified] maintains a liaison relationship with representatives of the Cuban and Israeli intelligence services. Clearly, this second-most powerful man in Panama is no one’s agent. He is a ruthless opportunist whose only loyalties lie with himself and Panama.

5. One of the cars bombed belonged to Canal Zone policeman William Drummond. Drummond recently came to public attention in late October when, as legislative chairman of the Canal Zone AFL–CIO, he filed suit in the Zone’s U.S. District Court for the purpose of halting canal treaty negotiations. Sometime earlier, Mr. Drummond had testified before a U.S. Congressional Committee in opposition to the negotiation of a new canal treaty with Panama. He had also authored correspondence on Panama based on information he claimed to have received from someone with access to the files of the 470th Military Intelligence Group; and Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan subsequently drew from this correspondence when presenting questions on Panama to the National Security Council. [4½ lines not declassified]

[name not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 79M00467A: Subject Files and Correspondence, Box 23, Folder 17: P–17: Panama. Secret. Sent through Wells who concurred on November 6. A copy was sent to the Deputy DCI.
2. Underneath the subject line, an unknown hand wrote: “(Additional details/possibilities of which you should be aware).”
3. In telegram 7529 from Panama City, November 3, the Embassy also reported evidence that “the recent bombings in the Canal Zone were the work of the Panamanian National Guard—presumably with Torrijos’s approval.” The Embassy offered options: A) ignore the evidence and maintain the status quo; B) end negotiations because of the bombings; or C) warn Torrijos personally about any future violence. (National Archives, RG 84, American Embassy, Panama, Classified and Unclassified Political and Economic Files 1976–78, Lot 80F162, Box 3, POL 23.8 Demonstrations, Riots, Terrorism, 1977)