Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

95. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Japanese Prime Minister Sato Comments on U.S.-Japan Economic Relations and Other Issues

In an interview September 1 with James Reston of the New York Times, Japanese Prime Minister Sato went to some lengths to keep current U.S.-Japanese problems in a balanced perspective. Specifically, he:

—Said he has “great expectations” for the U.S.-Japan Econ Com cabinet exchange next week, noting that the most important need would be for a frank exchange of views with no “mincing of words” that left room for misunderstanding. (Japan will clearly request as its highest priority removal of the surcharge as soon as possible, citing the fact that it is now floating the yen, and will ask for a clear and specific indication of what the U.S. requires in order to remove the surcharge.)

—Acknowledged that there had been a serious Japanese domestic political problem brought on by U.S.-China and economic initiatives.

—Expressed the concern that U.S.-Japan relations could be “impaired” by political repercussions from our economic problems, but said “We are in the same ship, so we must make every effort not to sink together.”

—Expressed his preference for tackling our basic economic problems in a multilateral form such as the IMF or the Group of Ten. (This would avoid the appearance of the U.S. directly inflicting its will on Japan, and make it easier for Japan to acquiesce to our requests.)

—Said the current primary Japanese economic need was to stimulate its economy, which would facilitate increased imports (including finished goods as well as raw materials).

Basic US-Japan Relationship

—Reaffirmed several times that Japan’s relationship with the U.S. is the basis and pivot of its foreign policy, and said that the Mutual Security Treaty is the basis of Japan’s security.

—Cited his “very close relationship” with you, and again welcomed a visit by you to Japan (although saying it would be better following the visit by the Emperor to the U.S.).

China Policy

—Attributed Peking’s fears of resurgent Japanese militarism to “scars left by Japanese militarists,” and cited political and constitutional blocks to such a development.

—Reiterated Japan’s “One China” policy, and said Peking and Taipei should resolve their differences by peaceful means.

Comment

Within recent days the Chinese representation issue has become the major political issue in Japan. Sato’s opposition apparently believes that he is most vulnerable on this issue, and that his government will fall if he associates himself with a Chirep strategy that fails. Most importantly, two of Sato’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders, former Foreign Ministers Miki and Ohira, have publicly come out in opposition to Japanese support for our two Chirep resolutions. Both want a Japanese position more in line with Peking’s demands. Miki’s opposition was expected and tolerable, but that of Ohira is somewhat different. Ohira, who is leader of the LDP’s second strongest faction (next to Sato’s), has previously supported Sato policy and has been given the best chance of succeeding Sato as Prime Minister.

Adding pressure to Sato on the China issue has been the just-concluded visit of Wang Kuo-chuan, Vice Chairman of Peking’s China-Japan Friendship Association. Wang was quite successful in stimulating heightened Japanese interest in improved relations with Peking, particularly among Japanese business leaders.

Embassy Tokyo reports that the Sato Government now apparently wants to defer further consultations with us on Chirep until Foreign Minister Fukuda arrives in Washington next week for the Econ Com meeting.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. V, 1 Jul–Sep 71. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it. Kissinger forwarded this memorandum to the President as Hormats and Froebe recommended in their September 3 memorandum. (Ibid.) Kissinger edited the Hormats/Froebe draft by eliminating a paragraph that read: “In retrospect, the effect of our China and economic initiatives was probably to accelerate Prime Minister Sato’s departure from the Japanese political scene—his opponents added their heavy criticism of his handling of U.S.-Japan relations and China policy to their earlier mounting criticism of him on several other scores. On China policy, they claimed that Japan had to develop an independent policy to keep the U.S. from getting out in front in normalizing relations with Peking.” (Ibid.)