Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

72. National Security Study Memorandum 122¹

Washington, April 15, 1971.

TO

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

• Policy Toward Japan

The President has directed a review of our policy toward Japan. The study should assess the issues in our relations with Japan and the policy options open to the United States.

The study should take into account the study prepared in response to NSSM 5² and developments in our relations since NSDM 13 was issued on May 28, 1969.³ In particular it should consider:

—Changing Japanese attitudes about Japan’s international role and its relations with the U.S.;

—The effect on Japan of the Nixon Doctrine;

—The effects of developments in U.S. China policy on U.S.–Japan relations;

—Changes in our defense posture in Asia, our defense relationship with Japan and any changes in Japanese defense policy which might affect our bilateral relations; and

—The effect of the Okinawa reversion negotiations.

In addition, the study should consider the following economic issues:

—Japanese economic and other interests in Southeast Asia; and

—U.S.–Japan economic relations and the means of dealing with them (the immediate textile issue will continue to be dealt with separately, but this study should, of course, assess its implications for overall U.S.–Japan relations).

The study should be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for consideration by the Senior Review Group by July 1, 1971.⁴ In considering the economic issues, the Interdepartmental Group for East Asia should include representatives of the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.⁵

Henry A. Kissinger

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. Kissinger rejected earlier drafts of this NSSM, arguing that economic issues should be placed at the end of the NSSM rather than near the front. (Kissinger marginalia on memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy to Kissinger, April 2; ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–182, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 122 [3 of 3]) The NSSM was also changed to include a member of Peterson’s staff on the Interdepartmental Group that prepared the requested study. (Memorandum from Richard Kennedy to Kissinger, April 12; ibid.) The Senior Review Group examined the issues raised by this memorandum on August 7, August 26, and September 7, while the CIEP Review Group considered economic aspects of these issues on August 10. The result of these meetings was the issuance of National Security Decision Memorandum 130, September 7, Document 94, which prepared the U.S. delegation before the eighth U.S.-Japan Joint Economic Committee Meeting, on September 9 and 10.
2. The NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia produced a paper in response to NSSM 5. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H Files) Box H–128, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 5 [1 of 2]) See Document 8 for the summary of this paper.
3. Document 13.
4. Deputy Executive Secretary Robert T. Curran requested an extension for completing the study, citing “a very heavy workload on the principals involved in the Okinawa reversion negotiations” and the “widely divergent views within the U.S. Government on U.S. policy toward Japan” as reasons for the delay. (Memoranda from Curran to the NSC, June 8 and July 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 JAPAN–US; and ibid.; Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–182, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 122 [3 of 3].
5. Dissatisfied with the role allocated him by NSSM 122, Peterson refused to participate in the economic aspects of the Interdepartmental Group and demanded that that he chair the economic section of the study. He insisted on clearing any NSSM that dealt with economic issues and that Kissinger amend NSSM 122 to make him chairman of the economic sections of the study, hinting that he might take his case to the President if Kissinger did not accede to his wishes. (Written comments by Peterson to Kissinger on a memorandum from Staff Director of the Interdepartmental Group Edward Masters to Doolin, et al., April 20; ibid.) Bergsten told Kissinger that Peterson “already despairs at State’s ability to carry out negotiations with sufficient toughness to get acceptable results and present a respectable image. He clearly views this as an institutional problem rather than simply one of present personalities, though he is fully aware that present personalities exacerbate the difficulty.” (Memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger, April 22; ibid.) Kissinger did put Peterson in charge of the economic aspects of NSSM 122. (Memorandum from Haig to Peterson, May 7; ibid.)