Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, March 11, 1971, 2130Z.

41080. Strictly Eyes Only For The Ambassador. Directly deliver soonest following message from the President to Prime Minister Sato. You should do maximum to confine knowledge of message and its contents strictly to yourself and Prime Minister.

Begin Quote:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I cannot conceal my disappointment and concern at the course the textile matter has taken.² I thought that last October we had reached a good understanding which would lead to a mutually satisfactory resolution of this problem.³ Already then the issue had plagued relations between our two countries far too long, and previous understandings had not been realized. At the time I received your message of March 8,⁴ as well as the statement of the Japan Textile Federation, accompanied by the statement of your Chief Cabinet Secretary, it had been my impression that Ambassador Ushiba and Mr. Flanigan were finally making some real progress in their talks. These statements thus came as a complete surprise. As you know, those statements were very promptly followed by the statement of the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, who is a member of the Democratic party.

All of this would be of little importance if the unilateral steps taken by your industry would have come reasonably close to meeting our needs here, with which you are familiar. In any event, if unilateral action of this kind was to be taken I would have hoped that it could have at least been consistent with the area of agreement at which Ambassador Ushiba and Mr. Flanigan had arrived.

Nevertheless, I am sure that you will have noted that the approach taken by the Japanese industry has been violently and unanimously attacked by all members of the American industry and its supporters, including those in the Congress. Thus, rather than resolving this problem, I fear that it has led to increased controversy.

However, what has been done is done and, while I would much prefer that we continue our efforts to find a mutually satisfactory negotiated solution, I understand from your message and from your talk with Ambassador Meyer that you do not feel that this is possible. I thus see no way of resolving the matter unless over a period of time the Japanese Federation, with the cooperation of the Japanese Government, were to so administer the controls as to be consistent with our needs here, as Mr. Flanigan has previously outlined them to Ambassador Ushiba.

As you will see from the statement that I am issuing today,⁵ I have felt it necessary to instruct my officials to observe closely the actual development of textile imports from Japan, in order to determine the manner in which the Federation carries out its pledge to prevent undue distortions in the pattern of the trade. I hope that our officials can keep in close touch on this matter. In the meanwhile, I am sure that you understand why I felt it necessary today to reiterate to the Congress my support for legislation to protect the American textile industry.

I deeply regret, Mr. Prime Minister, the necessity of writing you in this vein. However, I felt it best that you have a clear and frank understanding of the situation and problems that I face here, for I continue to believe it is only by such frank understanding between us that we can handle this matter in a manner that will assure that this issue not impair those relations of friendship and cooperation between our two peoples which are of such overriding importance.

Sincerely, Richard Nixon.

End quote.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO FIBERS 17 US–JAPAN. Secret; Nodis; Flash. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Eliot and by Kissinger in draft. Meyer delivered Nixon’s letter to Sato shortly after noon on March 12. Meyer’s report of this meeting in telegram 2238 from Tokyo, March 12, indicates, “[Sato] is under no illusions as to US displeasure and need to make amends via meaningful unilateral restraint program reflecting US requirements as set forth in Ushiba–Flanigan discussions.” (Ibid.)
2. See Document 69.
3. See Document 58.
4. Document 69 describes Sato’s message to Nixon. The Embassy in Tokyo reported in telegram 2178, March 11, on a meeting between Meyer and Sato. The Japanese Prime Minister said that his country’s textile industry had acted without his approval and cut the ground from under the Japanese government’s negotiating position. In addition, Sato expressed regret that he had “failed” to meet Nixon’s expectations, and warned that if the U.S. Government publicly criticized the Japanese proposal, this would facilitate Communist China’s efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 536, Country Files, Japan, Vol. IV, 1/1–6/30/1971)
5. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 423–424.
6. The telegram is not signed.