25. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Okinawa Reversion
I have received the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the reversion of Okinawa. Given the importance of this subject, I believe it appropriate that I forward to you their specific views:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
In view of the fact that it has not been possible to obtain public assurances, the United States should, prior to or during the summit [Page 75] meetings, obtain confidential written assurances, for a period at least through the decade of the seventies, to guarantee:
a) maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to the Republic of Korea, China, and Vietnam; and,
b) in event of a Presidential decision to withdraw nuclear weapons, rights for transit of nuclear weapons for periodic exercises and temporary storm haven and for emergency reentry and storage of nuclear weapons, when security conditions in Asia require.
Although time will not permit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommended that the final proposed Joint Communiqué, the GOJ unilateral statements, and the U.S. position which has evolved from negotiations with the Government of Japan be considered by the National Security Council prior to the meetings with Prime Minister Sato this week.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103, Box 14, Okinawa, 323.3. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Rogers. The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is contained in a November 8 memorandum to Laird, numbered JCSM–708–69. (Ibid.) Kissinger later thanked Laird for expressing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this memorandum, noting that the considerations they raised “were given careful weight in the discussions with Prime Minister Sato.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Laird, December 3; ibid.)↩