119. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Topics for Discussion—Japan Trip
There are a number of US-Japan security related issues that you may be confronted with in your discussions with representatives of the Government of Japan and/or the American Embassy. I would like to convey to you my views on these issues in the event that you have the opportunity to discuss them.
Recently, Ambassador Ingersoll approached Lt. General Graham, Commander U.S. Forces, Japan (COMUSJ) with a proposal that would transfer the chairmanship of the US-Japan Joint Committee on Military Affairs from COMUSJ to the American Embassy. COMUSJ, CINCPAC, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose this proposal, and I fully support their position. The preponderence of the problems considered by the committee are military in nature and range across the entire spectrum of military operations. Decisions on Joint Committee matters are in accordance with our treaty and SOFA obligations. They vitally affect US forces and must primarily be developed and made by military commanders. The Embassy politico-military advisor, who sits on the Joint Committee, is kept fully informed of all actions and problems as they are raised and staffed. The myriad of technical detail necessary for the resolution of these problems is found in military channels and can most effectively be brought to bear under military control. I strongly urge that present arrangement which has proven extremely effective since 1952 be continued.
There is some evidence that the Japanese are thinking of possible means of defining more specifically, at least in their own minds, military situations that would require “prior consultation”. The prior consultation clause concerning implementation of Article VI of the 1960 MST is a flexible arrangement and has served the US and Japan well. Specific wording follows: “Major changes in their equipment, and the uses of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the [Page 418] government of Japan.” However, during recent days in the GOJ Diet, opposition parties and news media have paid much attention to the prior consultation clause alleging lack of consultation in recent US Air deployments from Japan to SE Asia. Based on USG and GOJ understandings of the consultation clause, prior consultation was not required for these moves. The GOJ was informed. Nevertheless, for political reasons Foreign Minister Fukuda acquiesced to opposition pressures and stated that this subject would be addressed at the next US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting. Defense concern is that past arrangements not be undercut. Revision of the prior consultation clause could severely restrict flexibility of employment of US forces and use of facilities and areas in Japan and in turn bring the viability of the US-GOJ MST into serious question. US forces and bases in Japan must continue to be available for support of other US treaty commitments in East Asia with a minimum of restrictions.
We are at the onset of the typhoon season in the Pacific. Our build-up of B–52s in WESTPAC has saturated B–52 facilities at Guam and U-tapao2 to the extent that neither location can be used to accommodate aircraft threatened by typhoon tracks. Kadena Air Base on Okinawa has long been used for Guam based B–52s during typhoon periods. Because of the fact that the B–52 requires 200 feet wide runways and taxiways, there are a limited number of airfields that can be utilized. These include Kadena and Yokota in Japan, Hsin Chu and CCK on Taiwan. The recent threat by typhoon Lola and a request for GOJ understanding that it might become necessary to evacuate some B–52s to Yokota, due to the large build-up of B–52s on Guam and in Thailand, resulted in Embassy Tokyo taking strong opposition due to political sensitivities within the GOJ. There was an indication that even continued use of Kadena would create political problems because of the Okinawa elections. Obviously, it is not in the U.S. interest to allow this extreme political sensitivity to persist. Typhoon evacuations are emergency situations. Safe-haven by one of our major allies should not be denied, regardless of class of aircraft. These temporary evacuations should not be considered as a parallel issue to combat operations. As long as the current high number of B–52s are deployed in WESTPAC, our planners require assurances that bases in Japan, in addition to those in Okinawa, may be used. I would greatly appreciate your effort to affirm an understanding that should the need arise, Japan bases including Yokota Air Base on the mainland, may be used for B–52 safehaven.
[Page 419]In the interest of improving the morale of our Navy personnel and to provide better utilization of our forward deployed carriers in the Pacific, I have proposed homeporting to Yokosuka an aircraft carrier and airwing. As you know our carriers have been visiting Yokosuka regularly for a number of years. The essential difference between these visits and the stationing of an aircraft carrier there would be the introduction of approximately 800 families to the Yokosuka and Yokohama area. We have sufficient on base housing to accommodate approximately 500 of the families and believe that the overflow can be absorbed by the community. We are currently exchanging views with the Department of State on this issue. State has raised the issue of whether formal “prior consultation” would be required and the old issue of public/opposition speculation as to whether nuclear weapons might be aboard. I do not believe that these possible issues should discourage us from proposing to the GOJ our need for the homeporting concept. The move would be visible evidence of our intent to regard seriously our security commitments to Japan and would promote closer ties between our two countries.
The last remaining order of business directly related to the reversion of Okinawa entails relocation of US Naval air units from Naha Air Base and the transfer by June 1973 of the immediate defense mission for the islands. Plans for the latter are progressing smoothly. Plans for relocation of the P–3s have not been implemented as in December 1971, the Government of Japan failed to appropriate the required construction funds. The next move is up to the Japanese. Once appropriations action is taken by the GOJ and construction plans are implemented, both on Okinawa and mainland Japan, we are prepared to uphold our end of the agreement which will relocate this last remaining military operation from Naha airport. Embassy Tokyo believes that the GOJ will act on this issue after the Diet adjourns in June but the matter may be delayed until the anticipated new government is formed.
Lastly, consistent with our basic tenets of stated policy toward Japan, which encourages moderate increases and qualitative improvement in Japan’s defense efforts, you may find an opportunity to discuss ways that Japan might play a more effective national security role. We have long encouraged the GOJ to share a greater portion of the Asian security costs. Their meager expenditures called for in their 4th Defense Build-up Plan continue to amount to less than one percent of Japan’s annual GNP. Possible contributions include Japan’s need to replace obsolete military equipment, incentives for retention of people in uniform, expanded air and submarine defense capability, increased participation in joint exercises, and providing economic and supporting assistance to other needy Asian allies. I believe that Japan can and should [Page 420] make a greater contribution to Asian security from which it reaps substantial benefits.