117. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
MEMORANDUM
- Japan and Russia
The rapprochement in our relations with Peking is a psychological nightmare for Moscow, but one of its more concrete manifestations would be if both Peking and Washington managed to accommodate Tokyo into a new triangular relationship that, in effect, excluded the USSR for what the Soviet leaders consider their rightful place in Asian affairs. But Soviet counters are not that wide-ranging. They can and will try to limit and disrupt Chinese-American relations. But as a long-term contingency the Soviets will have to do their best to conciliate Japan and draw the Japanese into a Soviet rather than Chinese orbit. This process has already begun on the Soviet side. It is proceeding on the economic plane primarily, but the political aspect is moving to the forefront since Gromyko’s visit to Tokyo in January.
Economic Bait
In the wake of the split with Peking, Russia’s largest trading partner in Asia is Japan. But the real lure to the Japanese must be seen as the vast natural resources that could be developed in the Soviet Far East. Thus, the Soviets are pressing joint projects such as development of the Tyumen oil deposits at a cost of around $4 billion which would supply, by a pipeline to Nakhodka, 25–40 million tons a year. In return the Japanese would extend a major credit to the USSR to develop the oil deposits and build the pipeline. A team of Japanese experts will go to Moscow early in May to explore the project. The Japanese are also interested in exploiting the coal deposits of the Soviet Far East, and have already agreed to develop a new port facility.
It is this type of approach—trading the development of Soviet natural resources for Japanese technology and credit that the Soviets hope will have a great appeal in the Japanese economic and business [Page 415] communities, and, therefore, shade over into the Liberal-Democratic Party policies. Soviet indebtedness to Japan and Japanese dependence on imports from the USSR would thus become a link to Tokyo that would be strong reinsurance against Japanese involvement with China. Moreover, in view of the probable increasingly difficult economic relations between the US and Japan, the Soviets would see their own involvement as loosening American ties and, in effect, offering an alternative source to sustain Japan’s obsession with economic growth.
Politics
The economic relationship should not be discounted. Over the long term it could prove a strong wedge for the Soviets. But, basically, the Soviets have to decide whether to make the concession in the political field which would be required by any Japanese government. And this comes down to a straightforward territorial issue.
The Soviets still retain what the Japanese consider their “northern territories—Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands. These islands were supposedly handed over to the USSR at Yalta, though it is not clear that a permanent annexation was contemplated. (We, the US, say military occupation only was envisaged.) The Japanese waived their claim to Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but maintain their claim to the “Northern Territories.” The joint Soviet-Japanese declaration of peace in 1956 did not settle the issue, though the Soviets offered to return Shikotan and the Habomai Islands upon the conclusion of a formal peace treaty. The Japanese, however, held out for the two larger islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu. There the matter rested until last year. (Indeed the Soviets hardened their position by claiming the matter was entirely settled, partly because they feared the implication for their Chinese border if they admitted any territorial revision.)
In the wake of the US-China rapprochement, however, and especially the reversion of Okinawa, the Soviet position has become more and more of a liability, and apparently had to be subordinated to the larger concern of a counteroffensive against Peking. Thus, the Soviets hinted that the question of the islands was not actually closed and, when Gromyko was in Tokyo last January, it was agreed to begin negotiations on a peace treaty “within the year.” Since the Soviets well know that the first issue will be the territorial claims, there is an implication that the Soviets will make concessions rather than deadlock the treaty negotiations.
Peace treaty negotiations will also allow the Soviets to raise larger political issues bearing on Japan’s position in Asia. It is certainly no accident that the Soviets have begun to talk about Asian collective security, and to spell out a few general principles—non-aggression, [Page 416] peaceful co-existence, etc. Presumably, any Soviet-Japanese peace treaty might be an important piece in Soviet development of an Asian grouping linked to the USSR.
It is a cliché to describe Soviet policy as aimed at encircling China. Nevertheless, this is the current thrust of Soviet policy in South Asia, and to some extent in Southeast Asia. For such a policy to make much sense, however, Japan (and the United States) are the key. We would do well to realize that the Soviets have much to offer to Japan, including an implied guarantee of security against China. Despite the traditional Japanese distrust and antipathy toward Russia and its fascination with China, the role of the USSR cannot be discounted in Japanese calculations.
As for the Soviets, it is worth ending on a vignette. Western Sinologists who have talked with their Soviet counterparts report that the common complaint is that the Soviet students are enthusiastically taking up Japanese studies, including the language. When the Sinologists recently appealed to the Government for more money for research, etc., on China, they were turned down in favor of increasing the emphasis on Japan.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 21, HAK Trip Files, HAK’s Japan Visit Jun 1972 [2 of 3]. Confidential. Sent under an April 7 covering information memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger, in which they stated that the attached memorandum “is largely a reminder of how things [especially Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Japan] may appear in Moscow.” Kissinger initialed his receipt on the covering memorandum.↩