115. Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (Meyer) to President Nixon 1

Dear Mr. President,

As my mission to Tokyo draws to a close, please accept my appreciation for the privilege of having served you and our country at this critical juncture at this important capital.

Much nonsense is being written in the newspapers. One myth is that your historic visit to Peking is wrecking our relations with Japan. Another is that our Embassy in Tokyo is “demoralized”.

As you so perceptively pointed out in your Third Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress,2 the July 15 announcement could not but have had repercussions in Japan. It is my conviction that: a) thoughtful Japanese, including Prime Minister Sato and his government, fully appreciate that your Peking visit was a historic breakthrough in the quest for a generation of peace; b) because of Japanese sensitivities and complexes about China, a certain amount of agitation on Japan’s domestic political scene was inevitable; and c) thanks to Anchorage, San Clemente and many other reminders, our pragmatic Japanese friends will continue to attach primary importance to their relationship with the United States, even as both our countries, consulting closely, address the delicate challenge of improving relations with Peking.

Most Japanese realize that a healthy relationship with the United States is indispensable for their country. Consistent with Newton’s laws of gravitation, Japan needs a counterweight to the massive and proximate power of China and the USSR. Also, despite the mirages of potential trade elsewhere, notably with Europe and mainland China, there is for the Japanese no substitute for the enormous American market for their exports.

As to our diplomatic endeavors, this is a world far different from that of Ambassador Grew 35 years ago. Instead of a ship or two per month at Yokohama, nearly 1,000 Americans de-plane daily at Haneda Airport. Aside from the upsurge of tourism, it is only natural that [Page 409] the arrivals include innumerable businessmen, seeking either to do business in Japan or to know how Japan wrought its miracle.

It is also natural that in this shrinking planet, problems are much more multilateral these days. Thus missions by Secretaries Rogers, Connally, Laird and other high-level Washington emissaries are invaluable. Some newsmen speak as though such missions were unorthodox and unthinkable, but such ventures have existed since the days when Silas Deane travelled to Paris soliciting cooperation in our nation’s movement for independence.

I can assure you that this Embassy has welcomed your special emissaries. They have been able to achieve results well beyond bilateral considerations. Our Tokyo mission has enjoyed cooperating with them, backstopping their endeavors, and sending in to Washington a continuous flow of pertinent information. Meanwhile, the Embassy has been keeping busier than ever with the broadening spectrum of bilateral problems, which inevitably has developed between the Free World’s two strongest economic powers.

The foregoing is not to say that our diplomatic intercourse with Japan has been uncomplicated. Our associates in Washington have had diversities of opinions, even as we have had some normal variations in view here. Those with a keen sense of political trends in Japan have been concerned that Japan’s postwar orientation, so favorable to us, might be in jeopardy. Those who so understandably have been preoccupied with sustaining a healthy United States economy, without which Japan’s economic exhilarations cannot last, have favored tough stances.

My own tendency has been to steer the course between Scylla and Charybdis. Tough we should and must be. Also essential is the maintenance of a political regime in Japan cooperating fruitfully with America.

In reviewing my stewardship, I believe we have weathered inescapably adverse historic forces with success. The credit is yours. You understood the importance of negotiating a mutually satisfactory resolution of the Okinawa problem. Its achievement assured the continuation of an American oriented policy in Japan, particularly the automatic extension in 1970 of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (the issue which prompted a volcanic eruption at the conclusion of President Eisenhower’s administration).

While most of our economic problems have had global overtones, we can report that much progress has been made in prying Japan loose from its self-centered policies. The sizeable yen revaluation would not have been predictable a year ago; it would not have occurred without August 15. Meanwhile, much patient but cumulatively notable progress has been made in scaling down restrictionism in Japan’s trade and investment practices.

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Despite adjustments achieved, Japan remains our most formidable economic competitor. As one observer phrases it, “The Japanese are guilty of unfair labor practices; they like to work”. Thus your endeavors to increase American productivity and forestall work-stoppages are of critical importance, if we hope to remain competitive.

There seems little doubt but that for years to come, we shall have serious problems with Japan in the economic field (as was true in Ambassador Grew’s days but now with higher quality Japanese products). Therefore, I am pleased that a fellow Illinoisan, whose credentials include guiding a major American corporation’s interests adroitly and successfully through Japan’s economic labyrinth, will be carrying on the Ambassadorial responsibilities in Tokyo.3

No capital is more important, no Ambassadorial work load more demanding. Having since my arrival invested circa 18 hours per day, I have often thought what is needed here is a four-platoon system: 1) one Ambassador to work the day shift, i.e. a flood of vital paper work plus a full schedule of appointments, including discussions with Japanese officialdom and opinion leaders; 2) one to work the “night shift”, where unlimited social occasions afford abundant opportunities for informal consultations and problem solving; 3) one to take care of the never-ending procession of top-level American visitors, e.g. government officials, leading publishers, company presidents and vice presidents; etc.; and 4) an Ambassador who can escape from the exhausting daily grind to meditate where we are and where we are going.

If a generation of peace is to be achieved, no collaboration is more important than that between our country and Japan. During the past three years some painful adjustments to reality were required. Here in Japan, if anywhere, 1971 was a “watershed year.” I am confident, however, that the linchpin relationship is stronger for it.

In the future we must expect and accept a greater degree of Japanese independence of action. At the same time, our Japanese friends now realize that with strength comes responsibility. I believe we can count on them to work closely with us in architecting the new structure of world peace.

In your historic mission, you know you have not only the well wishes of our Embassy in Tokyo, but those of all mankind.

Respectfully,

Armin Meyer
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 537, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VII, Jan–Apr 1972. Confidential. Kissinger read and initialed the letter and instructed Holdridge to “Make summary for President.” Kissinger also wrote: “Meyer goes out like a pro.” A handwritten notation on an attached note reads: “Draft a nice note from the President to Armin.”
  2. “Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 194–345.
  3. Reference is to Robert Ingersoll.