109. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Meetings with Sato
The Japanese view San Clemente as potentially of great significance to Japan’s adjustment to a changing world order and a less comfortable alliance with the U.S. Sato has weathered a series of rough jolts over the past six months centering on events in the U.S.-Japan relationship—China, the NEP, textiles, and the Chirep debate. Recent polls show [Page 372] his public support at an all-time low. However, the Senate’s strong endorsement of the Okinawa Treaty and the prospect of this meeting have bolstered Sato’s position and eased strains in our relations. There is also a general sense of relief that the textile issue has been settled, and the latest assessments indicate that the Japanese economy will adjust satisfactorily to the currency realignment. Thus, Sato will probably remain in office at least until the reversion of Okinawa.
The Japanese approach San Clemente with a mixture of gratification and uncertainty. Sato hopes the meeting will strengthen his hand for the succession struggle. His objective is to preserve the cohesiveness of the Liberal Democratic Party, now at odds over China, and to pass the leadership to successors who share his policy views. Fukuda remains the immediate heir apparent. Sato will look to conditions governing the reversion of Okinawa for concessions to satisfy his immediate political needs. He hopes to resolve our trade differences beforehand, and to avoid a detailed discussion of trade and monetary problems. He will also be keenly interested in prospects for your visit to Moscow.
For Sato, the focus of the meeting will be your discussion of our intentions with respect to Peking and Taiwan. The Japanese fear and suspect that we have made or will make deals with Peking which, when revealed, will embarrass Japan and alter the Asian situation to Japan’s detriment. Sato will therefore seek as clear a basis as possible for assessing the impact of our China initiative on our security relationship, the future of Taiwan, support for the ROK, Japan’s own prospects vis-à-vis Peking, and how all of these affect domestic Japanese politics.
San Clemente will be a success if Sato leaves reassured that we understand and will protect Japan’s concerns in dealing with Peking, and that there will be future opportunities for similar consultations.
An issues and talking points paper is attached.2
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, VIP Visits, Box 925, Japan, Sato (San Clemente), Jan 72, [2 of 2]. Secret. This memorandum was included in the President’s briefing books for his meeting with Sato at San Clemente, January 6–7, 1972. (Ibid.) A January 6 memorandum from Kissinger, outlined the agenda items that Nixon and Sato were to discuss at the summit. (Ibid.) Kissinger, on the advice of Froebe, rejected a request in a December 29 memorandum from Russell Train, Chairman of the Executive Office of the President’s Council on Environmental Quality, to raise with Sato the issue of excessive hunting of whales. Kissinger suggested in a January 17 memorandum to Train that given the crowded agenda, the problem should be raised “at other levels.” (Both ibid.)↩
- Attached but not printed.↩