105. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Comments and Recommendations of Professor Reischauer on the Current State of U.S.-Japan Relations
At Tab A is a letter2 to you from Professor Edwin O. Reischauer of Harvard, our former Ambassador to Japan, expressing his deep concern over the present state of our relations with Japan. Citing doubt, distrust, and hostility toward the U.S. which he finds building up in Japan and which he asserts could strongly affect the next election there, he sees these two years as a possible watershed in Japan’s relationship with us and the outside world generally.
He recommends greater attention on our part to style and tone in our dealings with Japan (avoiding the straight-forward, frank, tough bargaining approach and relying more on a somewhat slower, less unpredictable, and more consultative approach). He believes that a Japan visit by you could be extremely helpful, but should not take place until Prime Minister Sato has left office. He suggests that you add persons to your staff having a very sensitive feel for Japan.
In an attached statement which he planned to deliver November 8 before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy he elaborated his concerns:
—The Japanese are in the midst of going through two great transitions with us and the rest of the world: (1) assuming international economic responsibility in their trading and financial relations that is commensurate with their new-found status as the world’s third economic power; and (2) adjustment away from assumed subservience to [Page 362] the U.S. in their political and defense relations with us. (Professor Reischauer suggests that we ease this latter transition by giving the Japanese a greater feeling of equality in our political-security relationship, but makes no specific recommendations.)
—These two great transitions merge and interact on the question of Japanese reactions to whether or not the U.S. and other Western nations accept them as full and equal partners. If we do not, the Japanese, feeling discriminated against culturally and racially and rejected, could revert to behavior similar to that of the 1930s.
—On the economic side, if trading blocs and heightened restrictions emerged, Japan might react by attempting to reassert a more exclusive economic domination over other Asian countries.
—On the defense side, if the Japanese lose confidence in our security guarantee and in consequence we lost effective use of Japanese bases and retreated to the mid-Pacific, Japan would probably rearm seriously, which would touch off an arms race in Asia.
Comment: Professor Reischauer has presented something of a “worst case” projection of U.S.-Japanese relations, probably out of his belief that the executive and legislative branches are not sensitive to the drift of our relationship with Japan. While we are certainly not out of the woods in our more troubled relations with Japan of the last year, there is good reason to believe that this trend has bottomed out. We are over the hump on the long-standing nettlesome textile issue, and we will both have to tackle the remaining economic issues with great patience, perseverance, determination, and skill—although I think we should avoid further ultimatums. On China policy, on which we probably gave Japan a greater shock than on our economic initiative, we are in reasonably close touch, and I think Japanese leaders are beginning to realize that the feared millienium in Sino-U.S. relations is not just around the corner.
I would agree with Reischauer that we must continue to pay close heed to our style in relations with Tokyo, trying to accommodate Japanese sensitivities as they adjust to their new role in the world, and at the same time educate them to be more sensitive to some of our unique problems. Both of us can do this without compromising our basic interests.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 537, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VI, October–December 31, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. On November 12, Holdridge sent Reischauer’s letter to Kissinger along with a memorandum to the President, summarizing and commenting upon Reischauer’s remarks, and a courtesy letter that Kissinger signed and sent to Reischauer. (Ibid.)↩
- Attached but not printed. A stamped note on Reischauer’s letter indicates the President saw it. Reischauer also included the statement that he intended to make on November 8 before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy.↩