Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972

104. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 29, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

• Nobuhiko Ushiba, Ambassador of Japan
• Ryohei Murata, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT

• Mr. Kissinger’s Visit to Peking, Chirep Vote in the UN, and US-Japanese Relations

Mr. Kissinger began by confirming his interest in making a visit to Japan. The Japanese press would need to be kept quiet on this, but the visit was definitely on Mr. Kissinger’s schedule and the President had agreed to it.

Ambassador Ushiba mentioned that he had recently met Mr. Kissinger’s brother. When Mr. Kissinger noted that his brother had business connections in Japan, Ambassador Ushiba commented that Mr. Kissinger also had a lot of business there. Mr. Kissinger said that his brother was a great admirer of Japan, and that he himself would also be a great admirer of Japan if only the Ambassador would get off his back. The Ambassador seemed determined to have him an enemy of Japan.

Ambassador Ushiba apologized for having pressed Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Kissinger stated in response that he had wanted to see Ambassador Ushiba, who he assumed wanted to know what had gone on in Peking. Ambassador Ushiba confirmed that this was his intention; he had read Mr. Kissinger’s backgrounder, but wondered if there was anything else which Mr. Kissinger could tell him. Mr. Kissinger noted that he had described the make-up of the Peking party in the backgrounder, which was three-quarters technical. It had looked into such things as how to communicate between Washington and Peking while the President was there in Peking. This would be a terrible problem. In addition we needed to set up communications for the press. A lot of things which Ambassador Ushiba and Mr. Kissinger could settle between themselves here were still a problem in Peking. He had had to explain to the Chinese why we needed so many people in the Presidential party, several hundred, in fact, with so much press, so many telephones, etc. To us, this was not earth-shaking, but the largest party the Chinese had had before was 40, and we were taking several hundred. They had never before had anyone arrive in more than one airplane. Thus, Ambassador Ushiba could see the problem.

On substance, Mr. Kissinger noted, the Chinese went again through much of what they had gone through in July. With respect to Japan, he himself had made a strong pitch on the continuing US-Japanese alliance and the fact that the Mutual Security Treaty remained in full force. Nothing could happen to this as a result of the Peking trip. We placed the greatest emphasis on the Treaty, and as he, Mr. Kissinger, had told Ambassador Ushiba before, we would not give up our relationship with Japan to please our opponents. He had told the Chinese that we wouldn’t give up our friendship with Japan, and Ambassador Ushiba could assure his Prime Minister that there would be nothing coming out of the President’s visit which could be taken in the slightest way as a criticism of Japan, implied or otherwise, even though the Chinese for their part had expressed privately their feelings over the possibility of Japanese expansion.

Ambassador Ushiba wanted to know whom Mr. Kissinger had dealt with in general—was it Chou En-lai? Mr. Kissinger confirmed that he had dealt with Chou En-lai and the Acting Foreign Minister. When Ambassador Ushiba asked the name of the Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Holdridge noted that it was Chi P’eng-fei.

Continuing, Mr. Kissinger indicated that the discussion had indeed been a general one. With the President going to Peking, we had had no interest in making the discussions more specific. Ambassador Ushiba asked, did the question of the agenda for the President’s conversations come up? Mr. Kissinger stated that they would probably insist on discussing Taiwan, but the Ambassador could be assured again that we would not agree to anything that would impair our commitment to anybody. Even if Taiwan were discussed, we would not give up our defense commitment to Taiwan. There would be no cataclysmic changes in our friendships.

Ambassador Ushiba referred to what Mr. Kissinger had said about his not discussing third countries in Peking. Mr. Kissinger observed that we would not try to settle the Vietnam war with Peking, and while they obviously would want to discuss the war, the emphasis throughout would be on bilateral issues. Ambassador Ushiba assumed that one of these issues would be how to normalize US-PRC relations. Mr. Kissinger agreed, and added that another point was how we might continue the US-PRC relationship.

Ambassador Ushiba raised the question of whether economic matters had been discussed, or were these not so important? Mr. Kissinger jokingly remarked that on economic matters the Japanese were getting all the bonuses. We were being accused of betrayal while Japan was cornering the China market. Ambassador Ushiba denied that Japan was trying to corner this market. Mr. Kissinger went on to say that economics had not been the principal item discussed. It had been raised to some extent, but not much.

Ambassador Ushiba asked, had cultural matters and the exchange of persons been discussed? Mr. Kissinger said, “yes.”

Ambassador Ushiba expressed the opinion that the President’s visit to Peking was too much of an event just to stick to a discussion of bilateral relations. Mr. Kissinger declared that we would, of course, discuss general views of the world, but the settlement of bilateral affairs would take precedence.

Ambassador Ushiba inquired about the timing of the President’s visit—would March be the date? Mr. Kissinger replied that the date would be selected very soon.

Ambassador Ushiba remarked that Mr. Kishi regretted not to have been able to see Mr. Kissinger, and sent his best. Mr. Kissinger remarked that he would hope to see Mr. Kishi when he went to Japan.²

Ambassador Ushiba surmised that the Soviet Union had certainly been discussed by Mr. Kissinger and the Chinese in Peking. Mr. Kissinger dismissed this by saying that the Chinese problems with the Soviets were of no concern to us, and vice versa. The biggest Sino-Soviet problems were ideological, and there was also a border dispute. We didn’t care where the border should be, and would not get involved. Ambassador Ushiba wondered whether this had really been made clear?

Of course, the Chinese views of the Soviets were of a different nature. Mr. Kissinger observed that we all had an interest in a peaceful Soviet Union as well as in a peaceful China, but the location of the border was their affair—whether the Ussuri River or some place else. Did the Japanese have an opinion on this? Ambassador Ushiba disclaimed any interest in the border situation. He wanted to know, though, whether the Chinese were trying to find a peaceful solution with the Soviets. Mr. Kissinger stated that they indeed were. If a war started, it would not be by the Chinese.

Ambassador Ushiba felt that the Chinese would be unwilling to give up their political and ideological position. Mr. Kissinger agreed. It was his guess that Sino-Soviet relations would remain rather cool. It was almost inconceivable that a Sino-Soviet conflict would be provoked by Peking. Mr. Kissinger jokingly observed that Ambassador Ushiba should be the one to go to Peking. Ambassador Ushiba always attacked frontally, while he, Mr. Kissinger, used an oblique approach. He followed the Asian way, once he understood it.

Ambassador Ushiba laughed, and said that he would like to ask one last question about the Soviet Union. Were the Chinese very afraid about a military attack? Mr. Kissinger said that this was his impression. Ambassador Ushiba expressed the view that the Chinese were living under constant pressure, and Mr. Kissinger remarked that this was also his impression.

Ambassador Ushiba wondered whether Mr. Kissinger had any impressions of the domestic political situation in the PRC. Mr. Kissinger asserted that he couldn’t tell—he had seen nothing which proved one thing or another. As far as the leaders whom he had met were concerned, there had been no change since last summer. Chou En-lai appeared to be in complete control, and with respect to the foreign policy part of the President’s visit, while he had said before that he had to check with Mao, this time, except for one item, he always made the decision himself. He had made a big point of putting us on public display, and we had been accompanied not simply by protocol personnel but by senior members of the Government and Party such as Yeh Chien-ying. Yeh had met him, Mr. Kissinger, at the airport; had taken him to Peking opera where he had applauded him and other members of the U.S. party; and had taken him to the Summer Place [Palace?]. Everywhere he and the party had gone, people could see that they were being escorted by senior personnel. Ambassador Ushiba found it very interesting that the Chinese people could see Mr. Kissinger together with such senior Chinese leaders. Mr. Kissinger jokingly attributed this to his charming personality.

Ambassador Ushiba wanted confirmation of the fact that Mr. Kissinger hadn’t known of the UN voting before he left Peking. Mr. Kissinger explained that the voting had taken place at the precise moment he had left Peking. The party had departed from the guest house at 9:30 a.m., and arrived at the plane at 10:15 a.m., which was exactly the time of the vote. The Chinese had not informed him about the voting, which was right because it had happened just before the departure. He had learned afterwards that the vote was completed ten minutes before the party had left.

Ambassador Ushiba referred to the fact that there had been some press play alleging that Mr. Kissinger’s presence in Peking had adversely affected the voting. Mr. Kissinger retorted that some of his colleagues in Washington had not discouraged this view. However, it was a malicious, outrageous lie. Why would we not want to win the vote? It would be nothing but trouble to have the Chinese in the UN, because they would do and say many things in New York which could cause problems for us. We didn’t want Taiwan out of the UN, and had established this position weeks before. Despite the shameful stories being put out, Mr. Kissinger declared, it could be argued that his being in Peking would show that we could still have good relations with the PRC while trying to keep it out of the UN.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the Belgian vote, with respect to which he had told our people that the Belgians would never vote with us. The same was true for Cyprus. In Cyprus, where the population was divided between Turks and Greeks, there was no conceivable interest in dual representation; in Belgium, the population was divided between the Walloons and the Flemings. We were always counting countries which would never vote with us.³

Ambassador Ushiba mentioned that some countries abstained instead of voting in favor of the resolution, for example Morocco and Chile. Mr. Kissinger noted that Morocco was going to vote “no,” but the President personally called the King and moved him from a no vote to abstention. Nobody could tell him, Mr. Kissinger, that what he had subsequently done in Peking could have affected the King’s decision. When Ambassador Ushiba questioned whether the Belgians might have been affected by Mr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking, Mr. Kissinger retorted that the Belgians were saying this just as an excuse, and this was just a cheap little stunt. The Belgian Foreign Minister was all right, but the Government was too weak.

Ambassador Ushiba observed that the circumstances of the UN vote and Mr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking had caused a lot of trouble in Tokyo. Mr. Kissinger explained that the timing of his visit had been set when he thought that the UN vote would probably be in the middle of November. In fact, he had been assured by some of his colleagues in Washington that the vote would not take place before November 1, and if it could have been held 5 or 6 days after his return, he could have given the press a briefing to the effect that the U.S. could be on good terms with the PRC while still voting for dual representation in the United Nations. However, the vote had then been moved up.

Mr. Kissinger, asking Ambassador Ushiba not to repeat what he said, went on to note that he didn’t understand why there had been night sessions, and nobody had given him an explanation of why the voting was so early. It should have been possible to control that madhouse, and he was personally outraged. He had wanted to win, and was absolutely convinced that going to Peking could have been turned into a plus, for example by explaining how well he had been treated at the same moment Secretary Rogers was lining up votes. He had had every intention of making such a statement, and had received a written assurance that the vote would not take place before October 29, and with luck, Monday, November 1. It was only while in Peking that he had heard the vote would be earlier.

Ambassador Ushiba asked, would the timing of the President’s visit be fixed soon? Mr. Kissinger said that the date would be picked by the end of the month. Ambassador Ushiba pressed on the agenda—there would, he assumed, be questions of bilateral relations and a general view? Mr. Kissinger replied in the affirmative. He would let the Ambassador and Prime Minister Sato know.

Ambassador Ushiba inquired when Mr. Kissinger could come to Japan. Mr. Kissinger said that he was thinking of December or early January. Ambassador Ushiba asked how he could be of assistance in this, to which Mr. Kissinger replied, “by keeping quiet.” Ambassador Ushiba suggested that Mr. Kissinger might be invited by a private organization. Mr. Kissinger stated that this was how he wanted it done, but he had the means himself to make the arrangements, and would tell the Ambassador about them when the time came. He did not want any press stories. Ambassador Ushiba assured Mr. Kissinger that there would be no leak.

Mr. Kissinger raised the question of whether it would still be useful for him to go to Japan even after his most recent China visit. Ambassador Ushiba explained that people in Japan thought Mr. Kissinger was such a “great planner,” but if he showed himself in Tokyo he could demonstrate that he was an ordinary human being and not a superman. As things now stood, people in Tokyo thought that everything had been planned by Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Kissinger wondered how he could demonstrate that he was not engaged in planning, to which Ambassador Ushiba replied, “by your charm.” This would be a good thing for Mr. Kissinger, and it would also be quite profitable for him to see Japan. Mr. Kissinger asserted that he would like to go, and let the Japanese people know what an absurd position they had put him in. U.S. intellectuals attacked him for being too anti-Communist, and our Japanese friends attacked him for selling them out to the Communists. But he would try to come, and in fact was going to come. Was Ambassador Ushiba’s Prime Minister still going to be in office, though? Ambassador Ushiba said he didn’t know. The UN voting was a very serious blow, and there had already been two no-confidence votes. Nevertheless, if there was a real crisis, the Party would rally around him, as had been the case with the Okinawa issue. Ambassador Ushiba did not want to make a prediction, but felt that Sato’s position was assured until the Okinawa Reversion Treaty passed. Mr. Kissinger asked if the Japanese were going to ratify the Treaty only after the U.S. had ratified it. Ambassador Ushiba disclaimed any such intention on Japan’s part.

Mr. Kissinger wondered whether January would be a bad time for him to go to Japan, to which Ambassador Ushiba replied that January would be satisfactory, although some of the Ministers might not be available. Mr. Kissinger then remarked that he would come either in the first half of January or the first half of December. Ambassador Ushiba said that the Reversion Treaty should pass the Lower House by mid-November, and even if the Upper House didn’t pass the measure, it would become law after one month. In conclusion, Ambassador Ushiba suggested to Mr. Kissinger that the two get together at the Ambassador’s house for lunch from time to time. Mr. Kissinger thought that this would be a good idea.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 537, Country Files, Far East, Japan, Vol. VI, October–December 31, 1971. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. Kissinger approved the memorandum of this conversation after editing a passage that had created the misleading impression that he had met with Kishi. The previous day, Holdridge had sent Kissinger talking points for his meeting with Ushiba. (Ibid.)
2. Kissinger was in the People’s Republic of China at the time of Kishi’s October 22 meeting with President Nixon. See Henry Kissinger White House Years, p. 779.
3. Apparent reference to Chinese representation issue.